



Risks of a Stalemate in the European Union

A Macro-Geography of Public Opinion

Petr Dostál





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RISKS OF A STALEMATE
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
A MACRO-GEOGRAPHY
OF PUBLIC OPINION

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This book is dedicated to the late Professor Dr. Willem F. Heinemeijer of the University of Amsterdam, who introduced the author to the intriguing fields of political ecology and political geography.

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Preface

This book has been strongly influenced by my own direct experiences with life in the evolving European Communities and, since 1993, in the European Union. Living thirty years in the Netherlands provided me with an excellent opportunity to experience many remarkable and attractive aspects there, along with certain challenging uncertainties, which have been characteristic of European integration processes. The removal of the Iron Curtain opened the door for free and intensive scientific co-operation with my Prague colleagues. Particularly fertile co-operation with my colleagues in the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development at the Faculty of Science of Charles University in Prague sharpened ideas I had developed concerning the processes of post-communist transformation and possible challenges of the accession of the Czech Republic into the European Union. My move to the Department in Prague, in September 1998, has provided new and more intensive opportunities to experience the intricacies of the enlarging European Union, from the other side of the former geopolitical divide of the continent. Naturally, being a political geographer, I have decided to focus my research in Prague, among other things, on a variety of complex issues surrounding the European integration processes.

Research concerning European integration processes and the consequences of the accession of Czechia into the European Union is one of four major parts of the research programme “Geographical systems and risk processes in context of global changes and European integration” granted by the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MSM0021620831) to Charles University in Prague and carried out in the Geography Section of the Faculty of Science. The research programme began in 2005 and this book is a result of my involvement in this comprehensive research programme. I also feel it necessary to acknowledge the support that the European Commission (currently the Directorate General Communication) is giving to research on European integration through requesting, co-ordinating and publishing Standard and Special Eurobarometer public opinion surveys. This book draws upon the rich data sources of a number of these public opinion surveys. Five chapters of this book draw on articles I have previously published or parts thereof. These articles have been significantly revised and updated.

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Finally I want to thank Jiřina and our daughter Šárka for their acceptance of my being either absent-minded or locked up in my study room.

Petr Dostál

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1. Introduction

“Our conclusions as historian, political scientist and geographer have one thing in common: a caveat not to forget the limitations of human nature and the inertia of basic human values, as we live through an era of dramatic and unprecedented changes in technical range. Depending on disciplinary background, we may emphasize different aspects of human reach, be it identity, democratic values or sense of place. But we do agree that mental structures can prove to be barriers to rapid technological and organizational change.” (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000, p. 188)

“We live in a world of transformations, affecting almost every aspect of what we do. For better or worse, we are being propelled into a global order that no one fully understands, but which is making its effects felt upon all of us. Globalisation may not be a particularly attractive or elegant word.” (Giddens 2002, pp. 6–7)

These two quotations have been chosen in order to draw attention to processes and issues that comprise the focus of the theoretical and empirical considerations of this book. First, the crucial importance of differentiations in mental structures and articulations of mass values and public opinion across the political units of the enlarged European Union (EU) with twenty-five member states (the EU25) is emphasised. The May 2004 enlargement brought ten new member states into the EU, which at that time included fifteen member states. This so-called ‘big bang’ enlargement was of fundamental historical importance. It incorporated eight post-communist countries and inevitably increased the diversity and complexity of the EU. This incorporation justifies the specific focus of this book on the macro-geography of the enlarged EU of twenty-five countries. The subsequent January 2007 incorporation of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU, merely further extended this historical enlargement with the post-communist countries. The multi-layer structure of regional, national and European identities of the twenty-five polities is changing. Consequently, the macro-geography of identities and associated articulations of public opinion across the twenty-five polities is also changing. Second, accelerated interactions and interdependences evolve in the global system, which tend to increase as economic, social and cultural relationships continue to stretch worldwide. Indeed, the

EU as a whole and each of its member states are propelled into a changing global order. Globalisation processes were enhanced, in Europe, by the 1989 fall of the Iron Curtain and have subsequently had a tendency to lead to new socio-economic inequalities across the enlarging EU. Finally and simultaneously, there are a variety of tasks, necessitating co-operation in the EU, which have resulted from the increased diversity in the EU, brought on by the May 2004 enlargement with ten new member states. This intricate combination of circumstances seems to have created a stalemate in the enlarged European Union. This stalemate implies the existence of uncertainties about further European integration processes and even indicates the risk that necessary socio-economic and institutional transformations in the enlarged European Union will involve protracted and difficult changes. Therefore, a key aim of this book is to explore whether sufficient support was articulated throughout the twenty-five polities for the primary, future, European integration processes: (i) the deepening of integration and (ii) enlargement through the accession of new member states (i.e. widening). Accordingly, there are at least four circumstances that have seemingly contributed to the emerging stalemate and to various associated aspects of stagnation. First, challenges have arisen for the EU as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain, at the end of the 1980s, leading to the incorporation of ten new member states, in May 2004. Second, the pressures of globalisation and uncertainties concerning the geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances of the global system, in which the European integration processes have to evolve, are intensifying. Third, there have been challenges stemming from socio-economic adaptations to the shift from the industrialisation era towards the new conditions of a post-industrial economy and society. Fourth, issues concerning articulations of insufficient public opinion support for the primary European integration processes have arisen.

In the last two decades, important changes have taken place in the macro-geography of Europe. The post-war geopolitical and geo-economic envelope, revolving around the Soviet orbit, collapsed and the fall of the Iron Curtain resulted in unparalleled institutional, economic and geographical changes in East-Central and Eastern Europe. Three communist federations (i.e. the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) fragmented and fifteen restored or entirely new states emerged within the continent. The former Soviet dominated regimes languished and collapsed during a surprisingly short period from 1989 to 1991. Most of the nations in the eastern part of the continent initiated difficult institutional transformations from statist-socialist regimes and economies towards the pluralism of an open democratic society and the diversified structure of economic property forms, in which the private sector and the market system of resource allocation perform pivotal roles (Dostál 1997, 1998a, 1998b).

It was not overly surprising, after 1989, that the widening process of the EU continued with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, in January



Figure 1 - The twenty-five member states of the enlarged European Union

1995, and the accession of Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, in May 2004 (Fig. 1). By necessity, these two waves in the widening process were also geopolitical responses from the political elites of the old member states of the EU to new post-Iron Curtain developments in Europe. It also must be noted that the March 1999 inclusion of Czechia, Hungary and Poland as well as the May 2004 inclusion of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) significantly supported the decision-making of political elites of the member states concerned, to incorporate these post-communist states into the EU. The political elites of the old member states recognised the strategic value of NATO defensive membership (Dinan 2005; Brimmer, Fröhlich 2005; Emerson 1998).

Since its very beginning in the 1950s, the rationale of the European integration process has largely been seen in ideas considering the integration of the European market economy (Dinan 2005, McCormick 2005, Rosamond 2000). Yet, as early as the beginning of the 1990s, Musil accurately pointed out that “the theory of European integration based on the principles of the market economy and Weberian rationality, however, reaches the limits of its potential. These limits became apparent with the development of industrial societies, which had to face growing demands for popular political participation and for the democratic legitimisation of all kinds of organisational structures. Integration is not only a question of a functioning market, efficiency, organisation and growing interdependence; it is also one of human values, goals and attitudes towards power relations” (Musil 1994, p. 13). This is an important claim, which also indicates the nature of the analytical and explanatory orientation of this book. Because this view adequately emphasises the achievement of a necessary balance in the European integration process, between (i) functional integration, directed at the creation of an effective and efficient common market and (ii) normative integration, orientated at articulations of broader, socio-cultural changes in the existing plurality of national, regional and local cultures and identities, and stresses the importance of mutual tolerance among the polities of the enlarged EU. The normative integration process is concerned with changing differentiations in public opinion on geopolitical sentiments and identity, describing political opinions and mass interest articulations, which are central to studies on European integration (see also Duchesne, Frogner 1995; Sinnott 1995; Wessels 1995; McLaren 2007).

Since the 1989 fall of the Soviet orbit, the reintegration of Europe has been largely orchestrated by the European Union. The key claim of this book is that both deepening processes (i.e. more intensive political and economic integration) and widening processes (i.e. enlargement) must be sustained with sufficient support coming from the polities (i.e. electorates) of the democratic countries concerned. Public opinion and mass interest articulations are central to studies on European integration, because they provide important feedback from electorates, often implying barrier effects on governing political elites. It is clear that necessary public support for the European integration process has to develop in both the old member states as well as the new member states of the enlarged European Union. Accordingly, one of the key questions to be considered in this book is whether important divisions in political opinion are emerging between the electorates of the fifteen old member states, on the one hand (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, The United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Austria and Finland), and, on the other hand, the electorates of the ten new member states (i.e. Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).

Globalisation processes have, at least since the end of the 1980s, led to new social inequalities (Milanovic 2005) and have also been reflected in EU politics and in the lives of citizens of the member states. Changing conditions of economic growth and mass value orientations of populations in the rich “western” civilizations of the EU are of special significance and have shown a tendency to increase the importance of subjective factors (human and social capital), on the one hand, and the articulation of so-called post-materialist value orientations, on the other (Inglehart 1997). Recently, stress placed upon globalisation processes has tended to emphasise external pressures as the source of social and cultural changes taking place in various, individual countries. The challenges of socio-economic adaptations, associated with the shift from the industrialisation era towards the current conditions of a post-industrial economy and society, have arisen. According to Inglehart and Welzel, the shift to a post-industrial economy and society “brings even more favourable existential conditions than industrialization, making people economically more secure, intellectually more autonomous, and socially more independent than ever. This emancipative process gives people a fundamental sense of human autonomy, leading them to give a higher priority to freedom of choice and making them less inclined to accept authority and dogmatic truths” (Inglehart, Welzel 2005, p. 29). It is therefore important to incorporate various impacts of public opinion, resulting from the shift from an industrial society and economy towards post-industrial societal and economic structures and associated so-called post-materialist value orientations of the polities concerned into the analyses of the public opinion regarding European integration processes carried out in this book. For instance, Hix argued “that greater understanding of and information about the EU” of individual with the post-materialist value orientation “will lead to greater awareness of its failings and limitations, such as the lack of democratic accountability, the secrecy of decision-making and corruption in the EU budget” (Hix 2005, p. 162). In other words, such awareness can result in articulations of more Eurosceptic public opinion about European integration processes and can lead to insufficient public opinion for European integration processes. The post-industrial stage brings a further acceleration of economic development and broadly conceived democratisation processes to society (Giddens 1994, 2002). It is important to emphasise early, in the context of this introductory chapter, that the shift towards post-materialist values and associated attitudes is occurring in life priorities, such as self-expression, quality of life and environmental concerns (see the more detailed discussion in chapter 2). Post-materialist value orientations also imply critical attitudes towards authority, as well as the more critical and more difficult task for political elites to influence public opinion (see Inglehart, Wenzel 2005). This book will explore whether the twenty-five polities of the enlarged EU have tended to be influenced significantly by post-materialist value orientations and whether the shift to post-materialist

value orientations in the polities concerned has tended to result in coherent critical approaches to European integration processes across the twenty-five polities. This question will be considered in most of the following chapters of this book.

It is, indeed, crucial to understand the fact that these sorts of challenges to European integration processes are emerging more or less simultaneously. Globalisation processes, post-industrial, socio-economic transformations and the shift towards post-materialist values are general changes that are taking place with different intensities in all regions of the global system and also, in particular, in the current EU. However, pressures of the post-totalitarian transformation have, since the beginning of the 1990s, clearly been specific factors within the set of post-communist countries (Dostál 1998b) and they present research, concerned with tendencies in public opinion articulations across the enlarged EU, with additional specific intricacies in studies of post-communist societies in the eight member states concerned (i.e. Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).

This book seeks to demonstrate that articulations of public opinion across the twenty-five polities of the enlarged EU can be understood in terms of coherent systematic tendencies. The book explores cross-national variations at the polity-level. The fact that values and articulations of opinion at the individual level can be characterised by central tendencies (average values), which represent authentic characteristics at the level of the polities concerned and which tend to have impacts on other characteristics at the polity level in ways that cannot be reflected at the individual level, is stressed. Accordingly, Inglehart and Welzel rightly explained that “in order to examine relationships between the political system and political culture, one must aggregate individual-level values to the national level” (Inglehart, Welzel 2005, p. 11).

The primary aim of this book is to provide some empirical evidence on tendencies for differentiation across the polities of the enlarged EU, in terms of public opinion and mass interest articulations at the polity-level, considering a variety of issues arising from European integration processes and associated political, economic and environmental developments. Most of the data used in this book are derived from public opinion surveys which are published in the form of Standard, Specific or Flash Eurobarometers and which are requested, co-ordinated and published by the Directorate General Communication of the European Commission. The various public opinion analyses made in this book utilise multivariate statistical methods, which enable one to postulate explanatory models with a large number of variables (see Saris, Stronkhorst 1984; Rummel 1970). Thus, the variables primarily represent differences in public opinion across the twenty-five countries, but structural variables that specify important differences concerning the set of twenty-five countries in certain important characteristics, such as aspects of the socio-economic situation, number of years of experience with the EU membership, etc., are also incorporated.

Chapter 2 presents different conceptualisations concerning the character of the EU. Three major approaches are considered (see also Rosamond 2000). First, supranational approaches, which conceptualise the EU as a structure of supranational institutions that are political actors in their own right, are reviewed. Second, intergovernmental approaches are considered. These claim that member states are the key actors in the integration process and that supranational EU institutions such as the European Commission, European Parliament or Council of Ministers only assist and facilitate bargaining processes among the member states. Moreover, these approaches emphasise the fact that supranational laws at the EU level reflect the interests of the most powerful states. The third category includes confederal-consociational approaches, which perceive the EU as a consociational system with significant veto rights belonging to the political elites of member states. Such approaches stress the importance of proportional representation in EU institutional bodies and procedures. These approaches recognise the crucial importance of the segmental effects of member states' territorial boundaries and also place great emphasis on the importance of the cultural systems of polities (i.e. electorates) in the countries concerned. This third type of approach also recognises the significance of the fact that there a well-integrated EU-wide polity is yet to emerge (Taylor 1991, Chrysschoou 1998). This book demonstrates that this third type of approach is the most attractive, providing sufficient room for interpretations of the differences in articulations of public opinion across the EU. In light of the fact that the major objective of this book is to make a series of complementary, multivariate analyses of public opinion across the enlarged EU, it is important to understand that the confederal-consociational system of the current EU is not based on the assumption of the existence of a common EU-wide, well-integrated polity, because the electoral representation process of the European Parliament is primarily linked to the political affairs of the various member states and rooted in territorial cleavages among the nation-states concerned. Chapter 2 also specifies the basic methodological and statistical techniques used in the complementary, multivariate explanatory models postulated in this book.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the westward geopolitical orientation of public opinion regarding the European Union, in a set of nineteen post-communist countries, in 1996. It considers several geopolitical options which the political elites of the countries, in question, had at that stage of the changing macro-geography of the post-communist part of the continent. The analysis highlights the importance of the much demanding option of integration in the form of full-fledged EU membership. An explanatory analysis is made of differences in public opinion, in 1996 and considering future, closer ties with the EU. The statistical LISREL modelling indicates the importance of differentiation as a crucial factor in the democratisation process. Examination reveals that the basic split in westward and eastward (closer ties with Russia) public opinion orientation in the mid-1990s showed a long-lasting cleavage

in public opinion articulation, indicating a new geopolitical and geo-economic fault line in the post-communist part of the European continent.

Chapter 4 provides an analysis of differences across the EU15 in support for Czechia's EU membership, in 2000. The outcomes of a postulated explanatory model show that there is an important positive effect of differences in post-materialist value orientations on public opinion across the fifteen countries, which supported Czech membership at different levels. This statistical examination is made in the wider context of changing public opinion in Czechia. Chapter 5 surveys differences in public opinion, opposing the draft of a Treaty on EU constitution, in 2004. The statistical explanatory analysis is explicitly concerned with public opinion tendencies that pointed to an emerging stalemate in the European integration process, resulting in a blockade of any further deepening process in 2005. These public opinion tendencies later resulted in the rejection of the draft of an EU constitution in France and in the Netherlands, in May and June 2005, among other things, and expressed existing and considerable tensions in public opinion articulations across the enlarged EU.

Chapter 6 focuses on important differences in public opinion and associated attitudes regarding energy consumption in the enlarged EU, in autumn 2005. EU policy-making has been confronted with the task of responding to new and complex energy challenges, under the pressure of uncertain globalisation processes and geopolitical circumstances, beset by considerable risks. The postulated model explaining systematic differences in public opinion regarding energy consumption across the EU's twenty-five polities indicates crucial polarisations in opinion and attitudes. A polarisation is specified between the political option, orientated on the EU level of policy-making, and the option, orientated on individual member state level. During autumn 2005, a polarisation also appeared between negative attitudes regarding new energy issues and positive attitudes in anticipation of certain necessary adaptations concerning energy consumption and habits. The explanatory modelling also considers the systematic impacts of differences in negative views regarding globalisation, across the twenty-five polities, tending to prefer national level of energy policies. Modelling also indicates systematic tendencies in public opinion in the wealthier member states to shift towards post-materialist values and preferences for national level of policy-making concerned with energy consumption and production. Moreover, the explanatory model used in chapter 6 indicates that differences in public opinion across the EU, in autumn 2005, did not tend to sufficiently support the development of strong energy policies at the EU level. This analysis also indicates the emerging features of a stalemate in European integration processes.

Chapter 7 addresses a complex group of interconnected empirical questions. First, differences across the twenty-five polities in public opinion, concerning widening (i.e. further EU enlargement) and deepening processes,

are considered. Four basic types of public opinion in the enlarged EU have emerged and these are characterised as Integrationist, Institutional, Eurosceptic and Europractical views. They were articulated in different subsets of the twenty-five polities, in autumn 2005. Second, differences in public opinion, concerned with challenging options of differentiated integration in the EU, in the form of a two-speed European Union, are considered. This is based on influential views at the level of political elites from certain member states, claiming that the development of a two-speed or 'flexible' EU would enable the accommodation of a variety of issues, arising from the increasing diversity of the EU through its enlargements. A postulated explanatory model indicates a lack of public opinion support for this 'core-periphery' option in the evolving macro-geography of EU. The modelling also indicates that with higher levels of post-materialist value orientation, support for deepening of the EU tends to decrease. However, the statistical modelling also shows that, in autumn 2005, some reasons for an EU constitution were expressed through public opinion, which supported further development of the EU's political union.

Finally, chapter 8 summarises the main findings concerning the macro-geography of public opinion across the enlarged EU, in the context of globalisation challenges and tendencies towards post-materialist value orientation. Especially, findings from the autumn 2005 survey warn against excessive optimism about further deepening and widening of the EU, because the complementary statistical analyses made in this book indicate various aspects of a stalemate regarding EU development. Naïve beliefs, assuming that the political elites, representing the polities concerned, can successfully decide about the institutional design of further core-periphery development of the EU or about further significant deepening and widening processes, without a sufficient support in public opinion across the enlarged EU, must be avoided.

2. The current European Union as a confederal consociational system: theoretical and methodological considerations

2.1. Introduction

Already in 1957, Deutsch and his colleagues remarked that the term “union” appears to be an attractive label because of its ambiguity. It conveys to some the idea of federation, confederation to others, and or close alliance among independent states to yet others. Given the focus of this book, it is interesting to note that, by integration, Deutsch and his associates meant “the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population” (Deutsch et al. 1957, p. 5). Naturally, public opinion and mass interest articulations, regarding the European integration process, also reflect this ambiguity. Therefore, it is necessary to add another definition, which also emphasises the need for the effective formation of a new supra-national, European polity, that can provide a strong basis for the European integration process. Accordingly, Christiansen describes integration as the “creation of a new polity bringing together a number of different constituent parts (member states)” (Christiansen 2001, p. 580). This brief definition is useful, because it emphasises one key characteristic of the enlarged EU, with twenty-five polities: the significant lack of a well-integrated EU-wide polity. It seems that the Copenhagen European Council meeting of June 1993 recognised this weakness in the European integration process and established three general EU criteria for evaluations of accession candidates: (i) stability of institutions of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities, (ii) the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU, and (iii) the ability to assume the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (EC 2000, pp. 9–10). Clearly, these criteria have to facilitate political pressures on candidate countries in order to realise a minimum homogeneity across the enlarging EU, in terms of certain essential political, economic and other affairs.

The importance of the lack of a well-integrated EU polity might be indicated through descriptions of three main approaches in attempting to specify the significant characteristics of the European Union (see Taylor 1991; Jönsson, Tågil, Törnqvist 2000; Christiansen 2001; Schmidt 2002; Rosamond 2000; Costa, Magnette 2003). Two sorts of traditional approaches have had the most influence on discussions concerning the nature of European integration: supranational and intergovernmental approaches (see Table 1).

Table 1 – Three approaches to the European Union

Supranational approaches	Intergovernmental approaches	Confederal con-sociationalist approach
Incremental integration process is leading to increasing authority at the EU level and is largely based upon the neo-fuctionalist spillover idea of positive feedbacks enhancing further economic and political integration.	Member states remain largely sovereign and can basically protect their national interests; EU integration is understood in terms of a succession of bargaining processes among member states.	EU institutions and procedures enable member states to arrive at co-operative joint decision-making at the Union level; institutions such as European Council and Council of Ministers, are sites for accommodation between national political elites.
EU institutions become autonomous political actors; deepening economic integration creates the need for further EU institutionalisation required by increasing regulatory complexity.	The EU institutions enable and assist bargaining processes among member states; the role of technocratic and political elites and domestic politics is important.	Compromise and consensus-building is sought among political elites (governments) of member states; the higher the stake involved in a decision, the higher the propensity of states to insist on joint consensual rule.
The EU legislation provides effective constraints for the policies-making and decision-making of individual member states;	The EU forms a framework for the execution of inter-state politics by alternative means of intergovernmental treaty reforms, policy-making and (budgetary) agreements.	Population proportionality serves as the basic standard for the allocation of votes if majority rule is required; but the qualified right of mutual veto is a crucial procedure;
Integration is, in part, driven by institutional dynamics which is based upon functional pressures arising primarily from economic interests.	Negotiation processes reflect interests of the member states; interstate bargain can lead to positive-sum outcomes.	Territorial bounders of member states define segmental limits of their electorates and political elites (national governments);
A new polity above the member state level is gradually emerging and tending to constitute an EU-wide polity.	EU legislation reflects the interests of the most powerful member states (usually those of Germany and France).	Cultural systems of the individual member states are defined as subjective systems of institutions, beliefs, values and attitudes; a new well-integrated European polity is not emerging.

Sources: Rosamond 2000, pp. 105–156; Chryschoou 1998, pp. 171–200; Taylor 1991

2.2. Supranational approaches

Supranational approaches are based upon the assertion that integration theory, in relation to the EU, has to be focused on the establishment of supranational institutions and their associated procedures, which have their own important tasks and competencies of policy-making and decision-making. In essence, emphasis is placed upon the capacity of EU institutional actors to enforce some decisions and procedures on member states (Rosamond 2000, pp. 126–127). According to the supranational approaches gradualism is emphasised in the European integration process:

1. gradual increase of competencies focused on responsibilities in specific fields of common EU institutions including broader sectors of socio-economic and political affairs; initial economic integration tends to create two types of pressure to widen the scope and intensity of integration: (a) economic spillovers lead to demands for further economic integration in order to facilitate extension of existing gains, (b) political spillovers result in the creation of supranational actors, who tend to favour more intensive integration
2. gradual increase in the number of decisions made by a qualified majority vote, based upon the agreement of national governments to give up their veto rights concerning a broader spectrum of policy-making and accept procedures of qualified majority voting
3. steady extension of parliamentary powers, giving the European parliament more significant competences to scrutinise EU institutions and pass EU-wide legislation
4. the EU legislation offers effective constraints for the policy-making of member states
5. supranational functional perspective emphasises decreasing importance of national actors (governments of member states) and neo-functional perspective stresses gradually increasing importance of non-state and sub-national actors.

It is obvious that these five aspects of gradualism are understood in terms of the EU's deepening process. It is also evident that the gradualism tendencies have expanded the powers of common institutions of the EU, from economic affairs to political and social affairs. However, the supranational approaches, provide a formalist and largely normative interpretations of the EU system. The normative interpretation tends to underscore the importance of the actual roles of EU institutional actors and national actors and their interactive behaviour. The supranational conceptualisations do not sufficiently stress the multi-level nature of the policy-making and decision-making that is so typically a characteristic of EU operations, in reality. It is also important to note that the supranational approaches are Euro-optimistic. They are

inclined to underestimate the important role of a wide range of interest articulating groups in the actual operation of EU institutions, as well as utilisation of procedures and, significantly, articulations of tensions between the political opinions of national elites and general public opinions of national electorates and also across the twenty-five EU polities (Chrysoschoou 1998; Rosemond 2000, pp. 105–129).

2.3. Intergovernmental approaches

Intergovernmental approaches give great stress upon the importance of member state-centric interpretations and, consequently, these approaches are more realistic ones. Liberal intergovernmental theory considers national preference formation and strategic bargaining processes among EU member states. This conceptualisation also incorporates much empirical material into analyses from real EU operations. It is emphasised that national political interests emerge in the EU member states through domestic political conflicts. The formation of domestic and supranational coalitions, and social interest group formation and competition are central topics of intergovernmentalist research. An in-depth analysis of national politics is seen as a prerequisite to analyses concerning the strategic relationships among EU member states (Moravcsik 1993, Rosemond 2000). The EU institutions and procedures are perceived as the provider of a structure for the execution of inter-state politics by different policies and decision-making. Such approaches tend also to claim that the EU legislation reflects the particular interests of the most powerful countries (which are usually considered to be Germany, France or the United Kingdom). EU institutional actors assist and facilitate bargaining among national governments. Therefore, a big number of analyses in the intergovernmental perspective have explored the interactions between national governments and EU institutional actors. The contributions made in terms of the intergovernmentalism come closer to realistically assessing the complexities of the EU's system of institutions, procedures and the behaviour of actors at national and EU levels. However, the fact that they do not capture all key features and functioning of the EU system remains clear (Rosemond 2000, pp. 146–147).

2.4. Confederal consociational approaches

As a result of the historical institutional evolution of the European Communities (EC) and of the EU, since the beginning in the 1950s (i.e. since the Treaty instituting the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community and the 1957 Treaty of Rome), however, the institutional and procedural system of the current EU, which can also be conceptualised as a confederal

consociational system, gradually emerged (Taylor 1991; Chryssochoou 1997; Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000, pp. 124–125).

2.4.1. Confederal consociational characteristics

The approaches in terms of the confederal consociational system give more inspiring foundation for relevant analyses of European integration processes than the two sorts of traditional conceptualisations described above, in Table 1. Utilisation of the concept of a confederal consociation system underlines what has been taking place in the EU over a long period of its development. The term “confederal” refers to the system of institutional arrangements and procedural frameworks, specified in the historical sequence of the treaties and giving the member nation-states room to defend their essential interests not only by potentially using their veto right, but also by necessary attempts, orientated on building consensus to realize a certain common aim. The political elites, elected in the democratic member countries, obviously represent their national electorates, in the words of Dahrendorf, as a “cartel of elites” (Taylor 1991, p. 110), which operates within the room provided by the confederal institutional and procedural system of the EU.

The notion of “consociation” refers to practices of co-operative, joint decision-making among national governments at the EU level. The defining consociational features are summarised in Table 1 (see Lijphart 1979). In the EU, the member states’ geographical borders define the segmental boundaries of their electorates and national political elites. Importantly, the term “segmental” also refers to the cultural system of each individual nation-state. Such a cultural system can be defined as “the *subjective* system of a society’s institutions: the beliefs, values, and knowledge, and skills that have been *internalized* by the people of a given society...” (Inglehart 1997, p. 15). Population size proportionality between the member states is accepted as the fundamental criterion of allocation of votes in certain key institutions, such as the European Parliament, and procedures, such as qualified majority voting. The consociationalism interpretation places particular stress on the idea that the EU system provides the political instruments, by which the intra-national dominance of national governments, representing the interests of the nation-states, can be strengthened, in the countries concerned, through their managerial control over the European integration process at the EU level. The European Council and the Council of Ministers are the chief institutions for inter-elite accommodation among the member countries and enable political process of consensus-building (Taylor 1991; Rosamond 2000; Costa, Magnette 2003; Chryssochoou 1998, pp. 171–200). The interactions among the two Councils and the European Commission and the European Parliament, within the EU confederal system, seem to represent the core of consensus-building and decision-making.

2.4.2. Multi-level attachment

Within the framework of the confederal-consociational approach, it is clear that systematic considerations of public opinion articulations, in the enlarged EU, must also take the changing identities of the twenty-five polities into account. Gillespie and Laffan (2006) argue that changing identities in the EU are not only associated with the long-term development of the EU itself, but also with broader continental and global changes such as the fall of the Iron Curtain. They claim that political identity analyses still tend to be tied in to traditional views concerning the homogeneity of the member state. However, Gillespie and Laffan accurately state that such views and associated conceptualisations cannot be applied, when one is considering the heterogeneous character of the enlarging EU.

Table 2 gives aggregate basic data, derived from the Standard Eurobarometer no. 63 survey regarding attachment, within the EU of twenty-five member states, to different geographical levels of identity articulations. First of all, it appears that the identity of EU polities is clearly a multi-level phenomenon, because people tend to be simultaneously attached to different levels of identity articulation. Second, the intensities of identity attachments to local and regional levels are close to that of the nation-state. Obviously, these identity levels are articulated by the polities, in regard to territories, within the nation-states concerned. Third, there are not significant differences between the EU averages (N = EU1) and the averages of levels throughout the twenty-five polities (i.e. N = EU25).

Fourth, however, there is a significantly lower level of attachment to “Europe”. Consequently, these general data clearly indicate, in accordance with the confederal consociational approaches, that a well-integrated political nation at the EU level is yet to emerge and that a sense of EU-wide identity must be developed. Again, in terms of the conceptualisation of Deutsch and his associates, it seems that at the EU level of identity, a sense of community, which is relevant for integration and a matter of mutual loyalties and trust (Deutsch 1957, p. 36), still needs to emerge. It seems that a comprehensive character of identity formation at the EU level is still in the initial stages of its development.

Table 2 – Average attachment levels to locality, region, country, and Europe (Standard Eurobarometer No. 63; May-June 2005)

Geographical level of attachment	N = EU (%)	N = EU25 (%)
attached to city, town or village	87	87
attached to region	87	86
attached to country	91	92
attached to Europe	66	64




Figure 2 – Scatter diagram of attachment to Europe and to one's own country (Standard Eurobarometer No. 63, May-June 2005; N = EU25)

There is considerable differentiation across the EU of twenty-five member states. Figure 2 shows this differentiation, in terms of attachment to Europe (the average is 66 percent) and attachment to the nation-state (EU average of 91 percent). It is important to note that there is no systematic correlation between the two levels of attachment. It appears that, in the spring of 2005, there was no negative correlation, which would suggest a competing relationship between the two levels of identity formation. Also, this scatter diagram documents the fact that there was no indication of a public opinion cleavage in terms of attachment levels to Europe between old member states and new member states, at a time when a number of referendums on the draft of a Treaty for an EU Constitution were held. It appears that some so-called "Eurosceptic" polities – such as those in Sweden (SE), Denmark (DK) or Finland (FI) – indicated high attachment levels to Europe. It is also interesting to document lower levels of national attachment in Belgium (BE) as well as in the Netherlands (NL). There were some "Euro-enthusiastic" polities among the new member states, which tended to be attached at high levels both to Europe and to their own nation-states: polities in Hungary (HU) or

Poland (PL), for instance. On the other hand, however, there were low attachment levels to Europe in Estonia (ES), Lithuania (LI) and Cyprus (CY), as well as in Greece (GR) and the United Kingdom (UK). These survey results, from spring 2005, clearly indicate, in accordance with claims from the confederal consociational approaches, that the identity formation process evolves across the enlarged EU in a very unequal way and that attachment levels to Europe are quite low in a number of EU countries. Clearly, the question arises as to whether a survey asking about attachment levels to the EU would result in a different scatter distribution, because it can be assumed that Eurosceptic polities would tend to articulate much lower levels of identity to the EU than to Europe (see Karp, Bowler 2006 and the further analysis carried out in chapter 7).

At this point in the discussion, the following two conclusions can be drawn. They will give a particular, basic orientation to the empirical analyses of systematic tendencies in public opinion articulations carried out in the subsequent chapters of this book:

1. Given that the primary task of this book is to make analyses of public opinion across the EU25, it is important to emphasise that the confederal consociational system of the enlarging EU is, characteristically, not based on a common electorate (see also Duchesne, Frogner 1995). The effective formation of a well-integrated European polity is lacking, because the electoral representation process of the European Parliament is primarily linked to the political affairs of the individual member states and is rooted in territorial cleavages among the twenty-five nation-states (see also Hix 2005).
2. The strength of the interpretation of the EU as a confederal consociational system is that it is readily connected to the empirical reality of the current stage of European integration processes. The EU is a compound system of distinct culturally and politically defined units, bound together by the successive treaties, in a consensually created system of institutions and procedures. They form a compact of states for specific purposes, without losing their national identity or resigning their basic nation-state sovereignty to a higher central authority (see also Taylor 1991; Rosamond 2000, pp. 148–151). This type of approach paints a picture that is more realistic in nature than that of a normative supranationalist approach. The confederal consociational approach indicates, in more specific empirical terms, what type of entity the EU appears to be. Moreover, this approach clearly shows that it is worthwhile to analyse changing public opinion articulations, which tend to be highly differentiated across the twenty-five polities of the enlarge EU. Consequently, this approach indicates that public opinion and mass interest articulations of national electorates are very central to studies regarding EU integration processes, because they indicate important feedback that often implies barriers effects to a variety

of the policy-making of governing political elites from the democratic member states concerned.

2.5. Explanatory modelling

The modelling formulations in this book utilise a conjunction of two multivariate statistical techniques. Although the details of the two techniques are complex and lies outside the scope of this study, one can summarise the capacities of the methods in the following way. Principal component analysis is utilised in some studies in the field of political ecology and political geography (for details of the statistical and mathematical procedures required see Harman 1967, Rummel 1970). First, this method enables to identify the basic dimensions of a correlation matrix of carefully selected variables, indicating various characteristics of the twenty-five EU countries, their economies and societies as well as differences in public opinion articulations of their electorates. Second, the so-called LISREL (linear structural equations) technique (see Asher 1983; Saris, Stronkhorst 1984) is used in the quantitative model building applied in this book. This approach is non-experimental and makes one it possible to specify the necessary quantitative versions of causal orders of explanatory models, which are also postulated in chapters of this book, in numerical terms and in accordance with some explicit theoretical considerations.

2.5.1. Principal component analysis and LISREL modelling

Principal component analysis (PCA) is a method which transforms an intercorrelation matrix of carefully selected indicators (variables). The variables represented in a new matrix of components (dimensions) are not correlated. The components are derived from the intercorrelation matrix with unities as diagonal elements by an iterative procedure called the principal axis method (Harman 1967, p. 135ff). The PCA involves the extraction of dimensions from the total statistical space of intercorrelated variables, wherein each of the variables can be specified by the new principal dimensions. The first dimension is a linear combination of the original variables and represents the highest share of the total variance specified in the intercorrelation matrix. The second largest share is represented by a second component which contributes the maximum of residual variance extracted from the analysed intercorrelation matrix. Any third or additional components (the maximum number of dimensions is equal to the number of initial variables) can be derived until the total variance of the initial variables is extracted from the intercorrelation matrix of variables. The variables are specified in comparable units, expressed in terms of standard deviations from the initial variables (so-called z-scores, with the average equal to zero and a

standard deviation equal to one). Thus, the variables are not expressed in their original measurement, but their variations (i.e. differentiations) are made comparable.

For the general purposes of the modelling utilised in this book, it must be stressed that the PCA results in three sets of basic outcomes. First, so-called eigenvalues indicate the shares of the total variation in the initial variables that is represented by the extracted dimensions. Second, the component loadings on each component specify correlations between the initial variables (indicators) and the component and identify those groups of variables that show intercorrelated patterns of variation within the group of observed units (in this book, therefore, the twenty-five countries of the EU). Third, the component scores are new variables, which indicate how the units under observation (EU member states) score on the components. Thus, a component (dimension) is a real (observable) set of scores, i.e. each EU country has a score on each dimension. Consequently, these scores can be mapped and also utilised as synthetic variables in further, sophisticated statistical modelling.

The LISREL model-building method can thus utilise the outcomes of the PCA. The PCA scores can be used in the LISREL modelling as explanatory or dependent variables. The LISREL approach estimates and tests postulated causal models (see Saris, Stronkhorst 1984). The method is used in non-experimental research, in which the investigator is not able to manipulate relevant variables. First, the investigator cannot have evidence on the causal ordering of events. The causal order of relevant variables must be indicated in a different way, through qualitative modelling. Qualitative modelling requires extensive formulation of relevant hypotheses, because a time sequence cannot be specified from the data. When a causal order is based on a well-formulated and postulated theory, the tenability of the causal hypotheses can be tested with non-experimental data. However, direct inferences, regarding postulated causal order are impossible, without theoretical assumptions that are specified in this book, in discussions concerning theoretical claims about the actual functioning of the enlarged EU. Second, the units of observation used in the study may differ, in respect to various features and not only in the single aspect, for which one seeks to establish an effect in the model. Consequently, it is not clear whether the relationship established statistically between the postulated causal variable and the dependent variable should be attributed to a causal effect or to the effects of other variables. This problem is resolved by statistical control of important variables in the postulated model. In this approach, a causal theory is one that includes important variables, based on the theoretical insights of the researcher. From such theoretical insights, testable hypotheses can be derived, in light of co-variations (correlations) between dependent and explanatory variables. A theory must be rejected if the theoretical assumptions do not hold true for the data. In other words, explanatory models, based

upon the LISREL approach, make it one to distinguish between more or less important variables through their statistically estimated, independent effects.

The LISREL approach is based on standard multiple regression analysis, which specifies relationships between a dependent variable and a number of explanatory variables. Accordingly, the representation level of a LISREL model, or its determination level, is measured with a classical multiple linear correlation coefficient. Therefore, the LISREL method also belongs to the general linear model group (see Saris, Stronkhorst 1984). An essential feature of any linear relationship is that the same change in explanatory variable x will cause an equal change in dependent variable y and thus, it can be described in terms a linear equation. In contrast to multiple regression analysis, however, the LISREL approach is explicitly considering the system of effects *within* the group of explanatory variables that statistically determine the variation (differentiation) in the dependent variable and such effects are independent effects, as in the multiple regression model. In this way, the investigator can explicitly specify the causal order of multivariate regressions. The postulated quantitative model is a system of multivariate regressions and the investigator can use the LISREL method to estimate the causal order of effects between well-ordered explanatory variables for the entire equation. However, in contrast to usual multiple regression coefficients, the LISREL method transforms multiple regression coefficients into standardised multiple regression coefficients (so-called Beta coefficients). The transformation enables the investigator to specify the size of the direct or independent effects of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable, resulting from one unit change in terms of standard deviation in the explanatory variable (Asher 1983). Finally, it must be emphasised that the effects of explanatory variables can be utilised in conjunction (i.e. multiplied) in the LISREL model, in order to indicate indirect effects, mediated through chains of effects of theoretically postulated variables (see Saris, Stronkhorst 1984).

2.5.2. Structural variables: the socio-economic dimension and EU membership (2005)

A key structural variable, which is used in the LISREL models postulated in this book, is GDP (in purchasing power standards) per capita. This variable is one of five indicators selected to specify differences in the socio-economic situation of the twenty-five countries of the enlarged EU, in 2004–2005. The results of the principal component analysis of five general socio-economic indicators are presented in Table 3. It appears that a strong dimension (component), representing 49.9 percent of the total variance of the five indicators (eigenvalue = $5.0 \times 0.499 = 2.495$) can be extracted from the correlation matrix of the five indicators regarding the economic and social situation in

Table 3 – Rich welfare state and low growth dimension in 2004–2005 (N = EU25)

Indicators	Component loadings
(1) share of taxes in GDP in 2004	0.842
(2) GDP per capita in PPS in 2005	0.679
(3) public debt share in GDP in 2005	0.555
(4) unemployment rate in October 2004	-0.570
(5) real GDP growth in 2005	-0.837

Note: represented variance = 49.9 percent

Source: Eurostat

EU countries. This dimension shall be called Rich welfare states and low growth 2004–2005 (see also chapter 7, in which component scores from this dimension are used in a postulated explanatory model).

The loadings of the variables on this component clearly indicate that the dimension is consistent both in terms of its content (i.e. the nature of the correlated indicators) and also statistically. On the one hand, the high positive loading of the share of total taxes in GDP in 2004 of 0.842, and the positive loading of GDP per capita in 2005 (in purchasing parity standards), of 0.679, represent the association between rich economies and extensive tax base, supporting the costs of their advanced welfare states (Swank 2002). On the other hand, significant negative loadings exist, in terms of the unemployment rate in October 2004 (component loading -0.570) and real GDP growth in 2005 (-0.837). Therefore, the key empirical conclusion to be drawn is that rich welfare states had a tendency to be confronted with lower unemployment rates, but also with low levels of real GDP growth. It is also interesting to note the positive loading (0.555) of government debt in 2005, within this dimension. This component loading represents a significant systematic association between rich economies and advanced welfare states and difficult financial affairs at the national government level, with a tendency to accumulate higher levels of public debt (see Baldwin, Wypolsz 2004, pp. 360–362). In short, these consistent, principal component analysis outcomes make it possible to use this component score in further statistical modelling, because the score of each of the twenty-five countries on this dimension is capable of describing major socio-economic, core–periphery patterns in the EU25. Accordingly, one can assume that the differentiation of scores on this dimension can, in the explanatory modelling, reveal important effects that influence differences in various public opinion articulations between the polities of rich countries and poor countries in the enlarged EU. This dimension also represents differences among the twenty-five countries in terms of the level of economic performance, expressed in GDP (loading of 0.679). GDP is usually a measure of the value, at market prices, of goods and services, over a year's time. It should be restated that the GDP indicator is in real terms and is expressed in purchasing power standards in order to




Figure 3 – GDP (in PPS) per capita and number of years of EU membership in 2005 (N = EU25). Source: Eurostat.

make comparisons more meaningful, by excluding the effect of higher price levels among EU economies.

Figure 3 portrays differentiation in GDP, in purchasing power standards per capita in 2005, and the number of years of EU membership. First, the scatter diagram clearly documents the fact that, in 2005, the new member states formed a group of poorer national economies. Only the economies of Cyprus (CY) and Slovenia (SI) were closer to the average EU level (i.e. the 100 percent level). It also indicates that, in 2005, the economies of Portugal (PT) and Greece (GR) from the old EU periphery were at a similar level. Only Spain's economy attained 98 percent of the EU average level. Second, it is evident that the national economies, forming the old outer core of the 1973 enlargement – Ireland (IR), Denmark (DK) and the United Kingdom (UK) – and the new outer core of the 1995 enlargement – Austria (AT), Finland (FI) and Sweden (SE) – were at similar or even higher levels, in terms of this indicator of aggregate productivity, when compared with the six founding countries that comprise the historical core of the EU. It is necessary to note that, in 2005, the national economies of France, Germany

and Italy were only a few percentage points above the EU's average level. It can be assumed that the relative stagnation of the French and German economies, in particular, would have important effects on public opinion from the polities of these countries and would influence the policy-making of political elites from these two leading EU countries. Finally, it should be mentioned that Luxembourg's extreme position is, in part, a result of the definition of the GDP per capita indicator. This is due to the fact that about one third of the total labour force in this 'micro-economy' is made up of foreigners and that GDP data per inhabitant do not correct for such a statistical distortion. In spite of some deficiencies, this indicator can be considered to be the key structural variable in describing primary differences in levels of development and economic performance among the twenty-five countries of the enlarged EU.

2.5.3. Public opinion variables: dimensions of post-materialism and negative views of globalisation (2005)

The analyses carried out in this book are concerned with linkages between socio-economic development, cultural and political changes, taking place across the enlarged EU. The fact that important cultural and political changes have been brought about by the shift of the polities concerned towards post-materialist value orientations was explained in chapter 1. Differences in post-materialist values across the EU polities can be considered important factors, having substantial systematic effects on differences in public opinion articulations, regarding policy agendas at both the national level and the EU level. The idea that the shift to post-materialism represents a change in mass values and attitudes, leading to a decrease in people's concern for issues of economic survival (materialism) was emphasised earlier. It is associated with the structural shift from the era of industrialisation towards the development stage of post-industrial economies and societies (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart, Welzel 2005). This change implies increasing existential security, in the circumstances of rich economies with their advanced welfare state provisions. It is important to emphasise, in the context of this book, that the shift towards post-materialist values and associated attitudes results in the increasing value of self-expression, and quality of life as well as concern for the environment, as life priorities. To understand the postulated causal orders of the explanatory models presented in this book, it is essential to recognise that post-materialist value orientations also imply critical attitudes to authority, more critical political opinion that is less easily manipulated by political elites and a general critical approach to European integration processes (Hix 2005). It is, therefore, also necessary to explore the significance of systematic differences in the intensity of post-materialist orientations across the EU's twenty-five polities in this book (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart, Wenzel 2005).

Table 4 – Post-materialist value orientation dimension (N = EU25)

Indicators	Component loadings
(1) protecting freedom of speech (QA33a)	0.930
(2) more informed regarding environmental and nuclear safety policy (QA22)	0.933
(3) priority of the EU to protect the environment (QA34)	0.725
(4) priority of the EU to fight unemployment (QA55)	-0.610
(5) fighting rising prices (QA55)	-0.852

Note: represented variance = 63.6 percent

Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 64. October–November 2005; own calculations

It is important to reiterate, in the context of this chapter, that the shift towards post materialist values and associated attitudes concerning European integration processes, are based upon life priorities of self-expression and democratisation, quality of life and concern for the environment. An attempt to specify, with a principal component analysis, a dimension which indicates such a shift is displayed in Table 4. The first component of the five-indicator correlation matrix represents the typical polarisation between post-materialist and materialist opinions in October–November 2005. The dimension represents 63.6 percent of the total variation estimated in the five-variable correlation matrix. The structure of principal component loadings clearly shows the assumed distinction between post-materialist and materialist orientations. There are high positive loadings, on the dimension, which stress the protection of freedom of speech (0.930), representing an emphasis on democratisation, the level of awareness regarding environmental and nuclear safety policy (0.833) and the priority of the EU to protect the environment (0.725). On the materialist side of the dimension, there are substantial negative loadings connected with public concerns with rising prices (-0.852) and the priority of the EU to fight unemployment (-0.610). Hence, the component score on this dimension can be used to indicate differences in post-materialist orientations across the twenty-five countries in postulated explanatory models, in chapters 6 and 7.

According to earlier public opinion research (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart, Welzel 2005), the shift towards a post-materialist value orientation is central to understanding differences in various other public opinion tendencies. It can, therefore, be assumed that the differences in post-materialist value orientation across the EU25 would have a systematic effect on the differences in various orientations of public opinion and attitude articulations to be considered in this book, such as the EU's deepening and widening processes. Figure 4 documents considerable differentiation in post-materialist value orientation, across the EU25. On the one hand, the highest scores are from politics in the most post-materialist countries Denmark (DK), Sweden (SE) and the Netherlands (NL). On the other hand, the positions of the South-European countries Portugal (PT), Greece (GR) and Spain (SP) of




Figure 4 – Post-materialist orientation and number of years of EU membership (N = EU25). Source: see Table 4.

the old EU periphery and Italy (IT), on the negative side of the component, indicate the materialist value orientations of their polities. Nine of the polities of the new member states in the new periphery are positioned on the materialist side of the dimension. Only the Czech electorate (CZ) assumes a position above the average score of the twenty-five polities. It is important to note the similar positions of the French and German polities, because they, seemingly, did not articulate convincing post-materialist value orientations. In chapters 4, 5 and 6 similar post-materialist scales will be used in explanatory analyses of differentiations concerning a number of public opinion articulations.

Clearly, significant differences in the perception and assessments of relevant aspects of globalisation extend beyond the EU and national political elites to individual polities of the enlarged EU. Given the complicated geopolitical and geo-economic contexts of European integration processes, it is logical to assume that systematic differences in views of globalisation among the twenty-five polities can significantly contribute to an explana-

Table 5 – Negative view of globalisation dimension (N = EU25)

Indicators	Component loadings
(1) globalisation leads to relocation of companies to countries where labour is cheaper (QA18.8)	0.941
(2) currently afraid of the transfer of jobs to other member states which have lower production costs (QA55)	0.861
(3) companies that relocate do so to increase profit (QA57)	0.716
(4) globalisation increases competition for our companies (QA55)	-0.481
(5) globalisation brings FDI to our country (QA56)	-0.660
(6) net agreement that the EU protects us from the negative effects of globalisation (QA56)	-0.786

Note: represented variance = 57.1 percent

Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 64. October–November 2005; own calculations

tion of differences in the polities' attitudes regarding a variety of issues in the enlarged EU. Giddens argues that "most people think of globalisation as simply 'pulling away' power or influence from local communities and nations into the global arena. And indeed this is one of its consequences. Nations do lose some of the economic power they once had. Yet it also has an opposite effect. Globalisation not only pulls upwards, but also pushes downwards, creating new pressures for local autonomy" (Giddens 2002, p. 13). Therefore, questions arise as to whether nation-states and the EU, for that matter, are perceived in the context of the current global system as effective 'shell institutions', protecting national polities and their economies from the pressures of globalisation.

Table 5 presents the outcomes of an attempt to derive a component, based on perceptions regarding six correlated features of globalisation, in October–November 2005. Positive loadings, on the dimension, represent opinions, regarding globalisation, that emphasise concerns about its economic effects. The highest loading has the opinion that globalisation leads to the relocation of companies to countries where labour costs are lower (0.941). The following opinion states that citizens were afraid of the transfer of jobs to other EU member states, which have lower production costs (0.861). It must be noted that this perception tends to stress tensions in EU public opinion, between the electorates in richer countries, with higher labour costs, and those in the new member states of the May 2004 enlargement, with cheaper labour markets. A similar message in opinion is suggested through the idea that relocating companies do so to expand their profit (0.716). On the other pole of the component, negative loading (-0.786) is connected with the opinion recognising certain capacities of the EU to shelter its citizens from negative impacts of globalisation. This opinion clearly expresses a positive view of the EU's capacities in this respect and indicates a lack of anxiety. A similar optimistic view is indicated in the belief that global economic relations enable the inflow of foreign direct investment into the country in




Figure 5 – Negative view of globalisation and number of years of EU membership (N = EU25). Source: see Table 5.

question (-0.660). These two optimistic attitudes are also associated with the idea that globalisation tends to increase competition for national companies (loading -0.481). This view seems to express certain confidence in the competitiveness of the national economies concerned.

Accordingly, this pattern of perceptions, regarding the pressures of globalisation, and the associated component loadings, enable this component to be labelled Negative view of globalisation. High scores of EU countries on this dimension represent anxiety and uncertainties, concerning the pressures of globalisation. Low scores indicate an opinion, exhibiting more confidence in regard to the various challenges of globalisation processes and their differentiating impacts, in the enlarged EU.

The negative view of globalisation must be taken into account, if the geo-economic and geopolitical contexts of differences in public opinion articulations are to be considered. Figure 5 shows great differences, in terms of the perceptions of globalisation, within the groupings of countries of each enlargement. It appears that, in 2005, the Czech (CZ), Slovenian (SI) and Hungarian (HU) polities were more concerned about globalisation pres-

tures than the politics of the other seven new member states. Similar low levels of concern were articulated in Spain (SP), Italy (IT) and Ireland (IR). More extreme negative views of globalisation were expressed by the politics in Sweden (SE), Finland (FI), Greece (GR) and Austria (AT).

However, the most extreme levels of articulations of negative views regarding globalisation were recorded in autumn 2005, in Germany and France. This outcome of the applied multivariate analysis is certainly one of the most important results documented in this book. These outcomes suggest that the critique of various aspects and socio-economic implications of globalisation pressures must be an attractive political issue, particularly in these two key, influential EU countries, which have led all major intergovernmental political debates in the EU, since its beginning in 1950s (see Dinan 2005, Hix 2005). Accordingly, in chapters 6 and 7, the scores from this globalisation dimension will be used in the postulated explanatory models in order to explore whether differences in the negative view of globalisation, in 2005, had a tendency to influence other important systematic public opinion articulations of the twenty-five politics on a number of crucial issues regarding European integration processes.

3. Westward geopolitical orientation towards the European Union: explaining public opinion across post-communist countries in the 1990s (survey 1996)

3.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on differences in public opinion in the post-communist countries, concerning basic geopolitical and geo-economic orientations during the mid-1990s, when a “new division” was emerging in the eastern part of Europe: westward geopolitical and geo-economic orientation towards the European Union or close ties to post-Soviet Russia. September 2001 can certainly be considered an important temporal marker in the macro-geography of European public opinion. On Thursday 13 September 2001, some swift reporters in Brussels and Prague spoke about shadows cast by the horrible terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. on the fifth European Union – Ukraine summit held in the Crimean sea resort of Yalta (HN No. 178, 2001). A place that was made famous by the April 1945 meeting of leaders from the victorious powers at the end of the Second World War who sealed the fate of post-war Europe, which at that time was already heading towards the long-lasting geopolitical and geo-economic division of the continent known as the Iron Curtain. However, there were more symbolic messages implied in the reports on the Ukrainian summit, related to the major theme of this chapter, concerning the geography of public opinion regarding the European integration process. First, the reports indicated that an important debated issue at the summit was a “new division of the continent” into three or possibly more groups of states. A seemingly new division of the continent, in terms of different options than those available to post-communist states, during the process of eastern EU enlargement, or, at least, through further political and economic associations with the enlarged EU. In other words, it seemed that the Ukrainian political elite did not believe in the principle, contained in the EU Treaties and proclaiming that any European country can ask to become a member of the EU if it fulfils the basic criteria (the so-called June 1993 Copenhagen criteria, see chapter 2). The Ukrainian politicians did not believe that this could have any significance for their country. Second, in spite of this, it appeared that the Ukrainian political representation expressed its wish to extend the framework of its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, in

an attempt to strengthen weak economic relations and to allow Ukrainian products easier access to the EU market. Third, the reports also indicated that the then Belgian EU presidency pointed to the basic criteria formulated at the summit of June 1993 Copenhagen and gave considerable emphasis to the need for progress in the democratic consolidation, economic liberalisation and restructuring of the Ukrainian economy, so as to enable a more realistic outlook, concerning the orientation of this large Eastern European state towards the western core of the continent, as represented by the EU and some of its associated candidate countries.

Looking at these 2001 reports, concerning geopolitical visions, orientations and opinions after a decade of post-communist transformation across an area of largely Soviet Heritage, the apparent necessity of looking back a little further in time at the mid-1990s may be established as a means of specifying:

- different options that the countries had in their basic geopolitical and geo-economic considerations during the initial years after the collapse of the former Soviet orbit in 1989–1991,
- post-communist regimes, in terms of democratisation and economic liberalisation realised by political elites, by the mid-1990s,
- visions and opinions of the general public (i.e. the electorates) in post-communist countries, concerning the basic geopolitical and geo-economic orientations of these countries, in the mid-1990s, with the emergence of a “new division” in the eastern part of Europe.

Accordingly, this chapter attempts to address different geopolitical and geo-economic options, in light of the character of post-communist regimes in the mid-1990s, and looks more specifically at the differentiation in public opinion regarding basic geopolitical and geo-economic orientation towards the “West” and the “East”, in the countries concerned. The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, four different options that the countries had, in terms of their geopolitical and geo-economic orientations, are indicated in section two. The character of the post-communist regimes, in the mid-1990s, is assessed, in terms of the democratic consolidation and liberalisation of internal and external economic relations. In section three, a statistical model (see the specification of the LISREL modelling in chapter 2) is postulated, in order to indicate a number of factors explaining differences in orientation concerning EU integration, as expressed in the public opinion of the post-communist countries concerned. Finally, major conclusions, resulting from this analytic explanatory effort to indicate a new divide in the geography of public opinion in the eastern part of the European continent, are drawn, in the concluding section.

3.2. Geopolitical transition and options for the West and the East

The reports from the Ukraine indicate that the post-1989 geopolitical transition (see Taylor and Flint, 2000) of certain post-communist countries in the area of Soviet Heritage was still not finished. In light of the unfinished process of geopolitical transition during the 1990s, the following four points should be stressed.

First, the scope of geopolitical considerations was particularly limited in this part of the world, after 1945, due to the fact that the Soviet Union largely dictated political and economic changes in the countries concerned. Beginning in 1948, Yugoslavia followed a course independent from the Soviet-dominated orbit, and was later followed by Albania as well (Archer 1994). However, geopolitical constraints changed or relaxed, subsequent to the revolutionary events of 1989–1991 and the fast area of the group of more than twenty-five old, new or restored post-communist polities and economies were impacted by significant geopolitical crosscurrents (see also Dostál 1998b). In terms of geopolitical and geo-economic transition, one could say that the post-communist countries were pressured from multiple sides. During the 1990s, each of the post-communist countries was in a location that exposed it to significant international crosscurrents. Some of the currents were positive and in favour of democratic consolidation and economic liberalisation, other currents appeared to be negative or ambiguous.

Second, different geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances, within the post-communist part of the continent, provided different opportunities and constraints, although such were not determinative. However, after the fall of communist regimes, political elites were faced with the difficult task of designing new geopolitical codes, suited to the old, new or restored post-communist states. The task of developing the basic components of operating code of the post-communist elites in foreign political and economic relations appeared difficult. External pressures were mediated through internal political and economic processes, as well as through democratisation initiatives and the creativity of domestic political elites. The political and economic regimes, which post-communist elites were willing and able to create, during the period from 1989 to 1995, were, to a significant degree, determined by the specific geopolitical and geo-economic positions of the countries concerned. The fact that the war-driven fragmentation of the former Yugoslav federation significantly complicated the democratisation and economic liberalisation processes in all successor states, with the exception of Slovenia, should be noted (EBRD 1999).

Third, following the revolutionary period of 1989 to 1991, important deliberated and durable impulses came from the west, i.e. from the EU and have been largely supportive of democratisation and economic liberalisation in most of the post-communist countries (Dostál 1997, 1998a, 1998b). By far the most powerful incentive was the prospect of EU accession. Along

with Emerson (1997), Lane and Ersson (1996), Preston (1997) and many other observers of the role of the EU in redrawing the political and economic macro-geography of Europe, one must emphasise the fact that the EU appeared to be a key institutional vehicle, able to make the dynamics of European integration persistent and strong (see also chapter 1). Accordingly, there is little surprise about the strong democratising impacts of the EU on the transformation process in the post-communist countries. From the east, however, a less-structured and predictable counter-pressure was evident. Nonetheless, this eastern counter-pressure produced certain constraints on the process of post-communist political and economic transformation and appeared to be felt, in the mid-1990s, in those countries located closest to Russia. It also appears that these influences from Russia emerged largely as side effects of the internal turmoil in these countries (see Sapir 1992, Vasiliev 1994).

The two directions of pressures and influences, from the West and the East, provided a framework of basic geopolitical and geo-economic options, which post-communist countries had in the Soviet Heritage space. For each of the post-communist countries one can indicate a number of fundamental options that the corresponding political and economic elites had available to them, in their task to create the basic political and economic aspects of post-communist regimes and associated geopolitical codes. However, more complex analyses, concerning the fundamental political and economic decisions of governing national elites should also incorporate the basic geopolitical and geo-economic orientations of public opinion in the post-communist countries concerned. This is due to the fact that sentiment describing political opinions and mass interest articulations clearly tends to support and strengthen or to weaken and undermine the geopolitical and geo-economic efforts of national political elites and, as such, can provide or withdraw the necessary foundation, on which the political stability of each state can be based (see also Deutsch et al 1957; Inglehart, Welzel 2005; Gillespie, Laffan 2006).

3.2.1. Different geopolitical and geo-economic options

One way of assessing the extent to which western or eastern counter-presures have influenced the geopolitical and geo-economic orientation of post-communist countries is to draw attention to basic options that emerged in the beginning of the 1990s. In principle, the following, more or less realistic, options for integration were available:

- a country could decide to follow the high route, aiming at full-fledged EU membership in a relatively short term,
- a country could consider a less demanding form of integration, such as an agreement on free trade with the EU,

- a country could decide to re-establish political and economic relations in the space of the former CMEA or in a smaller area of the former Soviet Union,
- a country could consider the adoption of development strategies of the so-called Asian Tigers or Oil Producers.

Clearly, there were other basic options available as well, but these seemed less realistic and relevant, when one is concerned with post-communist countries in Europe and post-soviet Eurasia. It is obvious that the first two options were associated with westward orientated transformations of the geopolitical codes of the countries concerned. The other two options represented eastern orientations.

From the beginning of the post-communist transformation, it appeared that the first and second options were largely acceptable for political and economic elites in the majority of the countries concerned. The first option materialised in the form of Europe Association Agreements (EAA). During the period from December 1991 to June 1996, EAAs were signed between the EU and ten post-communist countries (EC 2000). The EAAs covered geo-economic issues concerning trade and realms of co-operation including industry, customs, transport, and the environment. The agreements also covered geopolitical issues concerning political dialog, legal approximation and certain areas of security. Significantly, they aimed at rapidly establishing a free-trade area between the EU and the associated country, on the basis of reciprocity, which was, however, applied in an asymmetric way, allowing more rapid liberalisation on the EU side than on the side of the associated country. Trade between the EU and the associated countries increased significantly, partly due to the fact that these economies re-directed trade from the former CMEA countries. As early as 1994, the EU became the most important export market for products originating in the associated countries, absorbing more than the half of their total export. The EAAs recognised the geopolitical and geo-economic intention of the associated countries to become members of the EU. This objective was later confirmed with the applications of the various individual countries (see also Mayhew 1998). However, it should also be noted that when the political representations and elites of these ten associated post-communist states decided to take the geopolitical and geo-economic option of intensive European integration, it also inevitably implied considerable disciplining impacts. At the EU summit of Copenhagen, in June 1993, the political representations of the 12 member states agreed that accession could only take place, after an associated country was able to assume the obligations of membership and satisfy the economic and political conditions required (see chapter 2). In short, by mid-1996, it was clear both to the political elites of the post-communist countries and to the public that for some countries this option was already a realistic one. On the other hand, however, it also became clear that eventual membership imposed far-reaching adjustments and adaptation of political and economic

institutions, including the behaviour of political and economic elites and different interest groups of citizens (see further Preston 1997).

The second option was, by definition, much less demanding, in terms of political and economic reforms and western-style behavioural adaptations. This option was open, for example, to Ukraine, as mentioned above, and to some other post-soviet states (EC 1999). The EU signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with most of the Newly Independent States (NIS). The PCAs did not provide for preferential trade treatment, but gave the NIS the most-favoured-nation status that was granted to the former Soviet Union in 1989. All NIS were eligible for the generalised system of preferences that offered tariff reductions or duty exemptions. However, it should be noted that the PCAs did not include any prospect of accession to the EU, they merely included agreements on trade, competition policy and investment, as well as on democracy and human rights. PCAs were concluded with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, in 1994, and with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus, in 1995, and subsequently with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

The third option open to post-communist countries was the re-establishment of political and economic relations within the space of the former CMEA or in a smaller area of the former Soviet Union (EBRD 1996, Kumar 1996). To the majority of political and economic elites of post-communist countries this option appeared to be not very realistic. The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in December 1991, made this option available to a large number of the post-soviet states (see Dostál 1993, pp. 111–112). Vavilov and Vjugin (1993, p. 104) claimed, at the very beginning of the CIS's existence, that "the republic leaders view the creation of the CIS as a cover and an opportunity to win time to strengthen their own power and be first to introduce a national currency, using the free rider effect to their advantage". It was clear that the CIS could never resemble the former COMECON (CMEA). As a result, the CIS certainly did not develop into an effective geo-economic and geopolitical compact. The CIS has been used more as a general framework for economic discussions and for taking multilateral measures in organisational forms, such as the Interstate Economic Committee (October 1994) or the Interstate Monetary Committee (May 1995). However, modalities on the establishment of a Payments Union (September 1993) were limited to bilateral dealings (Kaiser 1997). In 1994, Kazak leader Nazarbayev made an unsuccessful attempt to initiate a so-called Euro-Asian Union. However, the CIS framework did facilitate a summit in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), in October 1996, which was attended by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan "to warn the Afghan Taliban that any incursion into CIS territory would be firmly resisted" (Kaiser 1997, p. 58). On the one hand, this illustrated a certain level of flexibility in the CIS framework. On the other hand, it also showed that this option could, apparently, only provide weak

and little-formalised procedures for multilateral geo-economic and geopolitical cooperation. In contrast, bilateralism appeared to provide more room for co-operation in major parts of the post-soviet space. Interestingly, much later, in October 2000, and under the Putin presidency, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agreed on the formation of a Euro-Asian economic community. It is also illustrative to note that, in autumn 2000, some other states of the original CIS attempted to build an economic association in the southern rim of the former Soviet Union, an area rich in natural resources. This geo-economic compact intended to facilitate geo-economic linkages concerning oil, natural gas and other valuable resources in regions of post-soviet Central Asia and the Caspian Sea with industrialised countries in the West, including the EU (HN No. 118, 2000). This emerging geo-economic compact was, reportedly, to include Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Ukraine and Moldova. This initiative provided a means for early considerations of uncertainties on the part of the EU, concerning supplies of natural gas, avoiding Russian territory (see also chapter 6 on energy issues).

Fourth, there was the option of a largely independent geopolitical and geo-economic position. The adoption of such a position could be realistic only if the economic base of the country concerned was very strong. There were basically two variations of this option. The so-called Asian Tigers variation would be based on rapidly increasing productivity, supported by a high level of flexibility and the adaptability of the labour force as well as the very active role of the state in its import-substituting and export-orientated industrialisation strategies and trade policy (see Dicken 1998, Held et al 2005). It seems that the political and economic elites of the countries concerned did not have capabilities to follow this very demanding geo-economic and geopolitical option. Interestingly, this variation also approximated, in some respects, the so-called “Chinese way” of economic reform and development (Ofer, Bosworth 1995, pp. 39–43). It refers to “China’s strategy of pursuing economic reform without political change”, thereby avoiding “a daunting ‘dual revolution’, attempting a historical transformation of the economy, while at the same time trying to build stable and effective democracies out of the ruins of a single-party dictatorship. Therefore, it is possible to view China’s continuing dictatorship, as a form of government well-suited to the implementation of economic policies that an electorate would not choose for itself, or that an unstable democracy could not successfully undertake” (Walder 1995, p. 975). But, clearly, one can ask how stable China’s “developmental dictatorship” can be and what specific conditions existed in large China and that were lacking in the post-soviet countries. It seems that sustained economic growth was successful in China, because it was undertaken by an extensive de facto privatisation, combined with a long-term tendency to disperse industrial ownership across local jurisdictions, which served to heighten the interest and experience of local cadres in economic

activities. Further, the claim can be made that the Chinese family emerged from the period of Mao collectivism with a much higher capacity to sustain small-scale entrepreneurship than a comparable Russian family would have had. At a more general level, the Chinese case suggests that a transformation economy “must alter incentives not merely for individuals and firms but for government agencies and government officials themselves, for the behaviour of the latter can have enormous economic consequences” (Walder 1995, p. 978). In short, however, it seems that the unique Chinese culture, the Chinese Diaspora and the influence of Hong Kong served as valuable sources of knowledge and investment and as important bridges to the world economy. These included quantitative and qualitative resources that none of the post-soviet countries had at its disposal. Moreover, the so-called Chinese way is clearly incompatible with the westward political and economic transformations that were anticipated with the status of EU membership.

Finally, there is also the sub-variant of Oil Producers. Evidence suggests that in wealthy oil and gas producing countries, political and economic elites could base the geo-economic linkages on a narrow spectrum of exports, avoiding the complexities of large scale industrialisation and an industrial labour force, and reducing or eliminating the need for taxation, in addition to other complex burdens of an advanced, industrialised country with “a diverse and interrelated economy that becomes increasingly difficult for authoritarian regimes to control” (Huntington 1991, p. 65). In essence, in rich oil producing countries, revenues accrue to the state and can be partially redistributed and used as a trade-off between authoritarian state support and democracy. It is also clear that, in the 1990s in the former Soviet orbit, there was no country that had, or utilised, the capacity to trade natural resources at the level necessary to enable the political and economic elite to choose this particularly expensive option.

3.2.2. A “westward” transition: democratisation and economic liberalisation

The preceding overview of the basic geopolitical and geo-economic options available to the post-communist political and economic elites clearly indicates that there was, in fact, only one successful option available. This was the so-called “westward” transition (see also Dostál 1997, 1998a, 1998b), the first option discussed above. The option involves the selection of a high route, in terms of post-communist transformation, aimed at full-fledged EU membership, in a relatively short timeframe. It is clear that, in accordance with the so-called Copenhagen criteria, this implies that the political and economic elites of the countries concerned were willing and able to pursue, more or less simultaneously, democratisation and economic liberalisation.

Many observers of the early post-communist transformation (cf. Gelb, Gray 1991; Aslund 1994) claim that there was a general positive (i.e. facili-

tating) impact of genuine democratisation on the process of liberalisation of internal and external economic relations. Such a general impact existed, because “a free economy is embedded in a democratic political order, characterised by the free competition of political forces and ideas” (Kornai 1990, p. 23). This claim emphasises the need for the legitimacy of post-communist successor regimes. Democratisation gave measures of economic liberalisation their necessary legitimacy and increased the credibility of the general economic liberalisation. There was a special attitude among citizens towards state institutions and policies, when the successor regime had a large degree of legitimacy, “meaning that the regime is accepted as valid in a moral sense” (Lane, Ersson 1994, p. 194). Thus, post-communist regimes, having a considerable degree of legitimacy, could easily introduce far-reaching economic changes and ask the citizens to accept the economic sacrifices associated with any transformational slump (see Linz and Stepan arguing that “the issue for modern democracies is not the creation of a *market*, but the creation of an *economic society*” (1996, p. 435). The logic of these arguments implies that a coherent regulatory institutional environment and the rule of law is required to transform etatist-socialist command economies into economic societies and market economies. Naturally, this was exactly the primary combination of institutional demands underlying the June-1993 Copenhagen criteria. It is clear that the creation of democratic, regulatory state power was a key priority. Constitutional engineers from among the emerging post-communist political elites of the countries concerned were taking control of and adjusting communist constitutions or drawing up entirely new constitutions (see Lane 1996). In all of the post-communist countries concerned, the old, adjusted or new constitutions established a basic legal and regulatory infrastructure and, importantly, the rules of the game between legislature, executive and head of state. One can assume that the consolidation of democracy can be measured and will show a positive relationship with a general institutional measure indicating differences within the set of post-communist countries, in terms of their progress in economic liberalisation.

One can use well-known data on the de facto respect for political rights and civil liberties from 1993, 1994 and 1995 provided by Freedom House surveys (variable DEMO9395) as a measure indicating progress in the de facto *consolidation of democratisation*. These scores on political rights and civil liberties have been compiled by a large team of Freedom House associates. The concept of political and civil rights is indicated by the basic proposition that “freedom is the chance to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of government and other centres of potential domination”. Democratic political rights are seen as enabling citizens to freely participate in political affairs, i.e. to choose policy-makers who will make “binding decisions affecting the national, regional and local community” (Ryan 1993, p. 77). This is in accordance with the well-known conception of democracy developed by Dahl (1982), who emphasises both participation and contestability

Table 6 – Twenty-five post-communist countries: some indicators

Name	POP	DEMO9395	ECONLI95	EDEV	PEREU7
<i>Former Czechoslovakia:</i>					
Czechia (CZ)	10.3	35	3.44	1.43	44
Slovakia (SK)	5.3	27	3.22	0.94	38
Poland (PL)	38.4	33	3.33	0.70	46
Hungary (HU)	10.3	35	3.44	0.78	27
Romania (ROM)	22.8	22	2.44	-0.62	40
Bulgaria (BUL)	8.9	32	2.56	1.14	34
<i>Former Soviet Union:</i>					
Estonia (ES)	1.5	30	3.22	0.97	42
Latvia (LA)	2.6	29	2.67	0.54	31
Lithuania (LI)	3.7	33	2.78	0.07	25
Belarus (BEL)	10.2	17	2.11	0.41	6
Ukraine (UKR)	52.1	22	2.22	0.51	15
Moldova (MOL)	4.4	18	2.56	-0.80	n.a.
Russia (RUS)	148.0	23	2.56	1.17	12
Kazakhstan (KAZ)	16.7	12	2.11	-0.29	4
Kyrgyzstan (KYR)	4.4	21	2.78	-1.25	n.a.
Uzbekistan (UZB)	20.3	2	2.33	-1.04	n.a.
Turkmenistan (TUR)	3.6	2	1.11	-1.87	n.a.
Tajikistan (TAD)	5.2	2	1.56	-1.53	n.a.
Georgia (GEO)	5.5	15	2.00	-0.05	11
Armenia (ARM)	3.3	22	2.11	0.36	4
Azerbaijan (AZE)	7.1	8	1.56	-0.78	n.a.
<i>Former Yugoslavia:</i>					
Slovenia (SI)	2.0	35	3.11	1.22	52
Croatia (CRO)	4.7	20	2.78	0.54	27
Macedonia (MAC)	2.2	24	2.44	-0.84	39
Albania (ALB)	3.3	24	2.33	-1.67	46

Note: POP – population size in millions (Eurostat); DEMO9395 – measure of political rights and civil liberties 1993–1995 (Freedom House assessment, see text); ECONLI95 – measure of economic liberalisation in 1995 (EBRD assessment, see text); EDEV – a standardized principal component score on inherited level of economic development and modernisation (see Dostál, 1998a; 1998b); n.a. – not available; PEREU7 – percentage of positive answers regarding future ties of the country to The European Union (Autumn of 1996; Central and Eastern Eurobarometer no. 7).

as the very minimal ingredients of any democratic order. Operationally, the concepts of political rights and civil liberties are applied on an inter-subjective basis, by the Freedom House team, to classify countries, annually, on two complementary scales. The overall annual score of democratisation for each country is derived from two summary scores, each varying from 1 to 7 (cf. Ryan 1993). Thus, the individual scores of eleven items on a checklist of political rights and thirteen items on a checklist of civil liberties (see Freedom Review 1994, 1995) were summed up and re-scaled in the survey to obtain two arrays of data, indicating the two sub-dimensions of democratisa-

tion. One added the two data arrays in order to obtain a single summarising scale simultaneously taking into account differences in both the scope and intensity of democratisation throughout the twenty-five countries in 1993, 1994 and 1995. Standardisation of the summarising scale DEMO9395 has been computed, according to its average, and the scores are expressed in units of their standard deviation, so as to describe the overall variation among the set of twenty-five countries (see score DEMO9395 in Table 6).

Economic liberalisation can be conceptualised as the process of *de-etatisation* of post-communist national economies. The overarching role of the state as the owner of large and small enterprises, director of the allocation of production factors and regulator of prices and domestic and foreign trade relations is reduced, during the process of liberalisation of internal and external economic relations (Kornai 1990, 1995). Accordingly, results of the mid-1994 and mid-1995 comparative surveys, made by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD 1994, p. 10ff; 1995, p. 11ff), can be used as indicators. The comparative approach of EBRD was broad enough to include major subfields of economic liberalisation, ranging from (i) large and (ii) small privatisation and (iii) enterprise restructuring to (iv) price liberalisation and competition, (v) trade and the foreign exchange system, (vi) banking reform and securities markets, (vii) non-bank financial institutions and (viii) the effectiveness of legal rules on investment. The EBRD team completed the arduous task of assigning numbers for each of the eight separate checklist items, allowing for quantification of economic liberalisation in each of the subfields. Naturally, these indications are also not purely mechanical and they are forced to reflect the judgments of a team of experts, considering the individual countries annually. The original scores ranging from 1 to 4 in each of the subfields for 1994 and 1995 can be combined and standardised in order to obtain a single dimension (ECONLIB95) of economic liberalisation across the set of twenty-five post-communist countries (see Table 6). The ECONLIB95 scores are also standardised in relation to their mean and expressed in standard deviation units.

It is evident that the primary argument in favour of a clear correlation between the processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation is not, in the case of the set of twenty-five post-communist countries, a priori watertight, and should be checked factually. This crucial institutional imperative can be accepted as a *base-line hypothesis* for the statistical examination. Accordingly, one can argue that viewing democratisation and economic liberalisation in the dynamic terms of a *gradual regime change* as opposed to a “qualitative jump”, allows for the *empirical* identification of the positions of the twenty-five countries on the dimensions of increasing democratisation and economic liberalisation. Moreover, it should be pointed out that relative positions of the individual post-communist countries on the two dimensions clearly show (see Figure 6) whether, by the mid-1990s, political and economic elites had succeeded at constructing more western-style political




Figure 6 – Democratisation and economic liberalisation in twenty-five post-communist countries in the mid-1990s. Source: Dostál 1998b.

and economic regimes, compatible with the first two geopolitical and geo-economic options discussed above, or whether progress in democratisation and economic liberalisation was slow and more closely associated with the other two “eastern” options.

The dimension of democratisation in Figure 6 is not accidentally placed horizontally. This is due to the fact that, as explained above, the scope and intensity of democratisation must be sufficient to make economic changes in the post-communist regimes credible, both in the sense of a necessary level of legitimacy in the countries concerned and in terms of external credibility of the institutional changes introduced to foreign investors (cf. Aslund 1994; Bosworth, Ofer 1995; EBRD 1996). Thus, one can perceive economic liberalisation as a process that is, to a large extent, dependent on

the democratisation process. There is a clear positive correlation between the factors, indicating that 72 percent of the variation on the ECONLIB95 axis is statistically determined by variation on the DEMO9395 axis (Pearson correlation coefficient $r = 0.846$). Although, cross-sectional data are used, this evident relationship is in accordance with the institutional imperative claim that democratisation is supportive of post-communist institutional transformations, both for internal and external economic relations.

The upper-right quadrant contains countries that have realised high levels of democratisation. These countries also appear to have made progress in economic liberalisation. The two highest ranking countries – with very similar values – on the democratisation dimension, during the period from 1993 to 1995, are Hungary and Czechia. Likewise, these countries had also realised the highest level of economic liberalisation, in 1995. Other countries that belong to this group include Poland, Estonia and Slovenia. The political elites of these post-communist countries selected the high route to European integration, as summarised above in the first geopolitical and geo-economic option. It is not surprising to note that, in December 1997, the European Council in Luxembourg endorsed EU Commission recommendations to open negotiations with these five countries (and Cyprus). The actual negotiations assumed the form of a series of bilateral, inter-governmental conferences between the EU member states and each of the candidate countries. Following detailed examinations of different chapters of the *acquis communautaire* (the so-called screening) negotiations proceeded with the candidate countries, chapter by chapter. It should be noted that this negotiation process requires high levels of compatibility, often requiring similarity or even unanimity, regarding the details of democratic and economic institutions, norms and procedures between the EU and the candidate countries involved (Mayhew 1998, Preston 1997, EC 2000).

It is interesting to note, in Figure 6, the apparent diversity in the positions of the other five post-communist countries, which also signed Europe Association Agreements. Great distance exists, for instance, between Slovakia and Romania. It appears that, in the mid-1990s, the political elite of Romania lagged significantly behind the other four members of this group, in terms of establishing a democratic and liberally economic regime. This unfavourable position indicated that, during the mid-1990s, the geopolitical option of a high route to European integration, selected by the Romanian political elite, seemed to be less realistic than initially expected. It also appears that Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania lagged significantly behind in the economic liberalisation process. It is apparent that, in Slovakia, the scope and intensity of democratisation did not correspond with the progress in economic liberalisation. It seems that Slovakia inherited certain basic economic reforms from the period of post-communist Czechoslovakia (1990–1992). Indeed, it appears that in spite of some deterioration in the *de facto* respect for political rights and civil liberties in this country, the Slovak political

elite conceived the economic measures already introduced, in 1990–1991, as largely irreversible.

Russia's position in Figure 6 is close to the average scores and yet on the positive sides of the two dimensions of early institutional transformation. However, both Vasiliev (1994) and Hanson (1996) have argued that Russian transformation of inherited political and economic institutions is highly problematic. When compared with the CIS economies, Russia's early transformation looks better. But, when compared with the post-communist economies in East-Central Europe and the Baltic, Russia appears unsuccessful. This suggests certain questions as to whether, in this largest post-communist state, the necessary "critical masses" of democratic and market measures were effectively introduced. It is clear that, in the mid-1990s, prospects were bleak for the countries exhibiting average progress in democratisation and economic liberalisation and it was doubtful that they would be capable of following the high route, European integration process, i.e. the first option discussed above. Instead, the public in these countries could anticipate reluctant progress in westward transformation of the post-communist regimes concerned.

The lower-left quadrant of Figure 6 contains countries that made little progress with democratisation and also realised only modest levels of economic liberalisation. Turkmenistan apparently exhibited the lowest rankings among the set of twenty-five post-communist countries in the two institutional dimensions and that Tajikistan and Azerbaijan also displayed very low levels of democratisation and economic liberalisation. The position of Uzbekistan should also be pointed out. It is particularly interesting to see that this less-developed national economy was making progress in economic liberalisation, while apparently avoiding the pursuit of a corresponding level of democratisation. According to the Freedom House surveys, Uzbekistan, along with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan, was classified, in the mid-1990s, as *not free*. It appears that the Uzbek successor regime made some attempts to follow, to a limited extent, the "Chinese way" of institutional reform discussed above, i.e. moving forward with some economic reforms, yet blocking the democratisation process (see also Ofer, Bosworth 1995, pp. 39–43). However, it is also clear that, in Uzbekistan, the progress of economic liberalisation was relatively modest. Its ECONLIB95 score is still well below the average of the twenty-five post-communist countries examined. However, as indicated in the previous section, it seems that these countries did not have any other options available, besides taking part in the rather loose and often chaotic geopolitical and geo-economic co-operation, within the general framework of the CIS.

3.3. Explaining westward (EU) orientation in public opinion (LISREL modelling)

The idea that various geopolitical and geo-economic options were not realistic, in the mid-1990s, in light of progress made in democratisation and economic liberalisation, was emphasised above. The fact that certain structural characteristics of the various groups of the post-communist countries are important has also been stressed. This section focuses on the geography of public opinion and directs its attention to the last group of questions, regarding the geopolitical visions of the public in the post-communist countries, in the mid-1990s. One could expect that the public in the countries concerned had differing basic orientations and feelings. One could also expect that the public showed considerable realism and preferred geopolitical opinions that were not necessarily in line with the geopolitical options chosen by the respective political elites of the countries concerned. A certain part of the public could be inclined to believe that the future of their country lied in closer links with the EU; another part of the public could believe that the future the country lied in closer relations with Russia. One can assume that identification of the basic structure of this major geopolitical and geo-economic division would tend to indicate how the post-communist polities were affected by the two key geopolitical crosscurrents in Europe.

Furthermore, the empirical relationships and associated questions are translated into a causal order of numerous variables, which are then used in a multivariate model to explain the most important geopolitical and geo-economic orientation in public opinion: i.e. a westward orientation in public opinion towards the European Union. Unfortunately, one cannot use data that would show public opinion in all of the 25 post-communist countries that were assessed above, in terms of democratisation and economic liberalisation processes. One can only analyse public opinion data, representing the geopolitical visions and orientation of nineteen post-communist countries (see Table 6). However, given the composition of this smaller set of countries, it can still be claimed that the set is representative of the larger set of twenty-five countries (see also Dostál 1997, 1998b). Clearly, due to the nature of this variable-oriented approach (cf. Ragin 1987, Gould 1970), the same explanation must be applied to all of the nineteen countries of post-communist Eurasia. In other words, one must assume that the variables and relations specified in the causal order of the general explanatory model have approximately the same meaning in each of the countries concerned. The assumption concerning the similarity of a number of fundamental variables and their correlations, across all of the political, economic, and ethno-cultural divisions in this vast region, makes it possible to derive the general questions, formulated above, concerning the conditions and processes of the stage of post-communist transformation, in the region, in the mid-1990s.

3.3.1. Public opinion variable and structural variables

Public opinion data on European integration are provided by Eurobarometer surveys, which are conducted on behalf of the European Commission (see Reif, Inglehart, eds. 1991; Niedermayer, Sinnott, eds. 1995). Representative national samples of the public were interviewed in the autumn of 1996. The standard sample size of the surveys was approximately 1,000 persons per country, representing the population 15 years of age and older. Over 19,000 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in the 19 states. Most of the questions were derived from policy considerations rather than scientific concerns. In spite of this, there are clear advantages associated with the Eurobarometer data. In autumn 1990, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer started with surveys of nationally representative samples undertaken by the EU in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Subsequent surveys were extended to also include certain post-Soviet states and most successor states of the former Yugoslavia. In each of these countries, respondents were interviewed during the period from 25 October to 30 November 1996 (see Central and Eastern Eurobarometer No. 7, March 1997).

The advantages associated with these Eurobarometer data are considerable. The existence of comparable data across a large number of countries, in Western and Eastern Europe, allows for cross-sectional statistical analysis at the macro-level of the countries concerned, in order to establish similarities and differences between countries and to specify systematic tendencies that seem to cause such similarities. In short, the analytical possibilities are great. Given the complexity of public opinion regarding the anticipated new EU enlargement, the broad spectrum of multivariate LISREL (linear structural equations) analysis is utilised (see the earlier description of this modelling in chapter 2; Saris, Stronkhorst 1984). An explanatory (causal) order of structural conditions is postulated, including characteristics such as population size; level of economic development; differences in progress, in terms of democratisation and economic liberalisation, and the intensity of trade relations with Russia in each of the countries concerned, which seemingly influenced opinion in the eastern polities regarding major geopolitical orientations, in autumn 1996.

The dependent variable in the statistical examination is derived from the public's answers, in each of the nineteen post-communist countries, to the question *"as things now stand, which of the following do you see (our country's future) most closely tied to?"* (Central and Eastern Barometer No. 7, 1997, Annex 26 and 27). The variable is the percentage of answers saying that the country's future lies in the European Union (dependent variable PEREU7). In other words, one may assume that, for the set of nineteen post-communist countries, this variable indicates a westward geopolitical orientation of the public regarding close ties with EU member countries, i.e. with the developed core of the European continent. The percentage of the public that perceived a




Figure 7 – Orientation of public opinion regarding the European Union and Russia (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer No. 7, October–November 1996; N = 19). Source: own calculations. (PERCEU7 = percentage of answers saying that country's future lies in the European Union, PERCRUS7 = percentage of answers saying that country's future lies in Russia)

geopolitical orientation focused on Russia is also presented as a second public opinion variable (variable PERCRUS7).

Figure 7 shows a scatter diagram between the variable PERCEU7 and the variable PERCRUS7. The scatter diagram clearly documents the systematic negative relationship between the two opinion variables. Accordingly, at least three preliminary, yet important, conclusions must be drawn. First, the strong negative correlation between the two variables indicates a significant inverse relationship between westward geopolitical orientation in public opinion orientated towards the EU and eastern orientation, directed at relations with Russia. These two tendencies in public opinion articulation show the importance of the key geopolitical crosscurrents. This is no great surprise; however, the intensity of the competition between the two basic orientations in post-communist Euro-Asia is extraordinary (Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.869). Second, in Figure 7, three major groupings of countries can be distinguished. Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Ukraine are grouped together in the lower right hand quadrant. It should be noted that only Ukraine and Georgia exhibit a small share of the public, about 10 percent in autumn 1996, that see the future of the country tied to the West (i.e. to the EU). This is especially true in the case of Ukraine. The

upper left hand quadrant includes post-communist countries that, in the mid-1990s, exhibited considerable progress in the processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation (Slovenia, Poland and Czechia). However, Figure 7 also clearly indicates that these leading EU candidate countries were accompanied by other post-communist countries, which lagged behind in the western-style post-communist transformation (Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia). The geopolitical views of these countries were clearly orientated westward, in spite of the less convincing results of western-style transformation implemented by political elites in the countries concerned. An intermediary grouping of countries, which includes the three Baltic countries and Bulgaria, is also discernible. It seems that this relatively stronger geopolitical orientation in the Baltic region is due to large portions of Russian and Ukrainian minorities and, in the case of Bulgaria, the effect of the important historical orientation of this country towards Russia seems to play a significant role. It is also interesting to point out the position of Hungary and Croatia. Public opinion orientated towards the "West" in these two countries was more divided. In Hungary and Croatia the public gave considerable importance to firm ties with the United States (22 and 39 percent respectively). This was a clear effect of the specific geographical setting of the countries, in or close to the war-driven ex-Yugoslav states (29 percent of the Macedonian sample also gave primary importance to ties with the USA). In order to include Russia in the comparison, the country is displayed in terms of the score, regarding the geopolitical orientation of the Russian sample towards the CIS. It is also necessary to point out that the Eurobarometer sample was taken in European Russia. Consequently, it is no great surprise that public opinion was still, in autumn 1996, directed westwards at a level of 13 percent.

The postulated statistical model uses seven structural variables, which describe a variety of relevant conditions and processes in the nineteen countries and which can be seen as independent variables, explaining variations in westward geopolitical orientation (PECEU7, the dependent variable) among the countries. The first structural characteristic (EDEV) is the level of economic development, represented with a principal component score, indicating the development level inherited from the former communist regimes, at the end of 1980s (Dostál 1998b). One can assume that this structural characteristic will have a positive effect on westward orientated public opinion. The second structural variable to be examined, in terms of its effects in the model, is population size (LOGSIZE). Claims have been made concerning the importance of population size, specifically that small post-communist countries would be more in favour of the EU integration process, because closer ties to the EU would strengthen the geopolitical and geo-economic positions of the countries concerned (Avery, Cameron 1998). Given the enormous differences in population size, varying from tiny Estonia (1.5 million inhabitants) to Russia (148 million inhabitants), this variable

has been transformed so as to obtain a more normal distribution. Thus, the right tail with large population sizes is drawn in towards the mean, while small sizes at the left of the distribution are moved away from the mean. This transformation means that smaller population sizes will have a stronger influence in the overall distribution along this explanatory dimension. The third inherited structural condition to be examined, in terms of its effects in the postulated statistical model, is the former dependence of the nineteen countries on trade within the former Soviet geo-economic bloc. One can assume that the collapse of the CMEA geo-economic bloc and the ultimate disintegration of its federal formations have led to serious adverse impacts on recent economic performance in the countries involved, due to the harmful decline or complete collapse of inter-republic trade (cf. Maschits 1992; Sapir 1992; Michalopoulos, Tarr 1994). Moreover, it can be assumed that a heritage of heavy dependency on intra-bloc exports could have negative impacts on the institutional transformation as well as on the economic results of such a transformation. As Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994) and Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996) have pointed out, the transformation economies had to significantly increase their trade with advanced market economies and show that they could produce sufficiently competitive goods and services. A variable, indicating 1990 intra-bloc exports as percentage of GDP (INTRAEX), has been calculated to specify in statistical terms this important development condition, inherited from the etatist-socialist past. This explanatory variable can be expected to have a negative effect on the westward orientation of public opinion (variable PEREU7).

The remaining two structural characteristics are progress in the democratisation and economic liberalisation processes, as discussed above. The scores shown in Figure 6 are used in the model. The last two explanatory variables are connected with interstate relations. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another important variable indicating substantial progress in economic transition. The internationalisation and globalisation, occurring subsequent to the geo-political and geo-economic opening of the post-communist economies, implied, among other things, that the countries needed to be successful in *attracting* FDI. Understanding that the advancement of FDI is largely dependent on institutional conditions in the region is crucial here (EBRD 1995; 1996). The post-communist states had to reduce uncertainty and increase the chances that economic liberalisation would continue to progress. One can assume that the post-communist countries *capable* of attracting intensive inflows of FDI would be those exhibiting significant progress in democratisation and economic liberalisation. Moreover, the fact that countries, which are able to attract FDI, will exhibit more westward orientated public opinion can be assumed. A survey of foreign investors, carried out by the EBRD, provides comparative data on cumulative FDI-inflows, from 1989 to 1995, throughout the twenty-five economies in question (EBRD 1996, p. 116). However, cumulative flows of FDI into post-commu-

nist Eurasia, since 1989, remain concentrated in a limited number of economies in the region. In per capita terms, the primary recipients are Hungary, Czechia, Estonia and Slovenia. Accordingly, a logarithmic transformation of the per capita FDI-inflow from 1989 to 1995 (in US dollars) is used, in order to obtain a more normal distribution for this variable (LOGFDI8995). The last explanatory variable describes the 1996 trade orientation with respect to the Russian market (RUSTRA96). This is a measure of the intensity of trade relations with the core country of the former Soviet-dominated bloc (see EBRD, 1997).

3.3.2. Explanatory model

The postulated LISREL model shown in Figure 8 explains 75 percent of the variation in the dependent variable PECEU7, which indicates differences in the westward orientation of public opinion, across the nineteen post-communist countries (unexplained variance = 0.25). The outcomes of the LISREL procedure can be interpreted as follows.

The standardised regression coefficients, expressing the *independent* causal effects in the model, indicate that a positive shift of one standard deviation in the variable LOGSIZE implies an average negative shift of -0.37 in the standard deviation of the DEMO9395 dimension. This indicates that population size has a significant negative effect on progress in democratisation. In other words, in smaller countries democratisation tended to proceed faster than in large countries. Similarly, a shift of one standard deviation in the EDEV variable implies an average shift of 0.55 in the standard deviation of the democratisation dimension. EDEV's considerable positive effect means that, in addition to population size, the inherited level of economic development and modernisation was an important positive circumstance, supporting the democratisation process, in the mid-1990s. It seems that in the less-modernised, post-communist states there were relatively fewer opportunities for rapid western-style institutional transformation. There is also an independent negative effect (-0.25) from INTRAEX, indicating that, in countries that were heavily dependent on the Soviet-controlled trading bloc in the past, political elites were less inclined or able to make progress in the democratisation of post-communist regimes. Viewed collectively, one may draw the general conclusion that from these structural variables, only a higher inherited level of economic development and modernisation (EDEV) had an important supportive effect on progress in democratic consolidation.

Further attention shall now be given to the intermediate of the causal model. The four structural conditions statistically determine 66 percent of the total variation of the dependent dimension ECONLIB95 (unexplained variation = 0.34). It appears that the net negative effect of LOGSIZE is low (-0.12), while the inherited level of economic development and modernisation (EDEV) has a significant and direct positive effect (0.37) on the scope




Figure 8 – Westward geopolitical orientation in public opinion: an explanatory model (LISREL; N = 19). Source: own calculations

and intensity of economic liberalisation. It is also clear that a former export orientation towards the Soviet-dominated economic bloc (INTRAEX) has a significant negative effect (-0.40). Also documented in the model is the considerable positive effect (0.44) of the democratisation measure (DEMO9395) on the ECONLI95 measure. Accordingly, the fact that the democratisation measure (DEMO9395) plays an important *mediating* role in the model must be established. The strong positive total effect ($0.37 + 0.24 = 0.61$) of the EDEV measure, indicating the level of economic development and modernisation, is partially mediated by the DEMO9395 measure ($0.55 \times 0.44 = 0.24$). As expected, the direct negative effect (-0.40) of the former export CMEA orientation (INTRAEX) on the economic liberalisation measure was confirmed. This negative effect suggests that an intensive orientation on the Soviet trading bloc, which largely coincides with membership in the former Soviet Union, also had significant retarding impacts on various institutional reforms of the inherited economic regime.

The summarising statistical outcomes in Table 7 make it clear that, within the set of nineteen post-communist countries, the effect of the process of democratisation on westward orientation in public opinion (dependent variable PEREU7) is positive and strong (0.55). The analysis also confirms the key hypothesis that a considerable positive effect of the inherited level of economic development and modernisation on progress in economic liberalisation was *mediated* through the democratisation process (DEMO9395). In essence, the process of democratisation appeared to be a crucial intermediate factor, which was supportive of post-communist economic liberalisation and which also promoted a clear articulation of public opinion supporting westward geopolitical and geo-economic options, in the countries concerned.

Table 7 – Effects of explanatory variables on the westward (EU) orientation of public opinion (N = 19)

Variable	Total effects	Indirect effects	Direct effects
EDEV	0.22	0.38	-0.16
LONGSIZE	-0.34	-0.31	0.03
INTRAEX	-0.58	-0.28	-0.30
DEMO9395	0.70	0.15	0.55
ECONLIB95	0.11	0.05	0.06
LOGFDI8995	0.03	-0.02	0.05
RUSTRA96	-0.15	—	-0.15

Source: own calculations

The fact that FDI-inflow and trade orientation towards Russia did not have any convincing systematic effects on public opinion in this regard can also be pointed out. It should be noted that countries with a heritage of an intensive former orientation towards the Soviet-dominated, geo-economic orbit tended to proceed slowly in the democratisation process and, particularly, in the economic liberalisation process.

Finally, the importance of the total effects of explanatory variables on the variable measuring westward orientation towards closer ties with the EU (PEREU7) can be stressed. Indeed, it appears that the democratisation variable has the most significant positive total effect (0.70) in the model. It is important to emphasise that progress in economic liberalisation seemed to have no systematic effect, and the same applies to the measure of FDI intensity. These results indicate that the economic circumstances of the transition did not have a significant impact on the formation of westward orientated public opinion, in the mid-1990s. On the other hand, it is clear that public opinion in the post-communist polities, exhibiting an intensive heritage of COMECON trade (INTRAEX variable), did not tend to be orientated towards ties with the EU (total effect: -0.58). This correlates, to a large degree, with the distinction between post-soviet countries and other post-communist countries in the former Soviet-dominated zone in East Central and Eastern Europe. Again, the overall negative effect of population size (-0.34) suggests that the polities of small post-communist countries, in the mid-1990s, had a tendency to prefer a westward geopolitical and geo-economic orientation towards closer ties with the EU.

3.4. Conclusions

The outcomes of the multivariate statistical examination, analysing the set of the nineteen post-communist countries, indicate that the structural conditions had relatively weak, yet important, effects on the differentiation in public opinion, concerning westward geopolitical orientation. It appears that the polities in post-communist countries, which inherited higher economic development levels, tended to exhibit higher levels of support for EU orientated geopolitical and geo-economic options, in the mid-1990s. The key conclusion to be drawn is that progress in the democratisation process provided favourable conditions for the westward orientation of public opinion in the polities concerned. It seems that the major cross-pressures, in the post-communist space of Eurasia, were significantly connected with the democratic capabilities of the post-communist political elites from the countries concerned to follow the very demanding western-style modernisation and accept various disciplining implications of anticipated EU accession. Positive evaluations of democracy and a free market economy and the belief in benefits, arising from intensive ties with the EU, seemed to have the most significant impacts and resulted in a “new division of the continent”, reflected in public opinion regarding the process of European integration. Consequently, EU political elites declared only the three post-soviet Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) to be candidate countries and subsequently incorporated into the EU, in the May 2004 enlargement.

4. Eastern enlargement and public opinion regarding Czech membership (survey 2000)

4.1. Introduction

Chapter 3 of this book explained the idea that, for Europeans and indeed for many people throughout the world, the collapse of the geopolitical divide of the Iron Curtain, at the end of the 1980s, brought a fundamental change of historical importance. It was, perhaps, the most important change since the end of the Second World War. As an inevitable consequence of this collapse, complex processes of redrawing the map of Europe and thereby changing the basic geopolitical and geo-economic organisation of the continent began. Such processes were structured in the historical core of the European Union, its old and new semi-peripheries and, significantly, in its periphery, which, since the fall of the Iron Curtain, includes a large number of old, new or restored post-communist countries. Many people were surprised by the rapidity, with which this geopolitical and developmental redrawing of the European map took place (see also Ash 1993; Dostál, Hampl 1996).

By the end of the 1990s, the anticipated eastern enlargement of the European Union became critical for the future of the European integration process (Preston 1997, Mayhew 1998). In the beginning of the 1990s, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed by the twelve member governments of the European Communities. The largely Liberal-Institutionalist view of Maastricht saw the Treaty as an important step towards an international society in Western Europe strengthening the European integration process. The post-war, four-decade-long period of building an international society, only in Europe's north- and southwest with Greece as an outlier, appeared to be over. It also seemed apparent to the numerous countries in East-Central Europe and Eastern Europe, in accordance with the new Article 49 of the EU Treaty (Amsterdam 1997) on enlargement, that: "Any European state may apply to become a Member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by absolute majority of its component members." However, Article 49 also demanded, in compliance with the June 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, that an applicant country respects the principles

specified in Article 6, which stipulate that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”. Interestingly, the EU Treaty did not include any clear geographic definition of Europe. Consequently, this omission and the basic stipulations of the Treaty made it clear that the prospect of EU membership continued to offer an important incentive to Central and Eastern Europeans to persevere with western-style political and economic transformation.

Clearly, the far-reaching fragmentation of the macro-geographic map of East Central and Eastern Europe complicated the evolution of European unifying processes. However, Emerson (1997), Preston (1997) and many other observers of the ongoing European integration recognised that the EU was the only key institutional vehicle able to make the dynamics of the European integration process persistent and strong. It seemed that the basic geopolitical and geo-economic organisation of the continent, in the historical core of the EU, its old and new semi-peripheries and its periphery, was undergoing significant changes. Most of the post-communist countries officially sought EU membership, beginning in the mid-1990s (EC 2000). Such membership required far-reaching qualitative regime adaptations, the establishment of western-styled institutional arrangements and compatibility with western political and economic standards of democracy and market economy (see Dostál 1998b; EC 2000, pp. 9–10; Mayhew 1998). In short, adaptation processes had to stretch much further and affect entire societies and economies, involving much more than the mere implementation of necessary adaptations by political and economic elites in the post-communist countries concerned. It is, therefore, important to know whether accompanying behavioural and public opinion adaptations contribute significantly to the current unifying processes of European integration. Accordingly, the central argument of this chapter is that, in line with the classical claim of Deutsch et al. (1957) about the integration process (see chapter 2), variables concerning geopolitical sentiment and identity and describing political opinions and mass interest articulations must be central to studies of European integration processes, because common identity and sense of community must be acknowledged again, at the beginning of the third millennium, as essential features of political integration (see also Sinnott 1995). In other words, analyses concerned with processes of integration have to be focused on these questions: (i) whether the supra-national integrative efforts of political elites from the countries concerned were supported by some sense of European community in public opinion from EU countries as well as from the candidate countries, (ii) whether such a sense of belonging to a European community was spreading across the former divide of the Iron Curtain and, more specifically, (iii) whether the value-orientation of public opinion in Czechia was westward orientated towards integration into the EU.

Accordingly, one way of assessing the extent to which the post-Cold War fragmentation of Europe was being surmounted and the manner in which the European integration process tended to proceed, is to focus analytical efforts on explaining public opinion in the fifteen member states of the EU regarding anticipated enlargement of the EU towards the set of twelve accession countries (ten post-communist states from the former Soviet-dominated geopolitical orbit and the Mediterranean countries of Cyprus and Malta). Therefore, this chapter attempts to analyse public opinion regarding anticipated EU enlargement, in terms of the anticipated membership of Czechia. The structure of the chapter is as follows. The second section focuses on the basic pattern of the macro-geographical structure of the EU and its enlarged periphery of then thirteen associated candidate countries and indicates certain general hypotheses concerned with articulated interests of the EU polities regarding eastern enlargement. The third section is concerned with a statistical explanation (based on the LISREL procedure) of differences in support of Czech accession in public opinion in the set of fifteen EU countries. The fourth section seeks to describe the character of the Czech electorate's changing public opinion, regarding anticipated EU membership, during the second half of the 1990s. Finally, the concluding section draws major conclusions, resulting from the analytical and explanatory efforts.

4.2. EU historical core, semi-peripheries and peripheries

The geopolitical division of Europe that persisted for more than four decades, after the Second World War, was artificial. This division neither corresponded with any pre-war macro-regional division on the basis of politics, culture or religion, nor did it make sense, in terms of the geography of diffusion of modernisation, during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century (see Musil 1994). In terms of the West-East gradient of modernisation (largely industrialisation), the Czech Lands (i.e. the current Czechia) certainly ranked among the western and most industrialised regions of the continent, during that historical period. Modernisation processes integrated the territory of Czechia into the core area of industrial activities of western continental Europe. Therefore, from this general geopolitical and geo-economic viewpoint, one could view the western-style institutional reforms and behavioural adaptations of citizens in Czechia, during the 1990s, as the result of a "return" to the development trajectory of "open" societal systems, with the corresponding reintroduction of competitive mechanisms and motivations, resulting from the plurality of actors and interest groups in political and economic subsystems. In other words, as explained in the preceding chapter of this book, the claim can be made that the western-style behavioural adaptations and changing value orientations taking place

in Czechia should be seen as qualitative, subjective processes of “westward orientation” (see chapter 3).

The EU is the primary geopolitical and geo-economic compact of the continent. Moreover, in terms of the complexity of political and economic integration, the EU cannot be compared with any other inter-state compact in the world. In spite of this reality, the fundamental political and economic structure of the set of 15 EU countries and the 13 candidate countries can be differentiated, at the end of the 1990s, on the basis of two different criteria. First, there is an evident distinction, according to the date of initial EU membership or initial EU association among the candidate countries concerned. Second, differences exist, in terms of gross domestic product per capita in 2000, which help define basic groupings of the 28 countries. The GDP measure is in real terms and is expressed in purchasing power standards in order to make comparisons more meaningful, by excluding the effect of higher price levels in the EU and in certain candidate countries, such as Cyprus or Slovenia.

The first (time) dimension distinguishes between the six countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) that brought the supra-national entity, which is presently known as the EU, from the Treaty of Paris (the European Coal and Steel Community) of 1951 to the Treaties of Rome (the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy) of 1957. These countries later negotiated enlargements in order to prepare for the accession of other (new) members (Preston 1997, Mayhew 1998). The original six members form the first grouping, i.e. the historical core of the European Community. These original members were joined by the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland in the first wave of enlargement, in 1973. The three countries of the 1973 enlargement now exhibit a similar level of economic performance (GDP per capita in 2000) as the historical core of the EU. This suggests that these early candidate countries have reaped long-term benefits from their integration into the EU geo-economic and geopolitical compact. It is apparent that the 1973 enlargement group forms a second grouping, i.e. an old outer group of the historical core. Next to join were Greece, in 1981, and, in 1986, Spain and Portugal. This second enlargement is often called the Mediterranean wave and, in terms of economic performance, these three members still form, as of 2000, the third grouping, i.e. the old periphery of the EU. Austria, Sweden and Finland acceded, in 1995, and this enlargement can be called the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) wave. These countries form the fourth grouping, i.e. a new outer core of the EU. This particular enlargement took place after the entity of the European Community became the European Union, in November 1993, as a result of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. This time axis of EU membership can be further extended with the initial dates of EU association of candidate countries. The idea that association with the EU materialised in the form of Europe Association Agreements (EAA) was explained in chapter 3. During

the period from December 1991 to June 1996, EEAs were signed between the EU and ten post-communist countries. These agreements entered into force between 1994 and 1998 (EC 2000). However, Turkey was the first country to have an EAA, having signed an association agreement in 1963 and having applied for full EU membership in 1987 (see McLaren 2007). Due to the fall of the Iron Curtain and unsatisfactory records regarding political rights and civil liberties, Turkey was not allowed to initiate accession negotiations, but was permitted to consolidate its custom union with the EU (Preston 1997, pp. 213–219). This is in contrast to Malta and Cyprus, which signed EAAs in 1971 and 1973, respectively, and which were able to negotiate their EU memberships (Mayhew 1998, pp. 95–99). In terms of GDP per capita, these countries form the fifth grouping, i.e. a periphery of old associated countries.

The ten post-communist countries signed their respective EAAs in the period from 1991 to 1996 and these agreements entered into force between 1994 and 1998. As soon as geopolitical conditions allowed, the post-communist countries were granted forms of association leading to free trade, albeit with certain significant limitations concerning agricultural and so-called, sensitive products. Interestingly, Harrison (1995) suggests that a close correlation is apparent between sensitive sectors and areas of high subsidy within the EU. Moreover, the Copenhagen Criteria, mentioned in the preceding chapters, appeared to be a clear restatement of the inviolability of the *aquis communautaire*, i.e. of full acceptance of the entire EU legislation and norms by accession countries. There are two groups of newly associated post-communist countries. On the one hand, there is the sixth grouping, the so-called Luxembourg group of post-communist countries including Slovenia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Estonia, which was established in the 1997 Agenda 2000 report from the European Commission. This group included candidate countries, for which the European Council in Luxembourg endorsed European Commission recommendations to open negotiations, in December 1997. From a long-term perspective, this group of countries could be expected to form a semi-periphery within the EU. The idea that this group of five post-communist candidate countries tended to show more significant progress in institutional transformation and economic performance than the other newly associated post-communist countries was presented in chapter 3 (Dostál 1998a, EC 2000). It seemed that other post-communist candidate countries would need to anticipate a significantly slower integration process and, from a long-term perspective in the late 1990s, they would potentially form a seventh grouping, i.e. a “genuine” periphery of the enlarged EU of the future.

This basic differentiation of the set of 28 countries into seven groupings of countries enabled the following assumptions to be made, which could in turn be used in an explanatory analysis of public opinion regarding eastern enlargement and, specifically, the accession of Czechia into the

EU. First, the historical core and the wealthy old and new outer cores of the current EU would need to anticipate larger contributions to the EU budget, when the newly associated countries would become members (see Baldwin, Wyplosz 2004). In general, one could assume that countries, forming the historical core, would all become contributors to the EU budget and to a much greater degree than they would be no recipients or, at the very least, they would be below-average recipients (Preston 1997). Second, they had to anticipate a restructuring of the Common Agricultural Policy. This would have significant impact on the long established interests of the agricultural sector, especially in the countries of the historical core. Third, the countries in the EU periphery would need to expect a restructuring of the existing Structural and Cohesion Funds. The impact of the Iberian enlargement meant significant structural spending (Baldwin et al. 1997). It could be expected that these members would demand special budget allocations in return for assuming the obligations of financial support for the new members. Fourth, under EU rules, small countries were afforded far more votes per citizen than larger countries. Clearly, eastern enlargement would bring pressure to change EU rules, and not surprisingly, this would lead to reorientations in budget priorities and uncertainty about well-established financial distributions between countries, sectors and regions, which had developed during the 1980s and 1990s. Public opinion in the larger countries could be expected to be concerned with overall effectiveness, if “micro-states” would be required to assume the same level of EU responsibilities as large states. Other concerns focused on the potential power of blocking coalitions of small states to frustrate ambitions of the larger states. Whichever assumption(s) was (were) correct, the anticipated eastern enlargement would inevitably change the budgetary interests of the four basic groupings of EU member countries. The new eastern entrants with their relatively low economic performance would be inclined to use their power as members to boost EU structural spending and to try to change eligibility criteria (Baldwin, Wyplosz 2004). In 2000, there was no reason to assume that the new entrants would be different from those of the Mediterranean enlargement. Finally, one may point to fears along the border regions of EU countries, such as Germany or Austria, concerning their proximity to the candidate countries.

4.3. EU public opinion regarding Czech membership

Public opinion data, concerning the European integration process and Czechia’s anticipated EU membership, were provided by Eurobarometer surveys. Analytical possibilities indicating differences in public opinion, at the macro level, among the fifteen EU member states regarding the question: “Should the Czech Republic join the European Union?” were used in




Figure 9 – Support for Czech membership in 1997 and 2000 across the EU15.
Source: Eurobarometer No. 54, European Commission, Brussels.

order to specify differences in public opinion concerning Czech membership (Eurobarometer no. 54, 2001, B.78).

Figure 9 clearly documents how support for Czech membership varied considerably among EU member states, by indicating the percentage of positive answers, in autumn 1997 and autumn 2000. Closer comparison of the variation across countries reveals certain shifts, from 1997 to 2000, in support for Czech membership. First, it appears that strong support was expressed in public opinion from Scandinavian members Sweden and Denmark, as well as in Greece. A further conclusion to be drawn is that a high level of support (50 percent or more) was also given by the public in Italy, the Netherlands and Finland. Second, the significant fact that public opinion in France and Austria, and to a slightly lesser degree in the UK and Belgium, was very low should be established. However, support in Germany was also low. It should be noted that there were significant differences between West and East Germany. The public in West Germany supported Czech membership at a rate of only 38 percent (autumn 2000). At the same time, public opinion in East Germany indicated 53 percent in favour. It appears that public opinion in the key countries of the EU, which form a so-called major axis




Figure 10 – Explanatory model of differentiation in support for Czech membership.
Source: own calculations.

of decision-making, namely France and Germany, tended to give only a low level of support to Czech accession. This seemed to be a serious handicap in acquiring the necessary legitimacy for the anticipated membership.

Third, the fact that Italy and the Netherlands, both members of the historical core of the EU, gave clear support for Czech accession should be noted. It is also important to point out that electorates in Greece and Spain both tended to support Czech membership. This is significant, because these two countries belonged to the EU periphery, which was largely dependent on Structural and Cohesion Funds and the public in these countries could anticipate a redistribution of these funds, following the accession. Fourth, it also appears that support for Czech accession decreased slightly, after 1997. Significantly, 41 percent of the public in Germany supported Czechia representing a higher-than-average support level. Also, the electorate in the Netherlands gave more support for Czech accession than its average level of support for eastern enlargement. Only in four EU countries did the public gave less support for Czech membership than the average level of support for the twelve candidate countries (see Eurobarometer no. 54). The lowest level of support for Czech accession was in Austria.

Given the complexity of these tendencies, concerning the differentiation of public opinion support for anticipated Czech membership in the EU, it is again necessary to use the broad scope of multivariate LISREL analysis (see Fig. 10). The LISREL approach necessitates postulation of an explanatory (causal) order of structural conditions that appear to influence opinions in

the western polities on EU enlargement, specifically regarding the accession of Czechia. The role of structural conditions and intermediate variables in the formation of political opinion are examined as determinants of public opinion articulations regarding new EU enlargement and are, therefore, analysed as explanatory variables. The dependent variable of this statistical examination is the difference between positive and negative answers, concerning Czechia's anticipated membership (variable CZPONE54). The causal order of the postulated statistical model, explaining attitudes, regarding Czech membership, among the fifteen EU countries is conceptualised in two blocks: five structural variables and four public opinion variables (see Fig. 10).

4.3.1. Structural variables

The first structural characteristic (GDP96) is the level of economic development, represented as GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in 1996 (Eurostat 1998, p. 45). Due to the fact that EU countries with high scores in this variable are the primary, net, per capita contributors to the EU budget (Preston 1997), one can expect a negative effect of this variable on the dependent variable (CZPONE54). The second structural variable to be examined, in terms of its effects in the LISREL model, is population size (LOGPOP96). Claims have been made emphasising the importance of population size, specifically that large EU members would be less in favour of the membership of these post-communist countries, because they are relatively small and would strengthen the position of small EU countries. Consequently, they would disrupt the balance with large member states and further complicate the already strained supranational decision-making process in an EU of twenty or more members (Avery, Cameron 1998, p. 140ff). Given the enormous differences in population size, varying from tiny Luxembourg (0.4 million inhabitants) to reunited Germany (80 million inhabitants), this variable was transformed, in order to obtain a more normal distribution. The third structural characteristic is related to basic language regions within the EU. The KNOWFRE variable (the percentage of a country's citizens that speak French) indicates differences among the fifteen countries, in terms of belonging to the French-speaking and French-familiar area. This structural condition is included in the postulated model in order to control for the frequent claims (see for instance Emerson 1998) that, during the 1990s, French-speaking polities exhibited geographical orientations, in their potential support for new enlargement, towards the south and south-east and, as a result, tended to support Mediterranean enlargement along the southern EU periphery and not eastern enlargement. The fourth structural characteristic of the fifteen countries, which the statistical model examines, is the average unemployment rate for 2000 (UNEMPLOY) as a measure, indicating the need for traditional welfare state involvement. A negative effect from

this variable on support for Czech membership, in light of the anticipated redistribution of structural and cohesion funds towards accession countries, such as Czechia, can be expected. Finally, the sixth structural characteristic is simple, but important. The *EUTIME* variable indicates the number of years of EU membership for the fifteen countries. The primary hypothesis to be tested in the model is whether public opinion in the older member states had a greater tendency to support the new enlargement with Czechia, due to long-term experience with EU institutions and procedures, including the frequent incorporation of peripheral countries into the EU compact, in the past, and due to advantages and disadvantages of post-war European integration, in general (see Sinnott 1995, Preston 1997).

4.3.2. Public opinion variables

Next in the causal order of the postulated model there is a block of three intermediate variables. From the very beginning of public opinion analyses in the EU, the proliferation of a post-materialist value orientation has been central to debates and research on the changing patterns and trends of public opinion. This post-materialist value orientation was widely seen as a major cause behind other trends in political opinion among the EU electorates (Inglehart 1997, p. 108ff). As noted in chapter 2, the basic claim of post-materialism argues that, along with the coming of a post-industrial economy and advanced welfare state, a shift from materialist to post-materialist values and political orientation occurred. This shift arose out of tension between public concerns regarding economic growth and quality of life, including the environment, well-being, more say on the job, more say in government, development support for Third World aid, research and education and human rights in general. This value orientation contrasts with traditional materialist values of 'economic survival', stressing employment and social policy, a stable economy, a strong currency, and fighting rising prices. Given the great significance of this value orientation in the EU public and in the literature, an attempt to substantiate the tension between post-materialism and materialism is made, using available Eurobarometer no. 54 survey data from the same autumn 2000 sample, which is used in constructing the dependent variable (*CZPONE54*).

The post-materialist dimension is similar to the one described in chapter 2, but slightly different variables, available in the Eurobarometer no. 54 survey, are used. Percentages of respondents indicating the three most important policy areas that they thought the European Parliament should focus on can be used as suitable indicators. Principal component analysis was employed (see a description of this method in chapter 2, and Rummel 1970) in order to construct a common statistical dimension, which represents the tension between post-materialist and materialist orientations of the public in various EU countries and which results in standardised scores for each country on

Table 8 – Post-materialist public opinion (component loadings; N = 15)

Indicators	Component loadings Post-materialism
Human rights	0.900
Third World	0.744
Environment-consumers	0.681
Drugs-crime	0.575
Research	0.397
Education-culture	0.299
Immigration policy	0.116
Social policy	-0.640
Employment	-0.735
Currency	-0.811
Total variance extracted = 40.3%	no rotation

Source: Eurobarometer no. 54, 2000. European Commission, Brussels; own calculations.

the dimension (see Table 8). The variables selected show remarkable consistency across the fifteen countries.

The first unrotated principal component presented in Table 8 represents 40.3 percent of the total variation of the ten indicators. The structure of component loadings clearly shows the assumed tension between post-materialist and materialist orientations. Hence, the comprehensive score on this dimension (called POSTMT54) can be used to show differences in post-materialist orientations among the fifteen countries. Sweden is home to the highest score on the dimension. It can be assumed that, within the postulated model, the complex POSTMT54 indicator will have a positive effect on the dependent variable (CZPONE54). The second public opinion variable describes a generally positive attitude towards further internal EU integration. It is the average percentage of the public, in each of the fifteen countries, that would prefer EU implementation of supra-national decision-making, regarding 18 separate policy areas (Eurobarometer no. 54, pp. B34–B36). In other words, one can assume that this variable describes the inclination of the general public to shift more competences in these fields from the nation-state to the EU level of decision making. This variable (EUDECI) is also expected to have a positive effect on the dependent variable (CZPONE54). The third public opinion variable is a measure representing systematic emphasis in EU public opinion on the importance of economic criteria, in evaluating the anticipated eastern enlargement (the ECONCR54 variable). This measure is also derived with the help of principal component analysis. Table 9 shows the structure of component loadings on the first two components. The first component has a structure that is consistent with the highly-overlapping, economic values-orientated opinions regarding enlargement. The structure of the loadings on the ECONCR54 dimension clearly indicates that this measure represents materialist attitudes concerning the anticipated enlargement.

Table 9 – Public opinion on criteria concerning enlargement (component loadings; N = 15)

Indicator	Component 1	Component 2
	Economic criteria ECONCR54	Socio-environmental criteria
Human rights	0.173	0.939
Economic development	0.893	0.116
Acceptance acquis	0.738	0.073
No costs	0.856	-0.085
EU interests	0.884	-0.159
Crime and drugs	-0.022	0.970
Environment	-0.081	0.968
Pay share	0.606	0.398

Source: Eurobarometer no. 54, 2000. European Commission, Brussels; own calculations.

Accordingly, one can expect that this measure will have a negative effect on support for Czechia's EU membership.

4.3.3 Explaining public opinion across the EU15

These empirical dimensions, representing structural conditions and public opinions, and associated hypotheses are reflected in the causal order of the postulated model shown in Figure 10. As explained in chapter 2, the LISREL model procedure estimates independent direct and indirect, or mediated, effects in complex models with a large number of variables. The multiple regression of this model indicates that the five structural conditions and three public opinion variables collectively determine 80 percent of the total variation in the dependent variable CZPONE54, across the fifteen EU countries ($R^2 = 0.80$). This resulting high level of determination makes it possible to estimate the various effects in the model and to interpret them in terms of causal relationships.

It appears that the five variables, representing structural conditions, combine to determine 33 percent of the total variation of POSMT54 scores, throughout the fifteen countries. As assumed above, differences in the post-materialist orientation are significantly affected by the GDP96 variable, representing the role of advance welfare state involvement and the importance of redistributive measures, in the various EU countries. The standardised regression coefficient indicates that a shift of one standard deviation in this variable means a significant shift of 0.39 of standard deviation on the POSTMT54 dimension. This effect complies with Inglehart's (1997) suggestion that, in democratic redistributive societies (i.e. advanced welfare states), the shift towards post-materialist values is considerable. In contrast, the independent effects of other structural conditions, with the exception of population size, have clear negative effects on the post-materialism indicator. It appears that the public, in French-speaking EU countries, tended to

be more materialistic (negative effect of -0.30). Also, the unemployment measure has a clear negative effect on the post-materialism variable (-0.39). Interestingly, the independent effect (-0.37) of the *EUTIME* variable shows that there is a general negative tendency concerning post-materialism in the old EU member countries. The determination level of the other intermediate variable *EUDECI54* is considerable (71 percent), and the estimated independent effects of two structural conditions on this variable are important. The *EUTIME* variable has a strong positive effect (0.68), indicating that the politics of older EU member states tended to support the further deepening of EU institutions. The positive effect of the unemployment variable (0.36) shows that the public in countries with a higher unemployment rate also tended to support a strengthening of necessary decision-making, at the EU level. However, the post-materialism measure also has a negative effect (-0.28) on the *EUDECI54* variable. This effect suggests that EU politics with clear post-materialist orientations are not inclined to support further strengthening of supranational EU decision-making. Here, Hix's (2005, p. 162) claim, that post-materialists with higher educational levels receive more information regarding the so-called democratic deficit of the EU institutional and procedural structures and are, consequently, more aware of the EU's shortcomings and limitations and are more likely to express considerable Euroscepticism, can be emphasised again (see also Karp and Bowler, 2006). As expected from the theoretical point of view (chapter 2), the post-materialism variable also has a very strong negative effect (-0.83) on the largely materialistic measure of economic criteria concerning enlargement (*ECONCR54*).

As indicated above, the five structural conditions and the three intermediate public opinion variables statistically determine 80 percent of the variation in the dependent variable *CZPONE54*. In Table 10, the fact that the post-materialism measure (*POSMT54*) plays a significant mediating role in the model (total indirect effect of 0.36) may be established. It appears that the variable describing the level of economic development (*GDP96*) has a direct, significant negative effect (-0.47) on support for the eastern enlargement with Czechia. This result indicates that wealthier EU politics were less inclined, in 2000, to support the anticipated Czech accession. Further, the clear negative direct effect (-0.65) of the population size indicator documents the tendency for large EU politics to consider Czech membership to be less desirable. A similar negative effect arises from the *KNOWLFRE* variable, suggesting that French-speaking parts of the EU did not tend to support EU enlargement with Czechia. It is also significant to note that the *EUTIME* variable shows an important facilitating effect (0.54) on positive public opinion regarding Czech membership. The negative effect (-0.45) of the *ECONCR54* variable, a measure of public opinion stressing the economic criteria of enlargement is in accordance with general hypotheses structured in the postulated model.

Finally, the importance of the total effects of the eight variables on the dependent variable regarding Czech membership should be stressed (Ta-

Table 10 – Effects of explanatory variables on public opinion regarding Czech membership (CZPONE54; N = 15)

Explanatory variables	Total effects	Indirect effects	Direct effects
GDP96	-0.27	0.20	-0.47
LOGPOP96	-0.60	0.05	-0.65
KNOWLFRE	-0.66	-0.24	-0.43
UNEMPLOY	0.37	-0.12	0.50
EUTIME	0.40	-0.13	0.54
POSTMT54	0.68	0.36	0.32
EUDECI54	0.04	-0.12	0.16
ECONCR54	-0.45	–	-0.45

Source: own calculations.

ble 10). First, it appears that the post-materialism measure has a very strong positive total effect (0.68). This is also in accordance with the key hypothesis explained above and presented in chapter 2 (see Inglehart 1997; Inglehart, Welzel 2005). Second, the population size variable has a significant negative total effect (-0.60). This suggests that, particularly, the electorates of small member countries tended to support Czech membership, in 2000. The variable representing French-speaking parts of the EU's general public has a very clear negative total effect (-0.66) in the postulated model. This outcome suggests that polities in the EU15, which speak or are familiar with French, tended to exhibit less support for eastward enlargement. Third, the unemployment variable shows a significant positive total effect (0.37). This outcome is surprising. It seems that high support for Czechia in Greece and above-average support in Italy and Spain can account for this unexpected effect. These Mediterranean countries tended to support Czech membership, in spite of structural problems in their national labour markets. Perhaps, these polities saw a potential associate in the Czech polity against certain hard free market measures that could limit the redistributive structural and regional funds policies, in the future. Fourth, the variable indicating the number of years of EU membership also exhibits a significant positive effect (0.40). This outcome suggests that the public in the original and long-time members of the EU had sufficient confidence in the successful conclusion of accession negotiations, because they had experience with nine such negotiations, which led to previous accessions (Preston 1997).

4.4. Changing public opinion in Czechia

It is clear that across Central and Eastern Europe, motivations to join the EU were based on what the EU represents, in terms of politics, economy, geographical location and security (Hix 2005, Giddens 2007). The EU was

seen as a successful post-war geopolitical and geo-economic compact that facilitated effective integration in Western Europe. The EU was also seen as a primary source of trade, investment and aid. The significantly higher standard of living in most EU countries, in comparison with Czechia, resulted in expectations concerning the various benefits of association with and later accession into the EU. These considerations seemed to combine in drawing public opinion towards the magnet of EU membership.

Realisation of an EU association agreement and the official submission of the Czech application for EU membership, in January 1996, clearly indicated the willingness of the Czech political elite to enter the EU. The application for membership is an autonomous decision for the country concerned. It is based on subjective assessments of the political elite, regarding other possible options concerning the geopolitical and geo-economic integration of the country. However, views and assessments among both political actors and the general public, concerning EU membership and its different implications, can differ significantly. During the 1990s, emerging attitudes, regarding issues that would be implied in the anticipated EU membership, could be discerned. On the one hand, such attitudes included expectations concerning necessary adjustments and adaptations, resulting from the negotiations on EU membership (Mayhew 1998). On the other hand, the assessment of both challenges and opportunities was also important. Moreover, there was little discussion, in Czechia, about the pros and cons of different elements of the rights and obligations of EU membership. Not until the economic downturn, in summer 1997, was there considerable confidence in Czech public opinion about entering the EU. Understandably, certain concerns existed regarding the future position of small countries within the EU and, similarly, people were wary about taking steps towards political union, in a country that had recently abolished an unsatisfactory federal relationship with Slovakia.

Public opinion is certainly important in establishing the necessary legitimacy of anticipated membership, particularly in Czechia, where a referendum was to be held on EU membership. Table 11 clearly indicates that, in May 2002, public support for EU membership was at the same level as it had been during the early years of political and economic transformation. At the most general level, in response to the question of whether or not the Czech electorate would support EU accession of Czechia in a referendum, public opinion showed decreasing support from a maximum of 50 percent, in 1997, to a significantly lower level of 40 percent, in May 2001. Importantly, in May 2002, support for EU membership had increased again to 47 percent. The share of those who would vote against EU membership seemed to be stable, but also considerable. In May 2002, 32 percent of the Czech electorate indicated an intention to vote against in such a referendum. Looking at the long-term trends in Table 11, one could draw the conclusion that the category of undecided voters remained substantial (21 percent in May

Table 11 – Czech public opinion regarding Czech membership in the EU 1996–2002
(percentages; intended voting in a referendum)

Answers	08/96	04/97	04/99	09/99	05/00	10/00	03/01	05/01	05/02
Yes EU	46	50	46	44	42	48	45	40	47
No EU	41	34	40	39	42	37	37	38	32
Undecided	13	16	14	17	16	15	18	22	21
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: STEM, Trendy 1996–2002, Prague 2002

2002). It appeared that voters in this group would ultimately decide on the future geopolitical and geo-economic position of Czechia, in the new map of Europe. Czech public opinion regarding EU accession seemed to reflect long and difficult negotiations concerning certain basic elements of EU membership. In particular, it seemed that anticipated constraints placed on one of the four basic freedoms of the EU integration: free movement of the labour force, contributed significantly to the declining support indicated in May 2001 (as shown in Table 11).

These poll findings must be viewed in the context of the very limited knowledge of the Czech public about EU membership, which was still perceived as an isolated event. In spite of general support for the country's westward orientation towards closer ties with the EU, in the mid-1990s, as indicated in chapter 3 of this book, the Czech public seemed more doubtful about who would benefit from closer relations with EU countries. Opinion polls show that the public believed that private business, the educational system, government civil servants and the armed forces would largely benefit, as ties with the EU became closer. In contrast, low income groups, manual workers and the employees of state enterprises believed that they would miss out on such benefits. Interestingly, over 50 percent of the public indicated that farmers would be hurt by EU accession (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer no. 7, 1998; STEM 1999; 2002). This certainly illustrated a low level of specific knowledge, concerning the Common Agricultural Policy as well as other sectors of EU policy-making and the political orientation of the EU in general.

Results from a survey, carried out by INRA/Respect during the end of May and the beginning of June 2002, indicated some significant differences in Czech public opinion, according to socio-economic position, within a sample of one thousand respondents. The survey indicated (see Table 12) that 68 percent of the entire sample would take part in the referendum and that 69 percent would vote yes in favour of Czech membership in the EU. However, if the outcome of the negotiations with the EU would imply limited access of the Czech labour force to EU markets, than the positive vote would decrease significantly to a mere 47 percent. An even more dramatic decrease, down to 26 percent would take place if EU membership would necessitate

Table 12 – Czech public opinion regarding Czech membership in the EU in May/June 2002 (percentages; intended voting in a referendum)

Socio-economic position	Planning to vote	Voting Yes EU	Voting Yes EU if limited access to EU labour market	Voting Yes EU if Beneš decrees are abolished
Leading personnel	82	73	47	26
Professionals	76	78	60	53
Entrepreneurs	76	76	57	40
Students	69	81	34	14
Other employees	65	70	43	22
Pensioners	64	51	30	14
Workers	61	65	31	11
Economically non-active	59	65	40	16

Source: INRA/Respect, Prague, June 2002

the abolishment of the post-war decrees of President Beneš concerning the 1945–1946 transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia. The post-war transfer was an outcome of decisions made by the winning powers at the 1945 Postdam conference (see Luža 1964, Krejčí 1990). Table 12 shows that socio-economic groups with a higher position on the societal ladder were more inclined to give a yes vote for Czech membership in the EU. In contrast, pensioners, workers and the unemployed were much less inclined to support EU membership. These results clearly indicated that the Czech political elite was faced with a difficult task. An intensive positive campaign for EU membership would need to be implemented, after the June 2002 parliamentary elections were won by a coalition of parties that supported the European integration process (the Social Democrats, the Christian People Party and the Liberal Union Party).

In a survey, commissioned by the European Commission in October 2001, of all associated countries (Applicant Countries Barometer 2001), however, it appeared that a majority (54 percent) of the Czech electorate would support the accession of Czechia to the EU, in a referendum (see Table 13). The highest levels of support for EU membership were indicated in Romania and Bulgaria. It should be noted that, due to lagging political and economic transformations (see chapter 3), the polities in these two countries could not anticipate membership in the first group of candidate countries that would join the EU. The lowest shares of support were in Estonia and Malta, where according to the survey only 40 and 38 percent, respectively, of the electorates indicated that they would give a positive vote in a referendum on EU membership. It should also be noted that, within the so-called Luxembourg group (specified by the European Council in December 1997: Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Malta and Poland), the sample from Czechia showed an average level of support for EU membership. Moreover,

Table 13 – Public opinion in 13 candidate countries regarding EU membership (intended voting in a referendum – survey results in October 2001)

Country	For EU	Against EU	No answer	No participation
Romania	85	3	6	7
Bulgaria	80	4	9	6
Hungary	70	10	7	13
Turkey	68	20	8	4
Slovakia	66	11	9	15
Average13 cc	65	18	9	8
Cyprus	62	25	11	2
Slovenia	56	22	13	9
Czechia	54	18	13	15
Poland	54	26	9	11
Lithuania	50	20	15	15
Latvia	46	32	12	9
Malta	40	36	14	11
Estonia	38	27	14	21

Source: Applicant Countries Eurobarometer 2001. European Commission, Brussels.

this survey also indicated that 75 percent of the Czech electorate intended to participate in the referendum on EU membership (Applicant Countries Barometer 2001, p. 6).

4.5. Conclusions

The statistical outcomes of the postulated model clearly show the very significant positive effect of a post-materialist value orientation on positive public opinion about anticipated enlargement with Czechia, in the set of fifteen EU countries in 2000. The analysis also confirmed the hypothesis that the polities of wealthier and larger EU countries were less inclined to support the anticipated enlargement. This outcome of the statistical examination is very significant. It documents the long-lasting importance of the West-East gradient that was summarised in section 4.2. of this chapter. As emphasised earlier, the countries of the historical core and the rich-old and new-outer cores of the EU of fifteen member states anticipated paying larger contributions to the EU budget, when the newly associated countries became members. On the other hand, there were some indications that public opinion in some countries in the historical core of the EU (Italy and the Netherlands) tended to support Czech membership. However, the most significant support for the accession of Czechia came from the Scandinavian countries, from their post-materialist polities.

The polities in the northern outer core of the EU15 preferred enlargement (widening) to supporting efforts focused on further deepening of the

geopolitical and geo-economic compact of the EU. The clear negative effects of the post-materialist dimension in the postulated model of public opinion focused on the further strengthening of decision-making in Brussels (the EUDECI54 measure) and on the opinion stressing the economic criteria of enlargement (the ECONCR54 measure) indicated this significant tendency. Another important tendency in public opinion was the clear negative effect of the population size variable on support for Czech membership. It seems that small EU countries tended to support Czech accession. As explained above, under EU rules, small countries were accorded many more votes per citizen than larger countries. Therefore, any eastern enlargement with small states would bring pressure to change EU rules, and not surprisingly, this would lead to reorientations in budget priorities and to uncertainty about well-established financial distributions between countries, sectors and regions. It seems that public opinion in the large countries tended to be concerned about the overall effectiveness of the EU if "micro-states" would have to assume the same level of EU responsibilities as large states. As mentioned earlier, other concerns in the public opinion of large EU countries focused on the power of blocking coalitions of small states that could frustrate the ambitions of the larger member states.

The assessment in the last section of this chapter showed declining support for anticipated Czech membership, among the Czech electorate. It seemed that, from 1996 to 2002, decreasing support for integration into the EU was associated with the anticipated, difficult negotiations between the Czech political elite and central actors in the EU. Therefore, the analysis carried out in this chapter again indicated that, in 2000, a strong and integrative sense of larger European community, based on mutual sympathies and trust along with mutual consideration was yet to emerge in western public opinion as well as in the views of the Czech polity.

5. Opposing public opinion regarding the draft of the EU constitution treaty (survey 2004)

5.1. Introduction

The May 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) was a historical, political and organisational change that significantly modified the institutional and geographical character of the continent. In October 2004, the representatives of the twenty-five EU member states (EU25) signed the draft of a treaty establishing a constitution for the EU. It appeared that the proposed draft would replace the old Treaty of Rome of 1957 that established the European Economic Community and the Treaty of Maastricht that instituted the European Union. In short, the draft of the EU constitution was intended to implement further deepening of the European integration process (Jacobs, 2005). Simultaneously however, significant uncertainties about the nature of the European integration process emerged, indicated in changing public opinion across the EU25. It appeared that, in accordance with the central claim of Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist (2000, 188), mental structures tended to become barriers to changes in organisation and protocol, practiced as part of the European integration process (see chapter 1 and chapter 2). Accordingly, this chapter provides an interpretation of the stage of the European integration process in 2004 and 2005, through the lens of 2004 public opinion in the twenty-five countries of the enlarged European Union regarding the draft of a constitution for the Union.

In 2004 and 2005, considerable public opinion, opposing the draft EU constitution, emerged in a number of old and new member states. Significantly, contradictory results came from referendums on the draft, held in some of the old member states of the EU15. On the one hand, in February 2005, voters in Spain supported the draft of the EU constitution with a large majority of 76.7 percent. Also in July 2005, voters in Luxembourg were in favour of the draft with a 56.5 percent level of support. On the other hand, however, voters in France went to referendum polls in May 2005 and rejected the draft of the EU constitution with 54.8 percent voting against it. In June 2005, the Dutch referendum also resulted in the overwhelming rejection of the draft by 61.6 percent of voters. These two rejections again demonstrated the importance of feedback as a process of political articulation from

electorates to the governing political elites of democratic member states, expressing dissatisfaction with the general conduct of the national political elites. An additional five old member states and five new member states ratified the draft, in their respective parliaments, before the summer of 2005. These contradictory results are significant and indicate that their explanation must, out of necessity, be complex and take into account the increased heterogeneity of the EU, brought on by the May 2004 enlargement of ten new member states. Moreover, these contradictory results also suggest that evolving public opinion in the different countries was concerned more with the societal *context* of the attempted institutional deepening of the EU25 than with the *text* of the draft of the EU constitution itself. In other words, it seemed that differences in various socio-economic, political and cultural circumstances among the EU25 must be examined to discover whether they had important effects on differences in support for or rejection of the draft. Accordingly, it is requisite to use the opportunity provided by the November 2004 Eurobarometer survey, which covers the EU25. The survey allowed for a complex examination of differences in public opinion opposing the draft constitution within the larger explanatory context of structural economic conditions and public opinion orientations throughout the set of the EU's twenty-five countries. The importance of both the inertia of basic mass values as well as emerging divisions and uncertainties in public opinion, regarding European integration across the enlarged EU, can be identified. The analysis also shows emerging complexities in the core-periphery patterns of the new organisation of European space.

Clearly, the fact that the far-reaching, post-war, geopolitical and geo-economic fragmentation of the map of Europe, including the divisive Iron Curtain, complicated the evolution of European unifying processes and contributed to the core-periphery interactions in the continent should also be reiterated in this chapter (Dostál, Hampl 1996). However, along with Emerson (1998), Preston (1997), van Gerven (2004), Cerutti (2005) and many other observers of the European integration process, one should recognise that the EU can be seen as the only key institutional and organisational vehicle able to make the dynamics of European integration persistent and strong. The basic geopolitical and geo-economic macro-geography of the continent, specified in chapter 4 as the historical core of the EU with its old and new peripheries (i.e. the Mediterranean and post-communist countries), was undergoing significant changes with the May 2004 enlargement. Moreover, it is also clear that, in European countries of the former Soviet-dominated orbit, the EU appeared to provide crucial incentives for pursuing post-communist political and economic transformations with general, modernising institutional principles from the West (see Dostál 1998b; Dostál, Markusse 2004 and chapters 3 and 4). In essence, EU membership required qualitative regime adaptations as well as the establishment of western-style institutional arrangements and compatibility with western political and economic stand-

ards of democracy and market economy. The Copenhagen European Council meeting of June 1993 established the EU's general criteria (see chapter 2) for evaluations of accession candidates (EC 2000, pp. 9–10; Mayhew 1998).

These introductory points make it clear that analytic efforts concerned with processes of European integration must be focused on two basic questions. First, to what extent was the integrative project of national political elites, as expressed in the drafted EU constitution, supported by some of European polities in public opinion from old and new EU member states. Second, can differences in opposing opinion regarding the draft constitution in the set of twenty-five EU polities be explained in the larger explanatory context of structural economic and social characteristics and public opinion orientations of the countries concerned. A larger context should enable (i) the indication of the importance of inertia in terms of basic mass values, as well as (ii) the assessment of emerging cleavages and uncertainties in public opinion regarding the European integration process, across the enlarged EU.

Accordingly, the chapter is structured as follows. The second section focuses on the complexities of the core–periphery patterns and highlights the lack of European polity formation. The third section is concerned with the statistical explanation of differences in opposing public opinion among the set of twenty-five EU countries. Finally, the last section draws major conclusions resulting from the analytical explanatory effort.

5.2. Some issues in debates on the proposed EU constitution

According to aggregate outcomes of survey questions on the European Constitution included in Eurobarometer number 62 (24,786 face to face interviews in the EU25; fieldwork carried out 2–28 November 2004), a majority of 49 percent was in favour of the draft of the European constitution. A 16 percent minority opposed the draft and 35 percent did not know whether to be in favour or in opposition. Clearly, this last figure indicated considerable uncertainties about public support for the draft. Furthermore, these outcomes of public opinion must be viewed with even greater caution due to the fact that they were not based on assessments of the general public, sustained through factual knowledge concerning the contents of the draft EU constitution (Piris 2006). The fact that the procedures of parliamentary ratification and referenda vary widely among the member states and that this makes exchanges across national borders difficult should also be noted (see Kurpas, Incerti, Schönlau 2005). Key players in the ratification debate included national governments and political parties, as well as a variety of societal actors such as trade unions, business and employer groups and even religious organisations. Different actors were engaged in debates promoting their respective aims. However, it must be stressed that the draft constitution

was subject to national debates and not to the necessary European cross-national exchange of assessments and views (Cerutti 2005). An important point is that the draft constitution was a voluminous, difficult and unreadable text for outsiders. Another very significant point is that opposing public opinion on the draft constitution tended to be formed by domestic socio-economic issues, especially when dissatisfaction with the national government appeared high and the electorates in question were seizing any opportunity to present the bill to the governments of the countries concerned.

Despite considerable diversity across the twenty-five member states, however, recurring issues arose in these debates. First, there was a clause in the draft allowing a member state to withdraw from the Union with potentially far-reaching consequences. This issue was particularly important in neutral and largely Eurosceptic Austria and Sweden, as well as in Denmark (Kurpas, Incerti, Schönlaue 2005). In some other countries it was seen as a weaker point, possibly decreasing the necessary political cohesion of the enlarged EU. Ratification of the draft constitution was seen as a condition for the continuation of the required deepening of EU membership. Second, there was an argument about the geographical extent of Europe that was linked with identity issues of the EU, which were perceived as being weakened by extensive enlargements, especially the big enlargement of May 2004. Third, there was an important debate concerning the role of the EU in the era of globalisation. On the one hand, there was the issue of developing common foreign and security policy. On the other hand, there was the problem of maintaining the so-called European social model, in the context of economic globalisation and competition. This debate was clearly concerned with opinions regarding 'fiscal and social dumping' and the economic benefits resulting from EU membership. The draft constitution was often seen as supporting a liberal restructuring of the traditional welfare state model under pressure from "governance of globalisation" (Ceritti 2005). Fourth, there were issues concerning the efficiency and democracy of the EU. Some opposing public opinion considered the draft constitution to be less than adequate in terms of boosting efficiency and weak at reducing the well-known democratic deficit of the EU. Fifth, the proposed system of qualified majority voting continued to be a sensitive issue (Kurpas, Incerti, Schönlaue 2005; Jacobs 2005). On the one hand, there were electorates that traditionally supported deeper integration (such as Italy, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg). On the other hand, a number of polities sought to maintain the existing scope of confederal sovereignty, largely based upon the veto right (such as the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Czechia and Slovakia). However, the fact that the draft constitution would not change, in any fundamental way, the institutional balance of the confederal consociational system of the EU maintained in the Treaties of Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) should be reiterated. Piris argued "that the most effective control exercised over the EU" by member state electorates proceeds "indirectly, through their nation-

ally elected representatives of the Council and in the European Council, while their direct representation through the European Parliament is in fact weaker, as it fails to reflect a collective will. This might be explained by the lack of a true European political space, the lack of a European political debate, the lack of EU-wide media and the lack of an EU public opinion” (2006, p. 15). These claims clearly indicate the usefulness of interpretations of the EU, in terms of the confederal consociational approaches discussed in chapter 2. Moreover, Piris further argued that, at the level of national elections “...both the extreme right (exploiting the impact of immigration) and the extreme left (exploiting unemployment and the weakness of the welfare state confronted with the effects of globalisation) have made progress and weakened the major political parties. ... Both phenomena, at the EU level and at the national level, must be taken together” (Piris 2006, p. 15). It is clear that these issues and associated claims must also be viewed in a larger context, including other structural problems and interstate perception patterns that characterise EU operations as well as the articulations of the interests of various groupings of the member states concerned.

5.3. Socio-economic and core-periphery patterns (2003–2004)

Basic differences among the set of the EU25 allow for the following assumptions, which can be further used in an explanatory analysis of opposing public opinion on the draft constitution, to be made. Some of the assumptions have already been discussed in chapter 4. First, the historical core and the wealthy member states of the current EU could anticipate, following the ten May 2004 accessions, being forced to make larger contributions to the EU budget in order to accommodate the development needs of the new member states. Basically, one could assume that the countries, forming the historical core, would all become contributors to the EU budget and much less recipients or, at least, below-average recipients (see also Preston 1997; Baldwin, Wypolsz 2004). Second, these countries would be confronted with the need to restructure the Common Agricultural Policy and its financing. This would have significant impacts on the long established interests of the agricultural sector, especially in the countries of the historical core (particularly in France). Third, the countries in the old EU periphery would have to expect further restructuring of the existing Structural and Cohesion Funds. The impact of the Iberian enlargement meant significant structural spending (see Baldwin et al. 1997). It could be expected that these member states would demand financial programming in the EU and special budget allocations in return for accepting further financial support for the new member states. Fourth, under existing EU rules from the Treaty of Nice (December 2000), small countries were accorded far more votes per citizen than larger countries. Consequently, the May 2004 enlargement brought pressure to change

these EU rules and, not surprisingly, this led to reorientations in debates on budget priorities and resulted in further uncertainties regarding arranged financial distributions between countries, sectors and regions. Fourth, the public in the large old member states tended to have doubts concerning the overall effectiveness of the EU, in the event that new member “micro-states” would have to assume the same level of EU organisational responsibilities as old and large member states. Other concerns of national electorates focused on the power of blocking coalitions of small states in frustrating the ambitions of larger states. It is clear that the large May 2004 enlargement inevitably changed the budgetary interests of the basic groupings of twenty-five EU member countries. Fears emerged around the idea that improving capacities for economic performance and competition would stimulate the political elites of new member states to use their power as members to boost EU structural spending and try to change eligibility criteria in the framework of structural and regional funds. Given certain similarities in terms of socio-economic situation, there is no reason to assume that the strategies of the political representatives of new member states, which formed the new EU periphery, would be fundamentally different from those of the old EU periphery, which resulted from the two Mediterranean enlargements, in the 1980s (see also chapter 4).

Therefore, it is necessary to examine the macro-geographical, socio-economic structure of the enlarged EU, with its new periphery, in order to derive further basic explanatory assumptions, concerning the articulation of negative attitudes among the national electorates towards the draft constitution, in 2004–2005. Significant changes were taking place in terms of socio-economic, core–periphery patterns in the enlarged EU of twenty-five members. The post-war economic boom resulted in nearly full employment and enabled the expansion of a welfare system across most of the fifteen old member states of the current EU. The era of Fordist industrialism brought a long period of economic prosperity and a significant decrease in poverty, in most of the old member states (Rodríguez-Pose 2002). Since 1970, however, the processes of economic restructuring, post-industrial development, globalisation and European market integration, had led to important shifts in core–periphery patterns at the inter-state level in the EU9, the EU12 and the EU15 (see also Baldwin, Wyplosz 2004, p. 242ff). Member states’ national economies and societies have entered the era of post-industrial development. Many member states witnessed a rise in structural unemployment levels. Some member states dealt with high unemployment rates through labour market liberalisation, like the United Kingdom, other member states appeared more reluctant to follow such welfare state restructuring policies. These economic shifts and the pressing issues of socio-economic policies have, in most of the old EU member states, shaken the foundation of established economic, social and political arrangements (see also Swank 2002). Structural reforms to welfare states and the deregulation of labour

markets remain, according to the key competences of the various national governments, a political concern of the individual member states. The EU's large core countries Germany, France and Italy all suffered from high unemployment rates and slow economic growth, seemingly caused, at least in part, by high taxes and overly regulated labour markets (Bulmer, Lequesne 2005). Moreover, low economic growth was associated, in some old member states, with high government debt and government deficit. This unfavourable combination of economic and social circumstances was an especially difficult political issue in the 12 euro-zone countries. This is, in particular, due to the 1992 criteria for the euro-zone of the Maastricht Treaty and the 1996 rules of the Stability and Growth Pact supplemented to the Treaty, both of which stipulate explicit thresholds for national public debt not to exceed 60 percent of GDP and for any national budget deficit not to exceed 3 percent of GDP, except when authorised under exceptional circumstances (see Treaty of Maastricht, Article 109(j), and protocols). Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, these criteria have had a significant impact on the stabilisation policies of all EU member states and have led to efforts from national governments to converge on sounder public finance and price stability. Interestingly, in most of the new member states, which as of May 2004 form the new periphery of the EU, the socio-economic situation was different, indicating that traditional EU core-periphery patterns were changing in the EU25. The economies of the new member states were growing, roughly two to four times faster than the euro-zone's average GDP growth. Moreover, the May 2004 enlargement brought more low-wage and low-tax countries into the EU. According to certain political groupings, this tended to further undermine, through competition, the welfare state model of big government and high taxes. According to the opinions of certain political elites and, in particular, of the public in some old member states, confronted with difficult economic and social circumstances, this competition from the new EU periphery amounted to "fiscal and social dumping". New member states were accused of using low taxes and low wage levels to lure jobs and investment away from the economies of the old member states, as well as to promote the transfer of factories and services to low cost locations in East-Central Europe. An associated view, stating that new member state governments in the periphery of the enlarged EU tended to balance their budgets with structural, regional and other funds from the EU budget, was also expressed. In light of these changes in core-periphery patterns and associated public opinion, it is appropriate to make a principal component analysis (see Rummel 1970 and chapter 2) of correlations between a number of general indicators, varying across old and new member states and describing the economic and social situation in the EU25, in 2003–2004. Such a multivariate analysis is needed in order to describe, in a more exact and comprehensive way, new systematic, socio-economic, core-periphery differentiations. The outcomes of this analysis

Table 14 – Two components of economic situation in EU countries in 2003 and 2004 (no rotation; N = 25)

Indicators	Loadings on component	Loadings on component
	RICH WELFARE STATES 2003–2004	GOVERNMENT DEBT AND DEFICIT 2004
GDP per capita in 2003 (in PPS)	0.796	0.221
Total taxes in GDP in 2003	0.843	–0.131
Unemployment rate in October 2004	–0.660	–0.399
Growth in GDP in 2003 (constant prices)	–0.794	0.362
Government debt in 2004 (% of GDP)	0.357	–0.854
Government surplus or deficit in 2004 (% of GDP)	0.362	0.728

Note: total variance extracted: first component = 44.5%; second component = 26.9%

Source: Eurostat, own calculations

can be used for further statistical examination below (see a similar analysis in chapter 2).

The results of a principal component analysis with six general indicators, describing the economic and social situation in 2003–2004 for the set of the twenty-five member states, are presented in Table 14. It appears that the economic and social situation in the EU can be represented as a two-dimensional pattern of two orthogonal components that combine to represent 71.4 percent of the total variance of the six indicators. The pattern is fairly simple to interpret and, consequently, no rotation of the dimensions is needed. The first dimension can be called RICH WELFARE STATES 2003–2004 and represents 44.5 percent of the total variation. The loadings of the variables on the component clearly indicate that the dimension is consistent both in terms of its content and statistics. On the one hand, the high positive loadings of GDP per capita 2003 (in purchasing parity standards), at 0.796, and the share of total taxes in GDP in 2003, at 0.843, clearly represent a relationship between the rich economies and their extensive tax base, which supports the costs associated with advanced welfare states (Swank 2002). On the other hand, there are significant negative loadings in terms of unemployment rate in October 2004 (component loading –0.660) and GDP growth in 2003 (–0.794). Therefore, the key empirical conclusion to be drawn is that rich welfare states tended to have lower unemployment rates, but simultaneously exhibited low GDP growth. It is also interesting to note the low positive loadings of government debt (0.357) and government surplus in 2004 (0.362) on this dimension. These low loadings indicate some association with the difficult financial affairs of the national government. However, differentiations in the two indicators across the twenty-five member states are convincingly represented by the second dimension, which can be called GOVERNMENT SURPLUS OR DEFICIT AND DEBT 2004. This component represents 26.9 percent of the total variation and also appears to be bipolar.




Figure 11 – Component scores: rich welfare state in 2003–2004 and government surplus or deficit and debt in 2004 (N = 25). Source: own calculations.

It is characterised by a high negative loading of government debt (loading -0.854) and a high positive loading of government surplus (0.728) showing the systematic negative relationship between these two key indicators of financial affairs, in the set of the EU25. Significantly, this dimension also has a lower negative loading of the unemployment rate (-0.399) indicating the above-emphasised relationship between structural socio-economic difficulties and the difficult financial positions of the national governments concerned. There is also a lower positive loading of growth in GDP in 2003 on this component indicating, not surprisingly, that government surplus and lower deficit tended to be related to economic growth. In essence, the consistent outcomes of this multivariate analysis make it possible to use the two component scores in further statistical modelling, because the scores of the twenty-five countries on the two dimensions aptly describe major socio-economic, core–periphery patterns in the EU25.

Figure 11 shows the pattern presented by the two uncorrelated multivariate measures, which enables one to draw a number of preliminary conclusions. First, it is not surprising that none of the 10 new member countries

exhibit scores on the positive side of the vertical axis, differentiating wealthy and poorer countries. However, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta were close to the average score, in 2003–2004. Second, the compositions of countries in the two upper parts of the scatter diagram, indicated by the average line on the dimension, do not represent a clear core–periphery pattern. Figure 11 clearly shows a grouping of countries that are rich welfare states and that also score on the positive side of the second dimension (Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and the United Kingdom). Interestingly, the three countries, which are not members of the European Monetary Union, belong to this macro-economically most successful group. Furthermore, this group includes countries from the older EU core (Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) as well as countries, which formed an outer core of the enlarged EU (Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland).

Third, there is a grouping of rich welfare states that score on the negative side of the horizontal dimension, meaning that, in 2003–2004, they faced difficult problems of low or no economic growth coupled with government deficit and debt. It is significant to note the big and influential EU countries belong to this group: Germany, France and Italy, which are accompanied by smaller member states Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands, and surprisingly also by peripheral Portugal, due its considerable debt. The position of Germany and France, in 2003–2004, in this wealthy, but less successful, economic performance group is significant. The two large member states have been very influential players concerning all the important issues of the European integration process so far (Rosemond 2000, Dinan 2005). Accordingly, public opinion in these two key EU countries has always significantly impacted national political elites as well as the supranational affairs of the EU. Fourth, there is a section in the scatter diagram in Figure 11, in which there are less-poor countries, including Spain, Slovenia and Czechia that did not have serious problems with government deficit and debt. However, there are also small, new member states from the Baltic region that were experiencing considerable economic growth, along with high levels of unemployment. It also appeared that these countries could achieve better macroeconomic performance (see also Baldwin, Wyplosz 2004). Fifth, there is a group of countries that were also poor, but which were simultaneously confronted with serious financial problems concerning their national governments. These countries include new member states from the EU periphery (Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus). Peripheral Greece also belongs to this group. Finally, the complex pattern of scores on the two dimensions shown in Figure 11 clearly documents that the 15 old member states cannot be grouped, in terms of historical core–periphery differences, in accordance with the earlier stages of EU enlargement (Preston 1997). Only the new EU periphery, resulting from the 2004 enlargement, can be described by negative scores on the vertical dimension of rich welfare states, in a more systematic way. Given the above-indicated hypotheses, concerning the importance of

debates on changing socio-economic and financial affairs, it is beneficial to examine explanatory effects of these differences on the two dimensions in the larger multivariate context of the statistical analysis below.

5.4. Public opinion regarding the draft constitution

Figure 12 shows the differentiation in public opinion opposing and supporting the draft of the EU constitution in November 2004 (Eurobarometer no. 62). First, it appears that strong opposition was expressed in public opinion in the UK (30 percent) and in Scandinavian members Sweden, Denmark and Finland as well as in Austria (about 25 percent).

A second conclusion to be drawn is that a high share of opposing opinion (20 percent) was recorded in Czechia. Opposing opinion above 15 percent was also recorded in France, Germany, Latvia and Poland, in November 2004. The lowest shares of opposing opinion regarding the draft constitution were in Ireland, Spain and Portugal. Therefore, member states of the old EU




Figure 12 – Opposition and support of the draft EU constitution (Eurobarometer No. 62, November 2004). Source: own calculations.

periphery that had been receiving substantial support from EU structural, regional and cohesion funds for decades (Bulmer, Lequesne 2005; Baldwin, Wypolsz 2004) exhibited low levels of opposing opinion. Third, the difference between public opinion in favour and in opposition to the draft indicates significant support in the member states of the historical core: Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, but also in new members Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia and Lithuania. This complex differentiation of opposing and supporting public opinion in the set of twenty-five countries indicates the necessity for an explanatory approach to be sufficiently complex, in order to reach an acceptable level of model determination.

Given the complexity of these tendencies in the differentiation of public opinion opposing the draft constitution, the broader scope of multivariate LISREL analysis is employed again. The LISREL approach is clearly based on the postulation of an explanatory (causal) order of structural conditions such as population size, scores on the two dimensions concerning socio-economic situation and number of years of EU membership for the countries concerned. Four explanatory public opinion variables that could seemingly influence the differentiation in opposing opinion on the draft of the EU constitution in the set of the twenty-five polities are also used (see the vertical axis in Figure 12). Accordingly, the causal order of the statistical examination, explaining the differentiation in shares of opposing opinion from sample totals (each about 1,000 respondents) in the twenty-five EU countries, is conceptualised in three blocks (see Figure 14).

5.4.1 Structural variables

The first structural variable to be examined, in terms of its effects in the postulated LISREL model, is population size (LOGPOP 2001). Claims have been made emphasising the importance of the population size, specifically that large EU members would be less likely to be in favour of the draft constitution, due to the assumption that the constitution will neither sufficiently streamline the balance between large and smaller states nor resolve anticipated problems with so-called 'micro-states' (Dinan 2005; Alesina, Spolaore 2005). Accordingly, the main hypothesis is that the population size measure will have a positive effect on opposing votes. Given the enormous differences in population size, the variable has again been transformed in this statistical examination to a logarithm, in order to obtain more normal distribution. This means that smaller population sizes will have stronger impacts in the overall distribution on this explanatory dimension. The second structural condition is the EU YEARS variable, indicating the number of years of EU membership of the twenty-five countries. The major hypothesis to be tested in the model is whether public opinion in the old member states is more inclined to support the draft constitution, due to long-term experience with the European integration process, with reforms to EU institutions and

procedures, with successive incorporations of peripheral countries into the EU compact in the past, and with awareness of the major advantages and disadvantages of post-war European integration in general (cf. Westle 1995, Rosemond 2000). The third and fourth structural characteristics are scores from the component measures RICH WELFARE STATES 2003–2004 and GOVERNMENT SURPLUS OR DEBT AND DEFICIT 2004 (see Figure 11). As expected above, the two component measures tend to have systematic effects on differences in public opinion variables.

5.4.2. Public opinion variables

A block of four intermediate variables follows next in the causal order of the model. In the above overview of new core–periphery patterns, the importance of the altered economic, social and political positions of EU countries in the context of globalisation was emphasised (see also Giddens 2002; Dostál, Hampl 2000; Held et al. 2005). As mentioned above, the draft constitution was frequently seen, in certain old member states, as supporting a liberal restructuring of the traditional welfare state model under pressure from the “governance of globalisation” (Ceritti 2005, p. 527). Of course, there is some relevance to this assessment. For instance, considering the socio-economic situation in reunited Germany, Swank argued that “(t)he importance of the political logic of globalisation is also illustrated by the degree to which international capital mobility (and trade competitiveness) is emphasised by the major social policy actors that contested the larger reforms of the German Sozialstaat” (2002, p. 185). Accordingly, it seems fitting to also assess the role of public opinion regarding the significance of globalisation pressures in the postulated explanatory model. Special Eurobarometer No. 215 provided specific information, for the set of EU25 countries, on public opinion concerning various issues of the Lisbon Agenda. The survey is also based on fieldwork carried out in November 2004 and organised as part of Standard Eurobarometer No. 62. The opinion survey was concerned with the impacts of globalisation and with the economic situation in the EU, in light of the national economic situation.

Table 15 gives the results of a principal component analysis. It shows the loadings of five answers concerning globalisation and specifying a consistent (unrotated) dimension representing differences, across the EU25, in public opinion regarding the significance of globalisation. There are clear positive loadings indicating the significance attributed to the economic situation in the USA (0.856) and to the global economic situation (0.777), in light of developments in the national economy in question. The significance attributed to the economic situation in the entire EU, in light of the state of affairs in the national economy shows a significant negative loading in the negative pole of the dimension (−0.717). There is also a negative loading to the significance attributed to the economic situation in neighbouring countries

Table 15 – Significance attributed to globalisation in public opinion in November 2004 (component loadings; N = 25)

Indicators	Component loadings globalisation
Economic situation in the USA	0.856
Global economic situation	0.774
Not depending on other countries	-0.571
Economic situation in neighbouring countries	-0.665
Economic situation in entire EU	-0.717
Variance extracted = 52.3 percent	no rotation

Source: Eurobarometer No. 62, 2004, European Commission, Brussels; own calculations

(-0.665). A similar negative loading describes the opinion that the national economic situation is not dependent on other countries (-0.571). It is clear that this component is statistically consistent (representing 52.3 percent of the total variation of the five indicators) and that, in terms of its contents, this dimension is also very significant. Therefore, scores on this globalisation component can be used to represent differences in the significance attributed to globalisation in public opinion of the EU25. It should be noted, however, that this dimension represents differences in the significance attributed by the electorates to globalisation. The dimension certainly does not specify differences in a negative view of globalisation, which indicates fears of globalisation pressures (see the discussion concerning negative views of globalisation in chapter 2). The main hypothesis is that EU polities which scored high on this dimension tended not to oppose the draft constitution, because they had a tendency to view the EU as an institutional tool that could ease the pressures of globalisation on the economic situations of member states. In the causal order of the model in Figure 14 this measure is called GLOBAL 2004.

As was explained in chapter 2, since the beginning of public opinion analyses in the EU, the emergence of a post-materialist value orientation was central in debates and research on public opinion patterns and trends (Reif, Inglehart 1991). The post-materialist value orientation was widely seen as a major factor influencing other trends in political opinion also within the EU public (Inglehart 1997, p. 108ff). This mass value orientation emphasises self-expression values in contrast to the traditional materialist value orientation stressing employment or pension policy (see also Inglehart, Welzel 2005). Given the great importance of this value orientation in EU public opinion, in extensive research and literature, the principal component shown in Table 16 attempts to substantiate the tension between post-materialism and materialism, using available survey results from Eurobarometer survey no. 62, carried out in November 2004. Percentages of respondents, who indicated their opinion regarding the three most important policy areas for the European Parliament to concentrate on, are used as suitable indicators.

Table 16 – Post-materialist public opinion in November 2004 (component loadings)

Indicators	Component loadings post-materialism
Environment	0.734
Common foreign and security policy	0.716
Enlargement of EU	0.795
Immigration	0.658
Mobility of EU citizen	0.570
Agriculture	-0.398
Education	-0.506
Employment	-0.688
Pensions	-0.906
Variance extracted = 46.1 percent	no rotation

Source: Eurobarometer No. 62, 2004, European Commission, Brussels; own calculations

Again, principal component analysis has been employed in order to construct a common statistical dimension that represents the tension between post-materialist and materialist orientations of the public in various EU countries and gives standardised scores for each country on the dimension (see Table 16). The nine policy areas selected in the survey appear to show remarkable consistency, across the twenty-five countries.

The first unrotated principal component shown in Table 16 represents 46.1 percent of the total variation of the nine indicators. The structure of component loadings clearly shows the assumed polarisation between post-materialist and materialist orientations. High positive loadings on the dimension include those representing concern for the environment (0.734), common foreign and security policy (0.716), enlargement (0.795), more open immigration (0.658) and mobility of EU citizens (0.570). On the materialist side of the dimension, high negative loadings indicate concern for employment (-0.688), and pensions (-0.906) and, to a lesser degree, education policy (-0.506) and agriculture (-0.398). Hence, the component score for this dimension, called POSTMAT 2004, can be used to indicate differences in post-materialist orientation, across the twenty-five countries. Significantly, Figure 13 shows a close correlation (determination of 50.2 percent) between scores on the globalisation measure and this post-materialism measure. First, it should be noted that a strong effect of the globalisation variable on the post-materialist measure can be expected in the causal order of the postulated model. Second, it appears that, in accordance with outcomes from the international world values surveys (see Inglehart 1997; Inglehart, Welzel 2005), the highest scores on the post-materialist dimension come from Eurobarometer survey samples representing the leading post-materialist electorates in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland. The most materialist public opinion was measured in Lithuania, Portugal, Greece, Slovakia or Latvia. The most post-material-




Figure 13 – Public opinion on globalisation and post-materialism (November 2004; N = 25). Sources: Special Eurobarometer No. 215, November 2004; Standard Eurobarometer No. 62, October–November 2004.

ist orientations among the set of the ten new member states are found in Czechia and Hungary.

The third variable in the intermediate block of public opinion variables represents a basic negative attitude towards the EU (Eurobarometer No. 62; question Q10.13 “Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust the European Union?”). This opinion variable is the share of negative answers to this question (see public opinion variable NO TRUST EU 2004). The highest negative scores were in Sweden (54%), Finland (50%), the United Kingdom (47%), Germany (42%) and the Netherlands (41%). The lowest scores were in Lithuania (15%), Ireland (20%), Portugal (22%), Hungary (22%) and Slovakia (24%). In the causal order of the explanatory model, it can be assumed that a lack of trust in the EU would also stimulate tendencies towards a negative opinion regarding the draft of the EU constitution. The final explanatory public opinion variable is support for enlargement (Eurobarometer 62, question Q36.4: “Please tell me whether you are for future enlargement of the European Union to include other countries in

future years"). The highest shares of positive answers are in Poland (78%), Lithuania (76%), Slovenia (75%), Slovakia (69%), Spain (67%) and Czechia (66%). Low support for future enlargement was measured in Austria (28%), Germany (36%), Luxembourg (38%), France (39%), Denmark (43%) and Sweden (44%). This polarisation in public opinion, concerning potential future widening, shows the important division between the rich welfare states, on the one hand, and the poorer countries in the new periphery, on the other. In 2004, the new member states were clearly in favour of future EU enlargements. It can be postulated that this opinion, the SUPPORT ENLARGEMENT 2004 variable, would tend to have a systematic negative effect on opposing opinion regarding the draft of the EU constitution.

5.4.3. Explaining opposing public opinion

These empirical measures, representing structural conditions and public opinions with their associated hypotheses, are transferred into the postulated causal model shown in Figure 14. The multiple regression of this model indicates that the four structural variables and the four public opinion variables combine to determine 80 percent of the total variation of the dependent variable OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004, across the EU25. Consequently, this high level of determination enables one to estimate the various direct, intermediate and overall effects in the model and to interpret them, in terms of causal relationships.

It appears that the four variables, representing structural conditions, combine to determine 70 percent of the total variation of the GLOBAL scores (determination coefficient 0.70). As postulated above, the significance attributed to the global economic position of the countries in question is significantly determined by higher scores on the RICH WELFARE STATES dimension (coefficient 0.76). All effects are standardised regression coefficients. They are independent effects, inasmuch as all other variables are held statistically constant in the postulated model (see Saris and Stronkhorst, 1984). In terms of the LISREL modelling, this means that a shift of one standard deviation on this explanatory dimension implies a positive effect of 0.76 of one standard deviation on the dependent measure GLOBAL. This high effect indicates that the electorates of rich member states, having long-term experience with globalisation pressures, will tend to appreciate the significance of the positions of their respective countries in the evolving pattern of globalisation. Also, differences in the post-materialist value orientation scores are largely determined by the four structural variables and the GLOBAL measure (determination coefficient 0.80). As assumed above, differences in the post-materialist orientation are affected by the RICH WELFARE STATES dimension (an effect of 0.29), which represents the role of advanced welfare state involvement and the importance of redistributive measures in individual EU countries. This effect complies with Inglehart's (1997) suggestion




Figure 14 – Opposing public opinion regarding the draft EU constitution in November 2004: a LISREL model (N = 25). Source: own calculations.

that, in democratic redistributive societies (i.e. advanced welfare states), the shift towards post-materialist values is considerable. However, the strongest effect on the post-materialism measure comes from the measure of globalisation (0.68). This is an important effect, because it shows that polities, which recognise the importance of post-materialism, also seem to be aware of global, post-industrial society and global patterns of the changing culture map of the world (Inglehart, Wenzel 2005, p, 57ff).

The NO TRUST IN EU 2004 variable represents a lack of faith in the EU and in European integration processes, in general. This measure also has a high level of determination (76 percent) in the model. It appears that the post-materialism dimension has the greatest effect on this measure (0.57). The globalisation variable has another substantial effect (0.41). These two effects suggest that, in 2004, EU electorates, with a broader view of global economic patterns and cultural change in the era of globalisation, tended to distrust the EU project. However, it is interesting to note that the structural variable EU YEARS has a significant negative effect on the distrust variable (−0.34). This effect indicates that the electorates in older member states were inclined to view the EU in positive terms due to long-term experience with European integration processes. Finally, the last explanatory variable in the

model describes differences across the EU25 in terms of support for future enlargement (determination of 72 percent). Three interesting effects determine this variable. A significant negative effect (-0.48) comes from the rich welfare states measure. This clearly shows that the politics of wealthier member states had a tendency to withhold support for future EU enlargements. It appears that the electorates of member states with higher levels of GDP per capita tended to worry about their contributions to the EU budget, which were required to finance the enlargement process. Next, the EU YEARS variable has a negative effect (-0.27). This low effect suggests that old member states did not envisage some of the new EU enlargement projects. Another not surprising and expected negative effect (-0.36) arises from the variable, expressing a lack of trust in the EU. This effect also represents a tendency to reject future widening of the recently enlarged EU.

Now, closer attention can be given to the right side of the postulated causal model in Figure 14. As indicated above, the four structural conditions and the four intermediate variables statistically determine 80 percent of the total variation of the dependent variable *OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004*, across the set of 25 countries. The results summarised in Figure 14 and Table 17 show that the variable, indicating a lack of trust in the EU, plays a significant role in the model, with a very high direct effect of 0.90. The outcomes of the postulated model, which have already been discussed, confirm this clear effect. However, the next strongest effect is a negative one, which originates from the globalisation measure (-0.52). This result indicates that the EU electorates, attributing significance to globalisation, also exhibited a tendency not to oppose the draft of the EU constitution. In essence, they tended to support further deepening of the EU. However, the model includes two substantial indirect effects of the globalisation variable that allow for another causal interpretation. First, there is a positive indirect effect, mediated by the *NO TRUST EU 2004* variable: $0.41 \times 0.90 = 0.37$. Second, there is a positive mediated effect, channelled through the variables *POST-MAT 2004* and *NO TRUST EU 2004*: $0.68 \times 0.57 \times 0.90 = 0.35$. Combined, these two effects ($0.37 + 0.35 = 0.72$) represent a significant positive indirect effect. This modelling outcome means that if public opinion attributes significance to globalisation and simultaneously exhibits a post-materialist value orientation and lower level of trust in the EU project, than the global awareness of the electorates has a tendency to oppose the deepening of the EU, as expressed in the draft constitution. The direct positive effect of the post-materialist dimension on the dependent variable is lower (0.27). But, the indirect effect mediated by the lack-of-trust-in-the-EU variable is considerable ($0.57 \times 0.90 = 0.51$) indicating that if post-materialist values are combined, within public opinion, with distrust for the EU project, than politics showed a tendency, in autumn 2004, to oppose the attempted institutional deepening of the EU. Next, there is a direct negative effect (-0.24) from the *SUPPORT ENLARGEMENT 2004* variable on the dependent variable. A negative effect was

Table 17 – Direct effects of explanatory variables on opposing opinion regarding the draft of EU constitution (November 2004, N = 25)

Explanatory variables	Direct effects
No trust EU 2004	0.90
Global 2004	-0.52
Postmat 2004	0.27
Support enlargement 2004	-0.24
EU years	-0.22
Log pop 2001	0.20
Rich welfare states 2003–2004	-0.08
Surplus or deficit and dept 2004	0.01

Source: own calculations

postulated in the model, but it is surprisingly low. The variable measuring the length of EU membership (EU YEARS) also appears to have little effect (-0.22). However, the negative effect mediated by the NO TRUST EU 2004 variable is more significant ($-0.34 \times 0.90 = -0.31$). Indeed, it seems that, in 2004, polities, which had more extensive experience with EU membership, tended to trust the EU and were less inclined to oppose the draft EU constitution.

The other structural variables have even more dispersed and complicated indirect effects. The population size variable has a very low direct effect and no significant indirect affects. The RICH WELFARE STATES dimension appears to have only one substantial and negative indirect effect, in the postulated model, through the globalisation measure ($-0.52 \times 0.76 = -0.39$). This means that electorates in the wealthier member states, which also attribute significance to globalisation, did not tend to oppose the draft and appeared inclined to keep the possibility of EU deepening alive, perhaps expecting some positive role of the EU in regards to the “governance of globalisation”. The outcomes of the model also indicate the lack of any systematic independent effect from the SURPLUS OR DEBT 2004 measure. This is certainly surprising and means that the differentiation in the financial affairs among the set of the EU25 did not tend to have any systematic impacts on the various directions of public opinion differences across the twenty-five EU electorates, in 2004.

5.5 Conclusions

This chapter focuses on the question of future deepening of the European Union. It is clear that the constitution project was an attempt to consolidate the deepening stage of the European integration process. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums held in May 2005, in France, and in June 2005, in the Netherlands, seemed to indicate the end of a long cycle

of attempts to deepen European integration that began with the Single Market Act (1985) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). However, considerable uncertainty emerged early on, in autumn 2004, concerning the future of the EU integration process. Approaching the EU as a confederal-consociational system made it possible to realistically interpret the state of affairs in the EU, following the May 2004 enlargement. Systematic analyses of public opinion, following this interpretation, have confirmed that the European polity remains largely fragmented by various divisions among the twenty-five polities. It appears that, as early as autumn 2004, public opinion and mass interest articulations of the national polities exhibited emerging uncertainties about the nature of European deepening and enlargement processes. Interpreting the state of the integration process through the lens of public opinion in the set of twenty-five countries of the enlarged EU uncovered significant feedback, showing barrier effects that clearly originated at the electorate level and were directed at the governing political elites of the member states, in 2005.

The statistical analysis of November 2004 articulations of public opinion opposing the draft EU constitution indicated (i) the importance of public opinion concerning both globalisation and the post-materialist value orientation, and (ii) the significance of the lack of trust in the EU. Outcomes of the multivariate examination made it clear that, within the set of the twenty-five EU countries, strong positive effects on public opinion opposing the draft of the European constitutional treaty came from the post-materialist values measure. The effects of post-materialist values once again indicated the crucial explanatory role, which post-materialism plays in articulations of public opinion regarding the EU integration processes. More post-materialist polities of the enlarged EU tend to oppose EU deepening. Significant indirect positive effects on opinion opposing the draft of the EU constitution also arose out of public opinion attributing significance to globalisation. The differentiation of member states, on the basis of the RICH WELFARE STATES measure, described basic core–periphery patterns in the EU, in 2003 and 2004. However, this variable tended to only exhibit a weak, indirect, negative effect on the final dependent variable. This surprising result means that the new core–periphery patterns of socio-economic disparity, across the EU25, did not manifest themselves as crucial conditions in the articulations of public opinion and interests in old member states or in member states in the new periphery of the EU. Consequently, major socio-economic divisions in the enlarged EU did not seem to be reflected in a systematic way in the differentiation of public opinion regarding EU deepening. The multivariate analysis confirmed the hypothesis that the polities of wealthier EU countries tended to lend importance both to globalisation and to post-materialist values. In autumn 2004, longer membership in the EU seemed to be connected with decreasing opposition of national electorates to the proposed new institutionalisation of the confederal consociation of the Union, as

expressed in the constitutional draft. It is also important to emphasise that the polities of new member states tended to support future enlargements of the EU25. However, the unsuccessful ratification process of the Treaty on the EU Constitution, in some of the twenty-five member states, could lead to an alternative that would significantly redraw the map of European integration processes. A political process turning inwards to focus on a smaller number of member states might emerge: the creation of a firm core of certain states with political elites believing in closer integration. In short, a process of differentiated integration, or a two-speed European Union, could be intensified. Such a political process has already been instituted with the creation of the inner circle of the euro-zone. This trajectory of future European integration processes might imply that the EU would be comprised of an inner group and a broader group of member states, remaining in the periphery of the confederal consociational system of twenty-five, or more, states (see chapter 7).

6. Attitudes on energy consumption across the enlarged European Union: uncertainties under globalisation pressures (survey 2005)

6.1. Introduction

Following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, energy policies of the member states of the European Communities, or the European Union (EU), could count on a more or less stable oil supply along with relatively stable oil prices. As one of the world's largest importers of crude oil, natural gas and hard coal, the EU is a key player in global energy markets. From 2000 to 2005, however, energy markets became much tighter and oil prices as well as the associated prices of other energy sources were volatile and rising. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that EU politics, concerning energy and related environmental issues, became crucial topics on the EU agenda (see the Green Paper "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy", EU Commission, March 2006). Rising energy demands directed attention at the importance of energy consumption. However, the acute policy issues of energy consumption and production should be considered in the wide and comprehensive context of the globalisation era, with its current geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances. Oil, gas and coal reserves are unevenly distributed across the global system of states. The largest reserves are located in politically and economically less-secure macro-regions of the global system such as the Middle East, West Africa and Russia. About half of all energy consumed in the enlarged EU of 25 economies is also produced there, while the other half is imported (EC 2006b). Consequently, the EU's present dependency on energy imports is considerable. The most important energy supplier for the EU is Russia. A recent communication from the European Commission to the European Council highlighted the fact that, within the enlarged EU, a great need to improve energy efficiency and to make decisions regarding more effective policies exists (EC 2006c). EU policy-makers are faced with three major energy and environmental challenges: (i) rising crude oil and natural gas prices, (ii) geopolitical insecurities related to fuel supply, and (iii) adaptations to greenhouse effects. Naturally any attempts to resolve the problems of rising energy demand must also be implemented, within a framework of economic and sustainable development policies, focused on increasing the share of renewable energy in the EU's energy mix, limiting the

increasing dependence on imported fuel and making fossil fuel use cleaner and more efficient. Significantly, the EU energy policy also gave considerable emphasis to the importance of sustainable energy consumption habits among citizens and is concerned with their opinion on energy politics, in general. This emphasis on the energy consumption habits of citizens, across the enlarged EU, has placed the issue in the specific context of cross-national differences in public opinion concerning the nature of uncertainties of globalisation processes and shifts from materialistic mass value orientations towards more post-materialistic value orientations, stressing environmental concerns and ecological sustainability (see Inglehart, Welzel 2005).

In July 2005, the European Commission launched a campaign to increase public awareness concerning sustainable energy and, between 11 October and 15 November 2005, the Commission organised a Special Eurobarometer survey (No. 248), as part of Eurobarometer No. 64, in order to monitor public opinion on the energy consumption of citizens across the enlarged EU of 25 electorates. The survey explored public opinion concerning (i) appropriate decision-making levels (i.e. local, national or EU levels) to respond to new energy challenges, (ii) priorities to reduce energy consumption and dependency on imported energy sources, and (iii) energy consumption habits and willingness to change them. Therefore, this specific survey, along with regular Standard Eurobarometer surveys, provides excellent opportunities to specify differences in public opinion and citizens' attitudes, concerning energy, across the twenty-five member states of the enlarged EU. Again, public opinion and mass interest articulations of national polities are clearly central to EU policy studies, because they indicate important feedback, often implying barrier effects from electorates, which are exerted on the governing political elites of the democratic countries concerned (Taylor 1991, Wessels 1995). Therefore, this chapter asks interesting questions dealing with differences across the EU25, in a societal context, in terms of public opinion and attitudes concerning energy consumption. Accordingly, the chapter is structured as follows. The second section focuses on basic challenges for EU energy policies under the above-mentioned pressures of globalisation and geopolitical considerations. The third section is concerned with general differences in attitudes towards energy consumption, across the enlarged EU, and indicates some key polarisation tendencies in public opinion. The fourth section provides a statistical explanation of differences in certain crucial attitudes regarding energy consumption, across the twenty-five electorates of the EU. Finally, the last section draws major conclusions regarding divisions and emerging uncertainties concerning energy consumption and public opinion across European space.

6.2. EU energy policy under pressure from globalisation and geopolitical considerations

Although the 1992 Treaty on European Union indicated that the energy sector was a EU-level competency, important responsibilities in the sector remain at the member state level (Dinan 2005). Until the late 1970s, Community members were in agreement on energy policy and nuclear energy was seen as the future source of energy that would make the Community less dependent on energy imports. At least since the beginning of the new millennium, differences of opinion exist among national governments, EU institutions and the public, not only concerning nuclear energy, but also on other energy issues. Nuclear safety and the greenhouse effect are also recognised as crucial, interconnected issues. These differences in opinion remain, in spite of clear geographical dimensions of energy issues, which assume the character of trans-border problems and which could be solved effectively, at least in principle, by policy-making efforts at the European level. Clearly, it is necessary to reconcile protection of the environment and security of supplies with competitiveness issues and, simultaneously, to also pay attention to the EU's concerns with job opportunities and greater business efficiency. Uncertainties and estimated risks also surround the energy supply and markets of the global economy (EC 2006a, 2006b). Total EU production of crude oil covered 20 percent of its 2004 consumption. Most EU crude oil imports came from Russia (27 percent) and the Middle East (19 percent). Possible disruptions of oil supplies would have parallel adverse impacts in other major consuming regions of the global economic system (i.e. the US, Japan, China or India). It appears that transport is the sector where reductions in oil consumption are most difficult to achieve. Natural gas is subject to similar circumstances, although 46 percent of EU consumption is covered by domestic production. Gas imports are increasing from Russia (25 percent) as well as from North Africa, Nigeria and the Middle East (a combined 14 percent). These circumstances necessitate policy-making that is orientated on diversification of supply and the integration of national and regional markets, within the EU, in order to partially reduce the insecurity of supplies. Substituting natural gas for solid fuels and oil as a transport fuel is environmentally friendly; however, substituting natural gas for nuclear power would lead to an overall intensification of greenhouse effects by increasing emissions and increasing natural gas consumption, without reducing other energy sources, and would clearly be unfriendly to the environment. It is therefore clear that the enlarged EU must respond to new and complex energy challenges, under pressure from uncertain globalisation processes and geopolitical circumstances.

Figure 15 shows the structure of total energy consumption in the EU25, in 2004, by fuel type. It indicates a dependence on crude oil and natural gas and a low level of renewable resources. It is clear that diversification of




Figure 15 – Total energy consumption in the EU25 by fuel type in 2004.

Source: EC 2006b.

energy sources is necessary. In particular, any reduction in the dependency on crude oil imports and products constitutes a very difficult task in the development of energy policies at national and EU levels. Risks of insufficient public support will accompany any regulations attempting to reduce EU oil dependence in transport sectors, tax incentives to promote the efficient use of energy, higher standards for energy consuming equipment or higher prices for energy from renewable resources. In essence, political risks of low support for needed, effective energy policies threaten, if electorates of the enlarged EU are not inclined to change energy consumption habits or to adapt current life styles and are not prepared to pay more for energy. Taking the possibilities of emerging negative feedback seriously between energy policy intentions of national and EU political elites, on the one hand, and public opinion regarding energy consumption and habits, on the other; this chapter considers differences in opinion and attitudes concerning energy consumption, in a societal context, across the EU25.

6.3. Public opinion and attitudes towards energy consumption: two polarisations

Various outcomes of the Special Eurobarometer survey “Attitudes towards energy” indicated considerable differences, across the 25 polities of the enlarged EU, in opinion and attitudes concerning energy politics and energy consumption and habits. The survey was part of Eurobarometer wave 64.2 and was conducted between 11 October and 15 November 2005. The survey covered citizens of the 25 countries, aged 15 years and older. In each country, basic sample design was applied in the standard Eurobarometer way: a multi-stage random procedure, in which numbers of sampling points were drawn with probability proportional to population size for a total coverage of the country with regard for its population density. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in the respondent’s home. The sample size was one




Figure 16 – Public opinion regarding European and national levels of policy response to new energy challenges (October–November 2005; N = EU25)

thousand respondents per country; with the exception of the micro-states Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta, where the sample size was five hundred (EC 2006d).

According to the survey, nearly half of all EU respondents (47 percent) believed that the European level is the most appropriate level to respond to new energy challenges (question QA67). Therefore, one can draw a preliminary conclusion that support in the total EU electorate for policy-making, concerned with new energy issues, at the European level was not convincing enough, in autumn 2005. Thirty-seven percent of respondents considered the national decision-making level to be the most appropriate and only 8 percent preferred the role of local authorities in promoting energy efficiency and renewable energies.

Figure 16 shows differences in opinion regarding the suitability of European and national levels for making energy policy. The clear negative correlation (r square of 0.679) indicates the existing tension between these two political and organisational options. Further, it appears that, in autumn 2005, there were considerable differences in public opinion, across the enlarged EU. Convincing support for the European level of energy policy-making was




Figure 17 – Two attitudes concerning energy consumption habits and willingness to pay more for renewable sources of energy (October–November 2005; N = EU25)

measured in Cyprus (CY), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL) and Belgium (BE). Traditionally Eurosceptic electorates, in Finland (FI), the United Kingdom (UK), Estonia (ES) and Sweden (SE), apparently did not consider the EU level to be an appropriate scale of decision-making on energy issues and tended to prefer the policy and decision-making level of their own national governments. It should also be noted that the large and influential electorates in Germany (GE) and France (FR) exhibit merely average support for the European policy-making level and that public opinion in the ten 2004 enlargement countries appears to be quite differentiated.

Figure 17 shows a similar tension and complex differentiation patterns in describing a negative correlation (r square of 0.483) between two key attitudes towards energy consumption and habits. The two questions were introduced with the comment: “As you may know, we are now facing new energy challenges (like high energy prices, international obligations to reduce CO₂ emissions) that could imply efforts for citizens. With which of the following propositions do you agree the most?” The horizontal axis describes differences in agreement with the proposition “I do not intend to change my

Table 18 – National response to energy challenges dimension (N = EU25)

Indicators	Component loadings
(1) response to new energy challenges at national level (QA67)	0.848
(2) response to new energy challenges at local level (QA67)	0.554
(3) promote new energy technologies (QA65)	0.679
(4) develop tax incentives on energy use (QA55)	0.532
(5) regulate to reduce dependency on oil (QA55)	-0.640
(6) response to new energy challenges at European level (QA67)	-0.775

Note: variance represented = 50.7 percent

Source: Special Eurobarometer No. 248, October–November 2005; own calculations

energy consumption habits and I would not be prepared to pay more”. The EU respondent average is 15 percent; however, in Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LA) and Austria (AT) the share of this negative attitude towards energy issues is over 20 percent. On the other hand, Figure 17 depicts the lowest scores, in terms of this negative attitude, in Denmark (DK), the Netherlands (NL), Malta (MT), Finland (FI), France (FR), Luxembourg (LU), Sweden (SE), and Poland (PL). In contrast, the differentiation on the vertical axis describes the degree to which the electorates in this group of EU countries declare their willingness to reduce energy consumption, while not being prepared to pay more (i.e. agreement with the proposition “As I intend to reduce my energy consumption, I would not be prepared to pay more”). The levels of this specific public opinion are above or near 60 percent, in these countries, and the EU average is 50 percent.

The negative correlations in Figures 16 and 17 suggest important polarisations in public opinion, across the enlarged EU. First, there is a clear polarisation between the political and organisational option orientated at the EU level of policy making and the option orientated at the level of individual nation-states. Second, polarisation is also apparent between negative attitudes towards new energy issues and positive attitudes that anticipate certain adaptations in energy consumption and habits. Both polarisations suggest the value of exploring their statistical consistency within a broader context of other questions. This type of exploration can be carried out with principal component analyses (Rummel 1970) of correlations between other relevant indicators in addition to those suggesting the polarisations described above.

Table 18 presents a bipolar dimension, extracted from correlations among six indicators, that represents 50.7 percent of their overall variation. Principal component analysis has been employed in order to construct this statistical dimension, which shows the tension between public opinion locating the policy-making regarding new energy challenges at the national level (component loading (0.848) and public opinion in favour of such policy-making at the European level (-0.775). This basic tension was described above in

Table 19 – Positive attitudes on energy consumption dimension (N = EU25)

Indicators	Component loadings
(1) intending to reduce energy consumption, but not paying more (QA66b)	0.824
(2) to bike more to reduce car use (QA70)	0.733
(3) to use public transport and bike more to reduce car use (QA70)	0.573
(4) not prepared to pay more for renewable energy sources (QA66a)	-0.579
(5) not changing energy consumption habits and not prepared to pay more (QA66b)	-0.852

Note: variance represented = 46.3 percent

Source: Special Eurobarometer No. 248, October–November 2005; own calculations

Figure 16; however, the dimension in Table 18 controls for this public opinion polarisation in the context of other interesting indicators. It appears that significance attributed to the national level tends to be associated with an emphasis on the local level as well (0.554). In short, this opinion stresses the importance of the domestic policy-making on energy issues. It is also important to note that public opinion, orientated at the national policy-making level tended to be associated with positive views regarding the promotion of new energy technologies (0.679) and the development of tax incentives for the reduction of energy consumption (0.532). In contrast, opinion on regulation in order to reduce dependency on oil shows a tendency to load on the negative side of the dimension (-0.640). It is clear that this dimension is consistent in terms of the content and structure of the six component loadings. This dimension can be called NATIONAL RESPONSE TO ENERGY CHALLENGES and standardised component scores for the 25 countries on this statistical scale can help describe existing differentiation in the tension, represented by its loadings, across the EU.

In a similar way, Table 19 attempts to substantiate the tension that is shown in Figure 17. In 2005, a polarisation between negative attitudes towards new energy challenges and positive attitudes, anticipating certain adaptations in energy consumption and habits, emerged across the twenty-five polities. This tension in attitudes is explored statistically, using correlations with three other indicators, showing additional, interesting attitudes. From a correlation matrix of the five indicators, the principal component analysis extracted a dimension that represents 46.3 of their total variation. In accordance with the negative correlation specified in Figure 17, this statistical scale is also clearly bipolar. It is evident that the positive intention to reduce energy, without paying more (component loading 0.824) is associated with the preference to bike more to reduce car use (0.733) and also with the intention to use public transport and bike more to reduce car use (0.573). These results demonstrate a tendency concerning the willingness of citizens to change their behaviour in order to contribute to reducing dependency on oil-based energy. The negative side of the dimension represents negative attitudes: attitudes indicating that citizens are not changing energy consump-

tion habits and are not prepared to pay more (-0.852) and also that citizens are not prepared to pay more for renewable energy resources (-0.579). Given the positive orientation of this dimension, in terms of the content of the five indicators, it can be called POSITIVE ATTITUDES ON ENERGY CONSUMPTION. It gives standardised scores for each of the twenty-five countries and indicates existing differences, across the EU, in positive or negative attitudes regarding energy issues. Accordingly, the explanatory analysis in the next part of this chapter shall seek to determine variables (explanatory factors) that tend to influence this differentiation.

6.4. An explanatory model of attitudes on energy consumption (LISREL modelling)

The statistical examination in the preceding section suggested a number of theoretical claims and associated hypotheses that should be incorporated into an explanatory model of differences in some crucial attitudes on energy, across the twenty-five electorates of the enlarged EU. Identifying causal differentiations in the explanatory model with nine variables is a complicated matter. The differences in public opinion, considered in the preceding section, indicate that the required explanatory approach must be sufficiently complex, in order to reach an acceptable level of model determination. The LISREL approach in this chapter is based upon the postulation of an explanatory (causal) order of key structural conditions, the socio-economic development level of the countries concerned or the number of years of EU membership, and basic public opinion variables, a negative view of globalisation and post-materialist value orientations (see section 2.5.3.), that seem to influence public opinion concerning new challenges to energy consumption and adaptations of behaviour, across the EU25. Consequently, the role of a large number of structural condition measures and intermediate variables regarding basic political opinions are examined as determinants of energy consumption attitudes.

6.4.1. Structural and public opinion variables

The postulated causal order of the explanatory model is shown in Figure 19. The first structural variable to be examined, in terms of its effects in the model, is the number of years of EU membership. The major hypothesis to be tested in the explanatory model is whether public opinion in long-time member states is more inclined to support the option of policy-making on energy issues at the European level and, in particular, whether it expresses positive attitudes towards the reduction of energy consumption and the adaptation of habits. This is due to the assumption that long-term experience with the European integration process and with reforms to EU institutions

and procedures could stimulate more positive attitudes towards new issues in the energy sector. The second structural variable is a measure, describing differences in socio-economic situation across the twenty-five countries in 2004–2005, which was discussed in chapter 2 of this book (see Table 3). In essence, this measure represents 49.9 percent of the total variation of the five indicators and is called RICH WELFARE STATE AND LOW GROWTH. The scores on this dimension show differences across the twenty-five countries in terms of the level of welfare state provisions and current economic productivity in GDP. The structure of the loadings also indicates that rich member states tend to accumulate high levels of public debt (see Baldwin, Wypolsz 2004, pp. 360–362). It is also clear that lower levels of unemployment are found in the wealthy countries; however, it is also apparent that the rich EU economies tend to lag behind the poorer member countries, in terms of realised economic growth. Accordingly, one can assume that, within the explanatory model, scores on this dimension could reveal effects that influence public opinion cleavages between electorates in rich and poor countries in the enlarged EU.

A block of five intermediate variables follows next in the postulated causal order of the model. It includes measures of post-materialist value orientation and a negative view of globalisation, as described in section 2.5.3. of chapter 2. Figure 18 shows the correlation between scores on the dimension of positive attitudes on energy consumption reduction and scores on the post-materialist dimension. There is a high positive correlation (r square of 0.612) between the scores of the 25 polities on the two multivariate measures. The highest scores on the post-materialist dimension belong to Denmark (DK), Sweden (SE) and the Netherlands (NL). The lowest scores were recorded in polities in the old and new EU peripheries: Portugal (PT) and Greece (GR) and Lithuania (LI), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK) and Latvia (LA). The positions of electorates in Germany (GE) and Czechia (CZ) are close to the average scores for the two dimensions. Indeed, it appears that, across the enlarged EU, increasing levels of post-materialist values tend to stimulate positive attitudes regarding the reduction of energy. In terms of the theory of cross-cultural variation (Inglehart 1997), this outcome is significant. It suggests a close link between post-materialism and more responsible environmental and energy consumption attitudes (see also the discussion in chapter 2 of this book). It is also significant to note that the tendency to cultivate more responsible attitudes takes place in the value setting of the post-materialist critical and emancipative ethos, with regard for national and the EU policy-making levels. Inglehart and Welzel claim that people with post-materialist value orientations “are economically more secure than materialists, but more sensitive to environmental risks. Individual security increases empathy, making people more aware of long-term risks. The rise of self-expression values fuels *humanistic* risk perceptions. These risk perceptions are fundamentally different from the *egocentric* threat perceptions




Figure 18 – Correlation between post-materialist value orientation and positive attitudes on the reduction of energy consumption (component scores; October–November 2005; N = EU25). Source: own calculations.

that underline survival values” (Inglehart, Welzel 2005, p. 33). In short, the suggested hypothesis argues that, in rich countries, socio-economic development brings increasingly favourable living conditions and this stimulates an increase in mass post-materialist values, which place greater emphasis on environment-related issues. Moreover, Inglehart and Welzel argue that, in post-industrial societies, post-materialists represent a shift from traditional, political, “elite-directed participation to toward elite-challenging participation” (Inglehart, Welzel 2005, p. 118). In accordance with this claim, one can again expect that electorates with higher shares of post-materialists will tend to be aware of the failings and limitations of EU policy-making and decision-making and prefer the national government level (see also Hix 2005, p. 162). In light of these theoretical considerations and empirical tendencies, two hypotheses can be postulated for examination in the explanatory model, in the next section of this chapter. First, the post-materialism score is expected to exert a substantial effect on positive attitudes regarding new challenges of energy consumption and adaptations of energy consumption habits, even

within the broader context of the additional explanatory variables of the postulated model. Second, in a similar way, the claim can be made that a higher position of an electorate on the post-materialist dimension would tend to result in views opposing political and organisational options for decision-making at the European level.

The third variable in this block represents differences in positive answers to the question of whether “the EU is protecting against globalisation” (Eurobarometer No. 64). It can be assumed that such an opinion would tend to support the EU level of energy policies as well as positive attitudes on energy consumption. The fourth variable is concerned with nuclear energy. The use of nuclear energy is a crucial, long-term issue in debates on safe energy production and greenhouse effects (Strydom 2002). Therefore, it is important to incorporate differences in opinion regarding this issue into the explanatory model. It appears that, in autumn 2005, 12 percent of all EU respondents viewed the nuclear alternative as an acceptable solution to current energy production problems (Special Eurobarometer No. 248, question QA65). However, significant differences in opinion exist between electorates in the North and South of the EU25. The highest levels of support for nuclear energy are in Sweden (32 percent), Finland (27 percent) and Lithuania (21 percent). The lowest support levels are in Malta (2 percent), Cyprus (2 percent), Greece (2 percent) and Spain (4 percent). Public opinion in these Mediterranean countries tended to display considerable preference for the development of solar energy (support levels in these countries range from 50 to 76 percent). It is clear that these differences represent articulations of public interest, which reflect fundamental environmental circumstances in the enlarged EU. Therefore, it is important to explore, within the explanatory model, whether differences in opinion on nuclear energy tended to have some systematic influence on attitudes regarding energy consumption and views concerning appropriate levels for policy-making.

The fifth variable in the intermediary block of the postulated model specifies differentiation, across the EU25, in public opinion concerning the question of whether “the EU is ahead of the USA in protection of the environment” (Eurobarometer No. 64, October–November 2005, question QA53.3). More than half of all EU respondents (59 percent) expressed agreement with this geopolitical claim. However, interesting differences regarding this opinion exist between the EU15 countries and the ten new member countries. In the former, the share of positive answers is 62 percent, while in the latter it is only 41 percent. This difference is significant, because it indicates a certain scepticism regarding the EU’s on environmental achievements, expressed in the public opinion of new member states. It can be assumed that the opinion stressing EU leadership in environmental affairs would tend to coincide with support both for the view of the EU level as an appropriate scale for the development of energy policies and for positive attitudes on energy

consumption. The third block of the explanatory model includes the two major dependent measures: scores on the dimensions NATIONAL RESPONSE TO ENERGY CHALLENGES and POSITIVE ATTITUDES ON ENERGY CONSUMPTION (see Tables 18 and 19).

6.4.2. Explaining attitudes to on energy

The two structural variables and the seven public opinion measures or variables as well as the associated hypotheses are translated into the postulated explanatory model shown in Figure 19. The LISREL procedure estimated independent direct and indirect, or mediated, effects in the complex explanatory model. The multiple regression of the model indicates that the two structural variables and the six public opinion variables combine to determine 75 percent of the total variation of the dependent variable, i.e. scores on the POSITIVE ATTITUDES TO ENERGY CONSUMPTION measure (r square of 0.75), across the twenty-five electorates of the enlarged EU. This outcome confirms the substantial determination level of the model.

It appears that the RICH WELFARE STATES AND LOW GROWTH component score measure (hereinafter RICH) is a key predictor of scores on the POST-MATERIALIST VALUE ORIENTATION dimension (hereinafter POST-MAT) for the set of 25 member states. The LISREL model indicates that a shift of one standard deviation on the explanatory dimension RICH implies a positive effect of 0.52 of one standard deviation on the dependent measure POST-MAT. This effect corresponds again with Inglehard, and Welzel's (2005) claim that, in rich democratic redistributive societies (i.e. advanced welfare states), the shift towards post-materialist values is considerable. The other structural variable, indicating the number of years of EU membership (hereinafter EUYEARS) has no independent effect (effect of 0.04) on POST-MAT. Also, differences in scores on the multivariate measure NEGATIVE VIEW OF GLOBALISATION (hereinafter GLOBAL) are substantially affected by RICH (effect of 0.49). This is another important outcome of the explanatory interpretation of the postulated model. It means that the electorates of wealthier EU member states tended to be more wary of globalisation pressures (i.e. they tended to be concerned about international competition and its domestic, socio-economic consequences; see Swank 2002) than the electorates of poorer states (i.e. mostly electorates in the new member states). This result suggests the emergence of serious divisions in public opinion, in the enlarged EU, concerning socio-economic and certain political affairs. The model also portrays the very low effect of POST-MAT on GLOBAL (effect of 0.12), allowing one to draw the conclusion that the shift towards post-materialist values does not result in a convincing tendency, in public opinion, to view globalisation pressures solely in negative terms (see also Giddens 2002, pp. 6–19 for a similar view). The model also indicates that EUYEARS has a similarly low independent effect (0.12) on GLOBAL.

Differences across the twenty-five polities regarding the opinion that the EU is somewhat protective against globalisation (the EU GLOBAL PROTECTION variable) are only 22 percent determined within the statistical model. RICH has interesting, contradictory effects on this variable. Its direct effect of 0.56 is considerable; however, RICH also has an indirect effect mediated by GLOBAL: $-0.56 \times 0.49 = -0.27$. This statistical outcome suggests that if a country scores high on RICH and on GLOBAL, then belief in the EU's capacity to protect against negative globalisation impacts has a tendency to decrease.

The next public opinion variable is concerned with views on nuclear energy in 2005. The NUCLEAR ENERGY variable also exhibits a low level of determination (25 percent). Nonetheless, three substantial direct effects are evident. First, RICH again displays contradictory effects. These include a negative direct effect (-0.45) and opposing positive indirect effects mediated by POST-MAT and GLOBAL; $(0.52 \times 0.45) + (0.49 \times 0.44) = 0.45$. Other effects mediated by the EU GLOBAL PROTECTION variable are negligible. These statistical results mean that the total effect of RICH on the NUCLEAR ENERGY variable is close to zero. Second, POST-MAT has a substantial positive direct effect (0.45), implying that electorates, scoring high on this dimension, tended to view nuclear energy in more positive terms. In other words, it seems that the more post-materialist electorates of the northern EU member states are more inclined to accept nuclear energy as one of the possible options for responding to new energy challenges. Third, GLOBAL has a similar independent, positive direct effect (0.44), suggesting that polities with a more negative view of globalisation and economic uncertainties tend to view the use of nuclear energy as an acceptable option. The determination level of the EU AHEAD USA variable is high (79 percent) and its differentiation across the twenty-five polities can be explained, in the model, through the positive direct effects of POST-MAT (0.62) and GLOBAL (0.52). Substantial indirect effects of RICH are also mediated via these two measures: $(0.52 \times 0.62) + (0.49 \times 0.52) = 0.56$. These statistical modelling outcomes demonstrate that when public opinion in wealthier countries tended towards post-materialist orientations or towards a negative view of globalisation, there was also a public opinion tendency to perceive the EU as being ahead of the USA in terms of protection of the environment. However, it is necessary to note that this particular question was asked in a way that does not clearly establish whether this perception of protection describes the EU level or the national level.

The last block of the postulated explanatory model examines the measures NATIONAL RESPONSE (see Table 18) and POSITIVE ATTITUDES ENERGY (see Table 19). The statistical determinations of the two measures are considerable (67 and 75 percent, respectively). The NATIONAL RESPONSE measure is especially important in the causal order of the postulated model, because it represents the crucial polarisation in public opinion between views, supporting national energy policy-making, and views, supporting EU level




Figure 19 – An explanatory model of positive attitudes on the reduction of energy consumption (N = EU25; determination = 75 percent). Source: own calculations.

policy-making. It is clear that this public opinion polarisation has certain significance concerning the development of EU policies that respond to new energy challenges in their global context. The statistical outcomes indicate positive and negative effects, which document a complex pattern of public opinion tendencies influencing this polarisation. First, there is a very strong positive direct effect arising from POST-MAT (0.79). This means that electorates with intensive post-materialist value orientations clearly tended to support national level policy-making on energy issues and not the EU level. It is necessary to emphasise that this independent effect remains strong in the broad pattern of the other six independent direct effects, in the postulated model. As has already been explained, in various chapters of this book, post-materialist value orientations have led to critical attitudes towards authority, to more critical and less easily manipulated political opinions and to a critical approach to European integration processes, particularly in terms of the deepening of EU integration (Hix 2005). A substantial positive effect from GLOBAL (0.46) is also evident, meaning that, across the EU25,

a negative view towards globalisation pressures tended to stimulate public opinion preference for energy policy-making within the framework of each of the respective nation-states. Next, there is a positive direct effect (0.36) from the NUCLEAR ENERGY variable. This statistical result suggests a public opinion tendency, indicating certain concerns among electorates showing preference for the nuclear energy option, concerning potential barriers to necessary policy-making on this energy source that could originate at the European decision-making level. Once again, the direct and indirect effects of RICH are more complex in nature. RICH exhibits a low negative direct effect (-0.24). However, the indirect effects mediated by POST-MAT and GLOBAL are positive: $0.52 \times 0.79 = 0.41$, respectively $0.49 \times 0.46 = 0.23$. It seems that the public in rich member states tended to display post-materialist orientations and preference for national level policy-making on energy. Finally, there is a negative direct effect from differences in the view that the EU is ahead of the USA in terms of environmental protection (-0.37). It seems that this effect represents a tendency, across the EU25 public opinion, to associate this accomplishment with the EU level of policy-making.

The final dependent variable in the causal order of the postulated model is the score on the POSITIVE ATTITUDES TO ENERGY CONSUMPTION dimension (see Table 19). The statistical outcomes clearly demonstrate a strong positive direct effect (0.74) resulting from differences in the post-materialist value orientation (POST-MAT) on differences in the dimension, representing the polarisation between positive and negative attitudes on energy consumption and changing habits. It should be noted that this positive independent effect is very similar to the simple correlation between the two measures ($r = 0.78$), as shown in Figure 18. This convincing outcome indicates that differentiation, across the enlarged EU, in the post-materialist value orientation can be seen as a crucial public opinion tendency, which also influences differentiation in attitudes towards energy, across the twenty-five electorates. There is also a lower positive direct effect (0.34) from the EU GLOBAL PROTECTION variable, indicating the impact of optimistic perceptions regarding the EU's sheltering capabilities on positive attitudes towards energy. There is a very low positive direct effect (0.23) from GLOBAL, suggesting a very weak tendency to stress positive attitudes towards energy, in light of negative perceptions of globalisation. A similarly low positive direct effect (0.22) comes from the variable EUYEAR. However, this statistical modelling result tends to suggest that the length of EU membership and the associated experiences of electorates with EU affairs appeared to lack, in 2005, decisive stimulating effects on positive attitudes towards energy consumption and behaviour adaptation. Finally, RICH again exhibits contradictory effects. On the one hand, it causes a negative direct effect (-0.32). On the other hand, there is a substantial positive indirect effect mediated by POST-MAT ($0.52 \times 0.74 = 0.38$). These positive and negative effects also show that the total effect of differences between rich and poor member states is close to zero.

6.5. Conclusions

The enlarged EU must respond to new and complex energy challenges, under pressure from uncertain globalisation processes and risky geopolitical circumstances. Any reduction in the dependency on crude oil, natural gas imports and oil products constitutes a particularly difficult task for developing energy policy, both at national and EU levels. There are risks of an insufficient public support for regulations, attempting to reduce oil dependence in the transport sectors, for tax incentives to promote the efficient use of energy, for higher standards concerning energy consuming equipment or for paying more for energy from renewable resources.

The articulated public opinion and mass interest of the twenty-five national electorates provide important feedback, implying barrier effects on the governing political elites of the democratic states in question and on policy-making, during meetings of the political elites at the EU level.

The multivariate statistical analysis of public opinion on energy consumption, across the enlarged EU, demonstrates that, in the autumn of 2005, there were two crucial polarisations in articulations of opinions and attitudes. First, there was a polarisation between the political option orientated at the EU level of policy-making and the option orientated at the individual member state level. It is significant to note that positive views, regarding the promotion of new energy technologies and the development of tax incentives for reducing energy consumption, were associated with public opinion stressing the importance of the national policy-making level and not the EU level. Second, there was a polarisation between negative attitudes towards new energy issues and positive attitudes that recognise and anticipate certain necessary adaptations in energy consumption and habits. These two polarisations in public opinion, across the enlarged EU, were examined in a postulated explanatory model with nine variables. LISREL modelling of public opinion differentiations, across the set of twenty-five polities, allowed for a number of major conclusions to be drawn. Strong direct effects in the explanatory model documented the importance of polities' post-materialist orientations, which tended to support both the national level of energy politics and positive attitudes towards the reduction of energy consumption and the adaptation of habits. The outcomes of the model also indicated a tendency for polities, with a more negative view of globalisation, to prefer the national level of energy politics. Third, the analysis failed to show any clear divisions in public opinion on energy consumption between the old member states of the EU15 and the new member states of the May 2004 enlargement. However, the postulated model did suggest a tendency for public opinion in the wealthier member states to be oriented towards post-materialist values and to prefer the national level of policy-making. Fourth, the explanatory model indicated that differentiations in public opinion, across the EU, tended not to support, to a sufficient level, the development

of strong energy policies at the EU level. Consequently, the major conclusion to be drawn is that considerable risks and uncertainties emerged in the global system, concerning the geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances of energy supply and production, but that these uncertainties were not reflected in public opinion, across the enlarged EU. The analysis made in this chapter shows that, in terms of public opinion in autumn 2005, development of effective energy policies at the EU level was seemingly also beset by considerable uncertainty and risk, involving insufficient electoral support.

7. Public opinion regarding the deepening and widening of the European Union and differentiated integration (survey 2005)

7.1. Introduction

The major conclusions drawn in chapter 5 and 6 of this book are based on multivariate analyses, concerning questions as to whether, in 2004–2005, the polities of the EU member states articulated sufficient support for future European integration processes or whether indications of a stalemate in public opinion, across the enlarged EU of twenty-five polities, existed. The questions, considering existing tendencies in public opinion and mass interest articulations of the national electorates in EU member states, are central to studies of the political integration of the EU, because they indicate important positive or negative feedbacks towards the governing political elites of the democratic states concerned (see McLaren 2005; Karp, Bowler 2006). The analysis carried out in this chapter begins with considerations from 2005 public opinion concerning the two primary directions of the European integration: (i) deepening (i.e. indicated through support for a constitution of the European Union and (ii) widening (i.e. support for further enlargement).

Deepening is a process through which the EU's competences and tasks are increased, scope of common policy-making at the EU level is broadened and decision-making powers of EU institutional bodies such as the European Commission or European Parliament are increasing. Widening is the process of EU enlargement. Practically from the beginning, the six founding countries subscribed to the enlargement principle written into the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Article 237) and stated that "any European State may apply to become a Member of the Community" (Preston 1997, p. 7). It is important to note that the enlargement process involves negotiations, in accordance with requirements, resulting from the June 1993 Copenhagen criteria, which any candidate country must meet to be able to join the EU. It must be reiterated that the enlargement criteria imply applicant states far-reaching institutional, organisational and behavioural adjustments. Adjustment processes affect societal structures and economic affairs and their influence extends beyond merely invoking needed behavioural adaptations among the political and economic elites of the candidate countries. It is,

therefore, important to explore whether such behavioural and public opinion adjustments contribute importantly to unifying European processes and whether the often very demanding adjustments seem to lead to articulations of Euro-sceptical opinion in the new member states. On the other hand, however, the fact that the EU must demonstrate that it can include new countries, while continuing its integration processes, should also be mentioned (see Piris 2006). Significantly, not all electorates in the old member states favoured of enlargement and deeper intergration. Not all electorates of the enlarged EU of twenty-five countries have been particularly welcoming further enlargement with countries in Eastern Europe such as Albania, the Ukraine or Turkey (see Cargolu 2003).

It is not too surprising, therefore, that on the basis of analyses of national elections and European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2004, for all twenty-five countries (thus including electorates resulting from the May 2004 enlargement and taking part in the 2004 European elections), Caramani (2006) concluded that an EU-wide electorate, based upon an integrated EU-wide polity, is yet to emerge. Indeed, this claim sends a disturbing message, when one takes into consideration the assumed need for the further deepening and widening of European integration, which could enhance the EU's capabilities to respond, in a global system, to external political and economic, competitive pressures. It is therefore beneficial to take a closer look at existing differences in public opinion on the two key European integration processes, across the twenty-five polities.

7.2. Widening and deepening processes

7.2.1. Differentiation in public opinion on widening (further enlargement)

Analysing mass opinion and attitudes towards the deepening and enlargement, across the set of twenty-five polities, the results of Standard Eurobarometer survey No. 64 (October–November 2005) can again be used. Figure 20 shows the differentiation in net support for future widening (question “what is your opinion on future enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years?”) and also according to the number of years of EU membership. Results from the Eurobarometer, carried out in autumn 2005, show an average EU support level for future widening (i.e. the average of the total sample of 29,430 respondents to the survey) of 49 percent as well as a significant 39 percent against with 12 percent taking no position in favour or against. In essence, net support is positive, but only by a 10 percent level. Figure 20 indicates great differences in net support for future widening. In the historical core of the EU's six founding countries, the polities indicate moderate support in Italy (IT), approximately zero net support in the Netherlands (NL) and Belgium (BE), with significant




Figure 20 – Net support for future enlargement and number of years of EU membership (Eurobarometer No. 64, October–November 2005; N = 25). Source: own calculations.

negative opinion, particularly, in the dominating EU countries Germany (GE) and France (FR). Net support for widening in Denmark (DK) and the United Kingdom (UK) is also close to the zero level. However, the old EU periphery, formed by Greece (GR), Portugal (PT) and Spain (SP) as well as Ireland (IR), seems to support future enlargement of the EU. The countries of the 1995 enlargement are divided on this issue. Moderate support for future widening can be found in Sweden (SE) and, in Finland (FI), support is close to zero, while in Austria (AT), public opinion opposing future widening is considerable. Figure 20 also documents that, in autumn 2005, polities in the new EU periphery, formed by the 2004 big bang accession, tended to support future enlargement. This net positive opinion ranges from lower levels in Estonia (ES) and Latvia (LA) to very high levels of support in Poland (PL), Lithuania (LI) and Slovenia (SI). Consequently, the general pattern of differences in Figure 20 indicates existing divisions concerning the strategic geopolitical and geo-economic options of the EU. The main conclusion to be drawn, at this point of the discussion, is that there is a particularly important division in public opinion between the polities of the

key countries Germany and France, on the one hand, and politics of the EU periphery, on the other. It appears that this clear division in public opinion could lead to risks of stalemate in the enlarged EU, resulting in lengthy and uneasy agreements on future widening among the political elites of the twenty-five countries. This due to the fact that public opinion and mass interest articulations, in some of the EU countries' democratic regimes, can lead to significant barrier effects from the national electorates affecting the geopolitical and geo-economic considerations of the governing national political elites concerned.

7.2.2. Differentiation in public opinion on deepening (a constitution)

Differences in the public opinion on the deepening of European integration processes can be determined using answers to the question of whether people support a EU constitution. As explained in chapters 2 and 5, rejection of the draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty in referendums held, in France in May 2005 and in the Netherlands in June 2005, suggested the end of a long cycle of attempts to deepen the European integration process, dating back to its initial stages with the Single Market Act, in 1985, and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Dinan 2005, Piris 2006). Considerable uncertainty about the future of integration processes, especially about the deepening process, emerged, following the two unsuccessful referendums.

According to the results of the Standard Eurobarometer survey, from autumn 2005, average support for an EU constitution (question QA32.5 "What is your opinion on a constitution for the European Union? Are you for or against it") was measured at 63 percent. However, 21 percent of the respondents were against and 15 percent were do-not-know answers. In brief, net support for further EU deepening was relatively low: 42 percent. It is important to stress that 2005's negative referendums in France and the Netherlands, which took place only a few months before the autumn 2005 survey, did not result in general negative opinion, across the entire EU on this key question regarding further EU integration. However, the fact that the extent to which respondents agreed with the idea of a constitution was not explicitly based on an evaluation of the contents of the rejected Treaty on the EU constitution should also be emphasised.

Figure 21 indicates very significant differences in net support for an EU constitution. It is important to stress that in so-called, Eurosceptic countries, such as Austria (AT), Sweden (SE), Finland (FI), the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark (DK), opposing opinion did not dominate and net support levels were positive, in autumn 2005. In the historical core of the six founding states of the EU, there were – with the exception of the Netherlands – high levels of net support for EU deepening; especially in Belgium (BE), Germany (GE) and Italy (IT). It is interesting to note that the net support level was higher in France (FR) than in the Netherlands




Figure 21 – Net support for a constitution and number of years of EU membership in 2005 (Eurobarometer No. 64; N = 25). Source: own calculations.

(NL). Figure 21 also shows that polities in the new EU periphery tended to be more divided on this issue. On the one hand, low levels of support were expressed by respondents in Czechia (CZ) and Estonia (ES), suggesting that public opinion in these countries reflected similar Eurosceptic opinions in other, Scandinavian countries. On the other hand, very high levels of support were documented in Hungary (HU), Slovenia (SI) and Cyprus (CY). This general pattern of differences indicates the significant risk of stalemate, which arises from these public opinion divisions, concerning needed geo-economic and geopolitical options to intensify continental integration in order to strengthen the capacities of the enlarged EU in its unavoidable competition with the central powers of the global system. These survey results clearly document that, in autumn 2005, significant divisions existed, across the EU of twenty-five member states. However, in spite of these difficulties, deepening (support for a European Union constitution) and widening (i.e. support for further enlargement) can be understood, at a general level, as the fundamental directions of key EU integration processes, which influence each other and which, in spite of certain short-term




Figure 22 – A scatter diagram of net support for future EU enlargement and net support for a constitution (Eurobarometer No. 64; October–November 2005; N = EU25). Source: own calculations.

difficulties, might eventually lead to critical, long-term correspondence concerning future integration tasks of political elites from the member states concerned.

Differences in public opinion on the two crucial directions of European integration processes suggest the existence of a very low positive correlation between the two variables, across the EU25. Indeed, the scatter diagram in Figure 22 indicates that practically no correlation existed between the two indicators, suggesting that differences in net support for an EU constitution were not dependent upon differences in the other variable. The highly diffused scatter distribution suggests the necessity of viewing the two differentiations in terms of a typology. The typology, defined in Table 20, can be used. According to Karp and Bowler (2006), mass values, attitudes and articulations of public opinion among the politics in the enlarged EU can be classified into four main types. The typology in Table 20, however, partially modifies the type labels, in order to make them applicable to our analysis, at the level of the twenty-five politics.

Table 20 – Public opinion on EU enlargement and deepening

Levels of support	Lower levels of support for future EU deepening	Higher levels of support for future EU deepening
Higher levels of support for EU enlargement	<i>Europractical</i> Main reasons: EU is perceived as an enlarged common market, trade and economic growth are important (CZ)	<i>Integrationist</i> European orientations, confidence in EU institutions and common policy-making (PL, LI, SI, GR, CY, HU, SK, LA, MT, SP, PT, IR, ES and IT)
Lower levels of support for EU enlargement	<i>Eurosceptic</i> National pride, lack of trust in EU institutions, current common market is most important (AT, UK, DK, FI and SE)	<i>Institutionalist</i> Main reasons: old policies, farmers, loss of subsidies, concerns about weakening and effectiveness of EU institutions (BE, LU, GE, FR and NL)

Note: modified version of a typology from Karp, Bowler (2006, p. 374)

On the basis of higher or lower levels of support for deepening or enlargement, the typology indicates four basic orientations in public opinion and articulations of instrumental reasons. The two averages of net support levels, as indicated above, are used as dividing lines in the typology (i.e. 10 percent net support for enlargement and 42 percent net support for deepening). Higher levels of support for both deepening and widening are characteristic of electorates believing in an *Integrationist* orientation. Such an orientation seems to be associated with a certain optimism regarding European integration processes, which is expressed in higher confidence in EU institutions and common redistributive policy-making such as the structural and regional funds. Nearly all the polities from countries in the new EU periphery – Poland (PL), Lithuania (LI), Cyprus (CY), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LA), Estonia (ES) and Malta (MT) – are in this category. Moreover, electorates from the old EU periphery, Greece (GR), Spain (SP) and Portugal (PT) along with Italy (IT), are also in this grouping. It should be noted that the electorates of this peripheral grouping seem to give decisive public support for continued, simultaneous deepening and enlargement, because otherwise their political elites could be lacking, in terms of needed public opinion support, power potential in internal geopolitical and geo-economic debates on the formation of the future European Union system. It also seems that polities from the enlarged EU's peripheries tend to perceive further deepening of European integration as a necessary means for extending the borders of the EU to the southeast part of continent.

These suggestions are linked with the configuration of the *Institutionalist* orientation, which seems to be based upon positive evaluations of older, traditional EU policies such as the common agricultural policy or upon the fear of losing subsidies from the structural and regional funds allocated in the richer EU countries, because various subsidies would have to be

shifted towards the member states of the new periphery. This public opinion orientation also suggests that, in autumn 2005, politics in Germany (GE), France (FR), Belgium (BE), Luxembourg (LU) and the Netherlands (NL) expected that taxpayers in wealthier countries would be required to make more subsidy contributions to the common EU budget (Karp, Bowler 2006, p. 372). It suggests that, in terms of historical accounts of European integration processes (see Harrison 1995, Dinan 2005, Hix 2005), these member states still form the core of the enlarged EU and their politics and political elites will be central to any political considerations, concerning future deepening and enlargement of the EU. Their concerns, about the weakening and overall effectiveness of EU institutions, further suggest the nature of this Institutional public opinion orientation. The polity in Italy (IT) fits also into the Integrationist category in Figure 22's scatter plot. This is not too surprising, because Italian public opinion has traditionally been one of the most integrationist, throughout the long history of the EU (see Duchesne, Frogner 1995). The Institutional grouping includes the very influential EU politics of Germany and France, suggesting the serious risk of difficult political debates regarding any future EU enlargement.

The *Eurosceptic* orientation describes public opinion in EU politics indicating low levels of support for both deepening and enlargement. National pride and a general lack of trust in EU institutions and their capabilities characterise this orientation. Negative responses to widening are likely based on short-term and narrowly defined instrumental, self-interests, in terms of 'euros and cents' (Karp, Bowler 2006, p. 373). Austria's polity (AT) appeared to be the most Eurosceptic. Politics in Finland (FI), the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark (DK) and Sweden (SE) exhibited similar public opinion orientations, characterised by similar articulations of public opinion on European integration processes. Finally, the *Europractical* public opinion orientation lends support to further widening, but simultaneously exhibits low level support for the deepening process. It appears that, in Autumn 2005, the polity of Czechia (CZ) tended to view EU membership primarily as participation in an enlarging common market and perceived EU financial support, stimulating economic growth, as the key benefit, arising from the EU membership. At the same time, however, the Czech polity displayed a lack of trust in EU institutions. It is significant to note that this Europractical public opinion position and, in particular, the Integrationist grouping include all politics of the ten new member states. This result from the analysis of the Eurobarometer survey is certainly significant, because it documents the crucial public opinion cleavage in the enlarged EU25: lack of support for future widening in most of the older EU countries, on the one hand, and moderate or high levels of support for widening in the new EU countries, shown by articulations of both the Integrationist and Europractical orientations, on the other. In essence, it appears that, in autumn 2005, considerable risk of protracted political debates concerning the further course of the Eu-

European integration process existed and that polarised articulations of public opinion, in which short term and long-term considerations will need to be debated both at the level of member states and, especially, at the European Union level must be anticipated. There was an apparent lack of sufficient public opinion support for further European integration processes. This is especially true as far the insufficient and highly differentiated support for the widening process is concerned. In addition, public opinion support for the deepening process was weak in autumn 2005 and clearly did not correspond with Europe's long-term, strategic needs.

7.3. Differentiated integration: multi-speed or two-speed integration

The differentiated integration of the European Union (EU) is considered as an important process of the EU since the outset of European integration. Differentiation refers to differences in the application of European policies or difference in the level or intensity of participation in European policy regimes and governance (Ehlermann 1995, Stubb 1996, Sepos 2005, Dinan, 2005). The primary reason that issues concerning differentiated integration arise is that significant differences exist in socio-economic or in other circumstances (i) among the EU countries and, significantly, (ii) across regions or societal groups of the countries as well. The six founding countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) or later the European Community (EC) recognised this issue, during the 1950s. As a result, from the beginning of the European integration process, treaties recognised that objective differences among countries, their regions and societal groups could be reflected under certain circumstances in the institutional regimes and procedures, which would be introduced in the institutional development of the EEC, EC or EU. Consequently, specific protocols and clauses were added to the treaties and variable procedures for implementing legislation were accepted in the form of time delays.

With each widening of the EEC or EC, and later of the EU, debates on differentiated integration have periodically re-emerged, suggesting that certain countries should be allowed to form a first "pioneering group" of deeper European integration. Such suggestions have been made in the expectation that the future EU might have twenty-five or more members (Sepos 2005, Dinan 2005). Beginning with the first enlargement, incorporating the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, and again with the incorporation of Mediterranean Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986), the discussions recognised the significance of increasing diversity within the widening processes. The 1985 Single European Act (SEA) introduced important institutional and procedural changes which primarily strengthened the formation of a more integrated common market. Article 23 of the SEA, concerned with socio-economic issues of cohesion introduced the task

of reducing disparities between various regions in the countries as well as the backward economy of the least favoured member states. Clearly, only certain countries and certain regions and societal groups were eligible for the financial programmes of such policies. In essence, these directions of European policy regimes and governance recognised the significance of the multi-speed diffusion of European integration and unequal socio-economic development, across the countries of the EC/EU. It is not surprising then that the May 2004 enlargement with Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus increased the already high level of diversity among the economies and societies of EU countries. Consequently, the option of institutional arrangements and procedures and of governance based on differentiated integration gained even more in importance.

However, terminology concerning the terms of multi-speed or differentiated integration in the EU is not sufficiently clear. Various issues arise, in terms of the scope and forms of EU differentiation processes. The Maastricht Treaty added two new modalities of differentiation: the UK and Denmark's non-participation in the European Monetary Union (EMU), set forth in special protocols and the UK's opt-out regarding social policy. These new modalities underlined the complex and evolving nature of multi-speed integration. Multi-speed integration is a mode of integration, according to which the pursuit of the EU member states' common objectives is driven by a core group of countries that are both able and willing to proceed further in the deepening process, with the underlying assumption that the other member states will follow later (see Stubb 1996).

It is obvious that, in the multi-speed development, the time axis is crucial as is the belief that countries from the peripheral group can (later) accede into the core group. This is the main reason, why the concept of a multi-speed EU is often replaced by the concept of a two-speed EU. It is essential to understand that the concept of two-speed EU assumes an integration process, in which countries maintain the same EU policy regimes and actions, not simultaneously, but at different time periods. In addition, it is important that sufficient emphasis be given to the fact that although this notion of differentiated integration recognises differences, countries follow the same objectives, which must, in due time, be achieved by all of the countries. This rule is compatible with the fundamental principles of EU legislation (Ehlermann 1995, Stubb 1996). Deciding whether EU standards which differentiate have to be subject to time limits is a complex issue. Differentiations in natural conditions or spatial circumstances (such as climate or geographical distance) could justify permanent differentiations. On the other hand, specific situations, resulting from the historical development of societies and economies, usually lead to temporary differentiations.

The fact should be noted that, since the outset of European integration, the successive treaties have allowed for objectively defensible differences to




Figure 23 – Net support for a two-speed EU in October–November 2005 and number of years of EU membership (N = EU25). Source: own calculations.

be reflected in differences in institutional and, procedural arrangements to be applied. However, problems often arose on the basis of the clearly subjective preferences of certain countries rather than objective conditions. In the mid-1990s, the UK government gave great emphasis to the necessary “flexibility” in the EU’s institutional and procedural arrangements. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty included a provision on ‘enhanced cooperation’ allowing for the formation of a ‘pioneering’ core group in new fields of EU policies. It is clear that a minimum set of core policies, which all EU countries must adhere to and which would leave little room to manoeuvre, needs to be maintained. Another view claims that some countries actually are more important and more committed to intensive integration than others. Such countries might carry more weight and be allowed to proceed more quickly than those countries willing to form a peripheral EU group. The crucial argument favouring the two-speed institutional development of the EU, has been the recognition of the need to effectively accommodate the increasing diversity of the enlarging EU (Dinan 2005).

Stub (1996, p. 294) argued that the crucial objective of EU institutional development was “to make necessary institutional, procedural and policy changes so as to ensure the effective functioning of an enlarged Union. Since expansion leads to diversity, the Union will have to be flexible enough to embrace varying patterns of integration. ... Widening and deepening – enlargement and integration – will not prove easily compatible”. Accordingly, the empirical question arises as to whether this perspective, of a flexible two-speed EU, was supported by public opinion, across the enlarged EU of twenty-five member states, in autumn 2005. More specifically, whether did public opinion in the key EU countries (Germany and France) tend to support the processes and visions of a two-speed EU.

Figure 23 shows considerable differentiation in terms of net support for a two-speed EU, in October and November 2005 (Eurobarometer No. 64), across the twenty-five polities of the enlarged EU. The survey asked: “What is your opinion on the speed of building Europe being faster in one group of countries than in the other countries” (question QA32.6). The outcomes indicate a 39 percent share in favour of this institutional option, with 44 percent against and 17 percent undecided. These results made it clear that EU citizens remained divided on this option for EU development. Figure 23 shows differences in net support and indicates that the French polity (FR) articulated the lowest level of net support from the set of countries forming the historical core of the EU. There were low levels of support in Belgium (BE), the Netherlands (NL) and, significantly, also in Germany (GE). It is clear that political elites from these influential countries could not rely on sufficient support for flexible, two-speed development of the EU, in autumn 2005. High levels of support were recorded in Estonia (ES), Czechia (CZ) and Cyprus (CY) as well as in some other new member states such as Hungary (HU), Latvia (LA), Lithuania (LI) and Malta (MT). Polities in Poland (PL), Slovenia (SI) and Slovakia (SK) were much less inclined to support the option of a two-speed EU, in autumn 2005. Clear articulations of opposing public opinion were also present in the Eurosceptic countries: Finland (FI), Sweden (SE), the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland (IR). It also seems that the polities in these member states were concerned about possible isolation in the future EU, if they remained in the institutional periphery and did not shift to the core.

These differences indicate that any attempt at their explanation should, once again, be conducted in the comprehensive context of other explanatory relationships. The question of whether the polities involved were worried about the formation of a ‘pioneering group’ of countries that would be able and willing to progress in deepening processes or whether they tended to welcome this institutional and procedural option is particularly interesting. The following statistical analysis suggests possible answers to this and other related questions, concerned with various reasons for an EU constitution, in the framework of a complex explanatory approach.

7.4. Postulated explanatory model (LISREL)

7.4.1. Structural and public opinion variables

A postulated model, enabling a more complex explanatory approach, is shown in Figure 24. Two structural variables are used in order to statistically identify certain key characteristics across the twenty-five countries of the EU. First, the number of years of EU membership in 2005 describes the time dimension of experience with the conditions of being incorporated in this compact of states for the various polities concerned. Second, the component score on the dimension RICH WELFARE STATES AND LOW GROWTH, which was statistically derived and interpreted in chapter 2 and also used in the postulated explanatory model in chapter 6, is utilised again. The explanatory model in Figure 24 also includes scores on the dimensions of post-materialism and negative view of globalisation, which again were employed in the preceding model (chapter 6) and which are also based upon results from the




Figure 24 – Explanatory model of public opinion in 2005 on a two-speed EU and reasons for a constitution (October–November 2005; N = EU25). Source: own calculations.

Eurobarometer survey from October and November 2005. The other four public opinion variables are derived from the same survey.

The third explanatory public opinion variable describes differences in net support for the development of European political union. It is clear that this variable describes articulations of public interest, tending to support the EU deepening process. If the postulated model shows a significant positive direct effect from this variable on differences in net support for a two-speed EU, this will indicate that the levels of articulated support for this core-periphery model can be understood, in terms of the further deepening of the EU. Another interesting question focuses on the further effects of the two-speed EU opinion variable on other articulations of public opinion included in the model. The effect that the two-speed EU variable tends to have on the net support for enlargement variable should be explored (see Figures 20 and 24). This indicator represents differences in public opinion on the widening process. Following the negative outcomes of referendums on the draft of the Treaty on EU Constitution, in France and the Netherlands, intensive debates emerged across the EU regarding whether the draft of the constitution would have to be re-negotiated (Pirin 2006). Accordingly, the sixth public opinion variable included in the postulated model is net opinion articulating support for the opening of re-negotiations on the draft of the EU constitution. Possible systematic effects on public opinion concerning this important political procedural option will be explored in the multivariate statistical model.

7.4.2. Differentiation in reasons for an EU constitution

The results of Standard Eurobarometer no. 64, carried out in autumn 2005, indicate that 13 percent of the interviewed EU citizens thought that the EU constitution project should be dropped. Another 22 percent thought that EU member states should continue the ratification process and 49 percent thought that the Treaty on EU Constitution should be re-negotiated. It is not too surprising that the highest levels of this last opinion were in France (65 percent) and the Netherlands (64 percent), while the lowest levels were in Malta (30 percent), Ireland (32 percent) and Spain (38 percent). Czech public opinion (52 percent) was close to the EU average of 49 percent.

The dependent variable in the postulated model (see Figure 24) is differentiation in the component scores, on an extracted dimension from the intercorrelation matrix of six reasons for an EU constitution, as expressed in October and November 2005 (see Table 21). Piris argued that “the European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses”. However, the European project “also derives its legitimacy from democratic, transparent and efficient institutions” (Piris 2006, p. 202). This claim is reflected in part in the articulated opinions on reasons for an EU constitution in Table 21.

Table 21 – Reasons for an EU constitution in 2005 (N = EU25)

Indicators	Loadings
(1) net opinion that the constitution will make the EU more competitive economically (QA48.1); mean = 45.8 percent	0.970
(2) net opinion that the constitution will make the EU more democratic (QA47.1); mean = 42.5 percent	0.934
(3) net opinion that the constitution will make the EU more socially-minded (QA48.3); mean = 30.8 percent	0.892
(4) net opinion that the constitution is necessary to ensure EU institutions work well (QA50); mean = 35.2 percent	0.849
(5) net opinion that the constitution will make the EU stronger in the world (QA48.1); mean = 52.5 percent	0.666
(6) net opinion that the constitution will make the EU more transparent (QA47.3); mean = 32.3 percent	0.596

Note: variance represented = 68.8 percent

Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 64, October–November 2005; own calculations

An impressive 68.8 percent of the total variation of the six indicators is represented by the component called REASONS FOR AN EU CONSTITUTION. The highest loading (0.970) on the component arises from the net opinion that the constitution will make the EU more competitive economically. This opinion represents the view that an EU constitution must be an institutional tool, ensuring the development of an effective common market. The mean value of this indicator throughout the set of twenty-five polities is 45.8 percent, further indicating its importance. Significantly, net opinion that the constitution will make the EU more democratic has the second highest loading (0.934) and a mean value of 42.5 percent. This result indicates that stress placed upon this aspect could represent a belief in the potential of a constitution to reduce the so-called democratic deficit of the EU (see Hix 2005). The high loading (0.892) of net opinion that the constitution will make the EU more socially-minded is also linked with ongoing debates, in the EU, concerning the nature of the so-called ‘European social model’. For instance, Giddens argues that “the *social model* (in its diversity) is a basic part of the reason for the existence of the EU. ... Initially this position sounds odd, because Europe’s welfare systems largely developed independently of the EU institutions and the EU lacks power over them. Yet Europeans as a whole, as surveys show, see the care and protection offered by welfare provisions as central to their lives. ... The social model is hence a key part of ‘Europeanness’, but in an evolving way” (Giddens 2007, p. 207). In accordance with this assertion and in spite of its lower mean level of 30.8 percent (see Table 21), one can claim that this articulated opinion regarding an EU constitution indicates a key factor, which could restore legitimacy for EU deepening through an effective recasting of European social models. The next highest loading (0.849) represents net opinion that a constitution

is necessary to ensure that EU institutions work well. This is a significant outcome of the principal component analysis in that it clearly indicates the articulation of opinion, supporting the deepening of the EU integration process. This opinion is clearly associated with both the Institutional and Integrationalist opinion orientations, summarised in Table 20, and stresses the need for significant, socio-economic reform in the enlarged EU. The following component loading is lower (0.666) and represents opinion that the constitution will make the EU stronger in the world. The mean level of this opinion is high (52.5 percent) and it exhibits a belief among EU citizens that further deepening of the integration process is needed in order to strengthen the geo-economic and geopolitical position of the EU, in the context of a global system (Dostál, Hampl 2000). The final indicator also has a lower loading (0.596) and it indicates a correlation with net opinion that a constitution will make the EU more transparent. This opinion is one of the central points in debates on the specific democratic nature of EU institutions and procedures. Piris argues that “in the future, political control over the EU institutions will largely continue to be exercised through national institutions, in addition to the control exercised through the European Parliament. It flows from it that one should stop trying to look for solutions of the so-called ‘European democratic deficit’ through institutional means modelled on nation-state’s institutions” (Piris 2006, p. 17). According to Hix (2005, pp. 177–178), this view of an EU democratic deficit primarily relates to increased executive power and decreasing national parliamentary control, a weak European Parliament, perceptions concerning a distant EU, and ‘policy drift’ often based on a neo-liberal regulatory framework. The issues of transparency arise in the sense that an EU citizen should be fully informed as to what EU policy-makers and decision-makers are, in fact, doing and who is responsible for what policy and decision (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000, p. 177).

It is clear that this dimension represents an important cluster of correlated views, supporting positive reasons for an EU constitution. The component score for each of the twenty-five polities of the enlarged EU on this dimension is postulated as the final dependent opinion variable in the explanatory model (see Figure 24). Figure 25 shows the scatter distribution between scores on the reasons for an EU constitution dimension (Table 21) and the number of years of EU membership, in autumn 2005. Clearly, certain similarities exist between this differentiation and the differentiation in public opinion regarding a constitution for the EU, as documented in Figure 21. However, the multivariate measure REASONS FOR AN EU CONSTITUTION identified a particularly interesting difference in public opinion among the polities of the EU’s historical core. It appears that the polities in France (FR), Germany (GE) and Luxembourg (LU) form a cluster in Figure 25 with the polity of the Netherlands (NL). This outcome is important, because it demonstrates, again, that the French and German polities did not tend




Figure 25 – Scores on the dimension of reasons for an EU constitution in autumn 2005 (N = EU25). Source: own calculations.

to sufficiently support views in favour of deepening European integration. These more specific articulations are surprising, given the Institutionalists' orientations of these polities, as documented in Figure 22 and Table 20. Additional significant changes are also shown in Figure 25. More extreme negative positions are evident from the Eurosceptic polities in the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark (DK) and Austria (AT) and from the Europractical polity in Czechia (CZ).

7.4.3. Explaining differentiation in reasons for an EU constitution

The multiple correlation coefficient (R) of the postulated explanatory model (see Figure 24) indicates that the two structural variables and the six public opinion variables combine to determine 80 percent of the total variation of the multivariate measure REASONS FOR AN EU CONSTITUTION, across the EU25 (R square of 0.80). This outcome confirms the substantial determination level of the model.

As indicated in the interpretation of the LISREL model in the chapter 6, the component score on the RICH WELFARE STATES AND LOW GROWTH measure (hereinafter RICH) is an important factor, which has a positive effect on scores on the POST-MATERIALIST VALUE ORIENTATION dimension (hereinafter POST-MAT) in the set of twenty-five cases. In terms of the LISREL approach, based on standardised multiple regression coefficients, this means that a shift of one standard deviation on the explanatory dimension RICH implies a positive effect of 0.52 of one standard deviation on the dependent measure POST-MAT. The fact that this effect is in accordance with the central claim of Inglehart and Welzel (2005), stating that in rich democratic, redistributive societies (i.e. advanced welfare states), the shift towards post-materialist values is considerable, can be reiterated here. The other structural variable, indicating the number of years of EU membership (hereinafter EUYEARS) shows no systematic independent effect (an effect of 0.04) on POST-MAT. The determination of POST-MAT is low (31 percent). Also differentiation in scores on the NEGATIVE VIEW OF GLOBALISATION measure (hereinafter GLOBAL) is also substantially and systematically affected by RICH (effect of 0.49). This is another important outcome of the postulated model. It means that polities of the wealthier member states of the EU tended to be more afraid of globalisation pressures (i.e. they tended to be concerned about international competition and its domestic, socio-economic consequences; see Swank 2002), than polities in the poorer states (i.e. mostly citizens in the new member states). This result suggests the existence of serious, emerging public opinion divisions, in the enlarged EU, concerning socio-economic and certain political affairs. The model also demonstrates the very low effect of POST-MAT on GLOBAL (effect of 0.12), enabling one to draw the conclusion that the shift towards post-materialist values does not result in a convincing tendency, in public opinion, to view globalisation pressures only in negative light. The model also indicates that the EUYEARS has a similarly low independent effect (0.12) on GLOBAL. The determination level of GLOBAL is 43 percent. Differences across the twenty-five polities in support for the development of the EU as a political union (the SUPPORT POLITICAL UNION variable) are determined, within the statistical model, at a higher level of 54 percent. Interesting direct negative effects come from the globalisation measure (effect of -0.30) and from the post-materialist measure (effect of -0.57). These statistical model results indicate that articulations of fears concerning globalisation pressures and, in particular, the post-materialist value orientation did not support the deepening development of the European Union towards political union, in autumn 2005. The former effect suggests a lack of trust in the ability of such a political union to provide a 'shelter' against globalisation pressures. In accordance with the theoretical claims of Inglehart and Welzel (2005), the latter effect shows that, with increasing post-materialist value orientations among EU polities, they tend to articulate critical attitudes towards EU integration processes (see also Hix 2005).

The next public opinion variable is a critical variable in the postulated model: net support for the institutional option of a two-speed EU. The *SUPPORT TWO-SPEED EU* variable is determined at a level of 44 percent. There are two substantial direct effects. *GLOBAL* exerts a direct negative effect (-0.45), suggesting that, in autumn 2005, polities concerned about globalisation pressures tended not to view the option of the EU developing into a core-periphery structure as an effective shelter against the risks and pressures of globalisation. There is also a substantial positive effect (0.47) coming from the public opinion variable *SUPPORT POLITICAL UNION*. This statistical model outcome is significant. Earlier in this chapter, certain questions were posed: whether EU polities tended to be concerned with the formation of a 'pioneering group' of member states, which would be able and willing to progress in deepening processes, or whether polities tended to welcome this institutional and procedural option as a necessary means of furthering the political deepening of the EU. The substantial positive effect described above suggests that, in autumn 2005, public opinion articulating in the autumn of 2005 the support for a two-speed EU was stimulated by public opinion in favour of political deepening.

Another key public opinion variable in the postulated model explores differences in support for further EU enlargement (*SUPPORT ENLARGEMENT*). This variable is largely determined (79 percent) by two structural variables and four opinion variables. No systematic effect is evident from the multivariate measure *RICH*. However, there is a substantial negative effect (-0.41) from *EUYEARS*, indicating lower levels of support in the polities of older member states. Interestingly, negative effects also arise from the *SUPPORT TWO-SPEED EU* variable (-0.31) and from *GLOBAL* (-0.25). These three negative effects suggest that public opinion from older EU polities was set against that of the new member states, which, in autumn 2005, tended to support further enlargement (see also Figure 20 and Table 21). The last explanatory variable concerns the opinion that the EU constitution must be re-negotiated (*RENEGOTIATION EU CONSTITUTION*). This variable is determined at a 42 percent level. Three direct effects again indicate substantial systematic tendencies in public opinion. A very strong negative effect comes from *RICH* (-0.87) and documents considerable resistance in public opinion in rich welfare states of the EU against renegotiating the draft of the EU constitution. Next, another very substantial negative effect (-0.67) comes from *GLOBAL*. This negative direct effect suggests that polities, which were more worried about globalisation's challenges and pressures, tended to withhold support for any renegotiation of the draft constitution. It also implies that these EU polities saw the distinctive profile of the draft as having greater potential to succeed in global economic and political competition with economic powers such as the US, China, Japan and India.

The final variable of the postulated explanatory model is the multivariate measure *REASONS FOR AN EU CONSTITUTION* (see Table 21). The statistical

determination level of this key dependent measure is considerable: 80 per cent. The statistical outcomes of the postulated model clearly demonstrate a strong positive direct effect (0.89) from differences in support for the development of EU political union (see Figure 24). It should be noted that this very substantial positive independent effect is not too surprising due to the fact that both variables represent public opinion orientated at deepening the EU integration process. There is also a substantial effect (0.61) coming from RICH. This direct effect indicates a tendency in public opinion from rich polities to support various reasons for an EU constitution. However, there is also an opposing negative effect from RICH, mediated by GLOBAL: $-0.67 \times 0.49 = -0.33$. This outcome suggests that rich polities that were worried about globalisation, in autumn 2005, did not tend to recognise certain convincing reasons for an EU constitution. This public opinion articulation was apparently reflected in the rejections of the EU draft constitution, in spring 2005, in France and the Netherlands. It is significant to point out the negative direct effect (-0.35) of the SUPPORT TWO-SPEED EU variable. This negative effect suggests that polities, supporting the development of a core-periphery structure of the EU, were less inclined to recognise convincing reasons for an EU constitution. This effect can indicate a tendency in public opinion (i) to accept the two-speed EU option as an institutional tool, accommodating the significantly increased diversity of the EU caused by the May 2004 enlargement, and (ii) to view reasons for a constitution, which might not be based primarily on the core-periphery model with its increased scope for flexibility in European integration processes, as being less acceptable. There is also a negative direct effect (-0.30) from the post-materialism measure. This result of the explanatory model is certainly not surprising. In the postulated model in chapter 6, a substantial positive direct effect was described regarding the measure representing national-level response to energy challenges as opposed to the EU level. This documented once again the fact that the post-materialist value orientation tends to result in certain scepticism concerning the EU deepening process (see also chapter 2). It should be noted that there is a very low negative direct effect (-0.18) coming from the SUPPORT ENLARGEMENT variable. This outcome from the explanatory model indicates the lack of a public opinion tendency that might result in systematic positive perceptions of various reasons for an EU constitution. Such an outcome was indicated earlier by the scatter diagram in Figure 22. Finally, the variable, representing support for renegotiating the EU constitution, exhibits a low positive effect (0.23). This effect coincides with the tendency to sustain the draft constitution through a process of constructive reconsideration.

7.5. Conclusions

The deepening, enlargement and differentiated integration of the European Union (EU) must be considered as crucial processes within the institutional and procedural construction of the European Communities (EC) and later of the EU itself. The multivariate statistical analysis carried out in this chapter has shown that there is insufficient public opinion support for deepening and widening as well as for the perspective of two-speed EU development. The statistical analysis also documented fragmentation among the set of twenty-five polities into four groups with basic orientations in terms of public opinion and articulations of instrumental reasons in favour of or against further deepening and enlargement. The differences and associated tensions among the Integrationist, Eurosceptic, Europractical and Institutional orientations suggest considerable risks of stalemate, concerning further development of the enlarged EU, which might be characterised by the protracted and difficult negotiations of political elites, deprived of sufficient levels of articulated public support for necessary institutional and procedural reforms of the enlarged EU of twenty-five polities.

8. Concluding remarks

After analysing various systematic tendencies in public opinion articulations in the set of twenty-five polities of the enlarged European Union, at the level of the changing macro-geography of Europe, a number of crucial, concluding remarks should be made. The key aim of this book has been to explore whether sufficient support has been articulated, across the twenty-five polities, for future primary European integration processes: (i) deepening of integration and (ii) enlargement through the accession of new member states (i.e. widening). Additional related and more detailed empirical questions have explored differentiations in selected structural conditions and public opinion articulations, which could seemingly contribute to an emerging stalemate situation, as well as various related aspects concerning stagnation in European integration processes, during 2004 and 2005. Another key empirical question explored consider differences between the polities of old member states and those of the new member states. The statistical explorations have been carried out, in light of an important combination of crucial challenges. Challenges arose for EU development as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain, at the end of the 1980s, which led to the incorporation of ten new member states, in May 2004. Simultaneously, intensifying pressures of globalisation along with uncertainties concerning geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances in the global system, in which European integration processes must evolve, were present. Challenges emerged in terms of socio-economic adaptations to the shift from the industrialisation era towards the new conditions of post-industrial economies and societies.

This book has provided empirical evidence concerning differentiation tendencies, across the polities of the enlarged EU, in terms of public opinion and mass interest articulations, at the polity-level, which focus on a variety of issues arising out of European integration processes and associated political, socio-economic and environmental developments. The complementary statistical analyses made in the chapters of this book demonstrate the fact that articulations of public opinion, across the twenty-five polities of the enlarged EU, can be understood in terms of coherent systematic tendencies. The postulated explanatory models explore cross-national variations at the polity-level. The fact that values and articulations of opinion at individual

level can be characterised by central tendencies (average values) has been stressed. These central tendencies represent authentic characteristics at the level of the polities concerned and, significantly, have a tendency to impact other characteristics at the polity level in ways that cannot be reflected at the individual level. Consequently, it was necessary to conduct the statistical analyses at the polity level, in order to examine relationships between the EU, or the national political system, and political culture as well as selected structural variables, representing theoretically important differences across the twenty-five polities. This required the aggregation of individual-level values to national level averages. Combinations of principal component analyses and LISREL modelling, based upon postulated systems of standardised multivariate regressions, comprise the primary methodological and statistical techniques used in the complementary explanatory models. This multivariate statistical modelling applied in the chapters of this book made it possible to effectively sort more and less important variables, in terms of their direct, mediated or total effects in the postulated explanatory models. This modelling approach enabled more complex explanations, exploring relationships between systematic differences in the structural variables (especially GDP per capita in purchasing parity standards, number of years of EU membership, and population size in the countries concerned), systematic differences in articulations of public opinion, representing post-materialist value orientations or a negative view towards globalisation as well as various tendencies in public opinion concerning important aspects of the EU's deepening and widening processes.

The statistical analysis of the set of nineteen post-communist countries in chapter 3 indicated that structural conditions had significant effects on public opinion concerning the westward geopolitical orientation of the polities. In post-communist countries which inherited a higher level of economic development, public opinion tended to exhibit higher levels of support for EU-orientated geopolitical and geo-economic options, in the mid-1990s. It appeared that progress made in the democratisation process, during the first half of the 1990s, provided vital, favourable conditions for a westward orientation of public opinion. It seems that major geopolitical and geo-economic cross-pressures, within the post-communist space of Eurasia, were significantly tied to the democratic capacities of post-communist political elites to embark upon the very demanding path of western-style modernisation and to accept the various disciplining implications of anticipated EU membership. Positive views regarding democracy and a free market economy and a belief in benefits arising from intensive ties with the EU were reflected in the most significant effects on the "new division of the continent" in terms of public opinion on the process of European integration. This division emerged during the 1990s and eventually resulted in the incorporation of the post-communist polities in East Central Europe and the Baltic region into NATO (in 1999 and 2002) and subsequently, in May 2004, into the EU.

Chapter 4's analysis of the set of fifteen EU countries, in 2000, described a very significant positive effect of post-materialist values on positive public opinion, regarding anticipated EU enlargement to include Czechia. The multivariate analysis also confirmed the hypothesis that the polities of wealthier and larger EU countries were less inclined to support the anticipated widening. This statistical outcome is very significant. It documents the long-lasting importance of a West-East gradient in articulations of public opinion. The polities of the historical core and the wealthy polities of both the old and new outer cores of the EU of fifteen member states anticipated being required to make larger contributions to the EU budget with the accession of the newly associated countries. On the other hand, there were indications that public opinion in some countries in the historical core of the EU (Italy and the Netherlands) tended to support Czech membership. However, the most significant support for the accession of Czechia came from the more post-materialist polities of Scandinavian countries. Polities in the northern outer core of the EU15 tended to prefer enlargement (widening) as opposed to efforts focused on the further deepening of the EU. One of the most important outcomes of the multivariate modelling in this book is the identification of clear negative effects of the post-materialist value orientation on public opinion supporting the further strengthening of decision-making in Brussels and on opinion stressing the economic criteria of anticipated enlargement. Another significant tendency in public opinion was the clear negative effect of population size on support for Czech membership. Small EU countries tended to support the anticipated accession of Czechia. Under EU rules, arising from the successive Treaties, small countries were accorded many more votes per citizen than larger countries. Therefore, any eastern enlargement with small states could bring about pressure from the political elites of large member states to change the EU rules. From the same perspective, public opinion in the large countries might be concerned about the overall effectiveness of the EU, if certain "micro-states" would be required to assume the same level of EU responsibilities as the large states. Other public opinion concerns in large EU countries focused on the potential power of small state blocking coalitions, which could frustrate the ambitions of larger member states. The results of this postulated model suggest the early development of concerns regarding a potential stalemate in the further development of the EU. Stagnating or declining support for the anticipated Czech membership was recorded in the Czech electorate. It seemed that dwindling support for integration into the EU was associated with perceptions concerning the presumably difficult negotiations between the Czech political elite and central actors of the EU.

The constitution project represented an attempt to consolidate the deepening of the European integration process. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums held in France and the Netherlands, in May and June, respectively, of 2005, seemed to indicate the end of a long cycle of attempts to

deepen European integration; a cycle that began with the Single Market Act (1985) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). However, the multivariate analysis of the differentiation of opposing public opinion indicated the emergence of considerable uncertainty, as early as autumn 2004, about the future of the deepening process. Viewing the EU as a confederal consociational system made it possible to realistically assess the state of affairs in the EU in 2003 and 2004. Systematic analyses of public opinion clearly indicate that the set of European polities remained largely fragmented with various public opinion divisions existing among the twenty-five electorates. Public opinion and mass interest articulations from the national polities highlighted emerging uncertainties about the nature of European integration processes. The postulated explanatory model indicated significant barrier effects, which tended to flow from the electorates to the governing political elites of member states. The multivariate statistical analysis of November 2004 articulations of public opinion opposing the draft of the EU constitution indicates (i) the importance of public opinion on globalisation as well as the post-materialist value orientation, and (ii) the significance of the articulated lack of trust in the EU. The results of this statistical examination make it clear that, within the set of twenty-five EU countries, a positive effect from the post-materialist value orientation exists, supporting public opinion opposing the draft of the European constitutional treaty. Additional significant indirect positive effects of public opinion emphasising the significance of globalisation and opposing the draft of the EU constitution also exist. Surprisingly, in 2003 and 2004, it appeared that new core-periphery patterns of socio-economic disparities, across the EU25, did not influence articulations of public opinion and interests in the old member states or in the member states of the new periphery of the EU, in a systematic way. The postulated explanatory model confirmed that the polities of wealthier EU countries tended to attribute significance both to globalisation and post-materialism. In autumn 2004, longer membership in the EU seemed to be connected with decreasing opposition of national electorates towards the proposed new institutionalisation of the confederal consociation of the Union, as expressed in the draft constitution. The significant fact that the polities of new member states tended to support future enlargements of the EU25 should also be reiterated.

However, indications emerged, in connection with the unsuccessful ratification process of the Treaty on the EU Constitution, in some of the twenty-five member states, concerning certain alternatives that would significantly redraw the map of European integration processes. These focused on the possible emergence of a political process turning inwards towards a smaller number of member states: the creation of a two-speed EU with a consolidated core composed of certain states, the political elites of which would believe in closer integration. In essence, a process of differentiated integration or two-speed European Union, which is already represented in the creation of the inner circle of the euro-zone, could be intensified. This

trajectory of future European integration processes implies that the EU might be composed of an inner group while a wider group of member states would remain in the periphery of the confederal consociational system of twenty-five or more states. Consequently, this institutional option of two-speed EU development was further considered in chapter 7.

In 2005, it was already becoming clear that the enlarged EU of twenty-five member states had to respond to new and complex energy challenges, under pressure from uncertain globalisation processes and risky geopolitical circumstances. Any reduction in dependency on crude oil and natural gas imports and oil products constitutes a particularly difficult task in terms of developing energy policy both at national and EU levels. Risks of an insufficient public support threatened regulations, attempting to reduce oil dependence in transport sectors; tax incentives, promoting the efficient use of energy; higher standards for energy consuming equipment or the idea of paying more for energy from renewable resources. The statistical explanatory analysis of public opinion on energy consumption across the enlarged EU, in chapter 6, confirmed the existence of two crucial polarisations in articulations of opinions and attitudes. Polarisation existed between the political option orientated at the EU level of policy-making and the option orientated at the individual member state level. It is significant to note that positive views, concerning the promotion of new energy technologies and the development of tax incentives for the reduction of energy consumption, appeared to be associated with public opinion stressing the importance of the national policy-making level and not the EU level. A second polarisation between negative attitudes towards new energy issues, on the one hand, and positive attitudes recognising and anticipating certain necessary adaptations in energy consumption and habits, on the other. These two public opinion polarisations were examined in the postulated explanatory model, across the enlarged EU. The explanatory analysis revealed strong direct effects, documenting the importance of the politics' post-materialist orientations, which tended to support both the national level of energy policy and positive attitudes on the reduction of energy consumption and changing habits. The multivariate model also indicated a similar tendency for politics, exhibiting a more negative view of globalisation, to prefer the national level of energy policy. The analysis failed to show any clear divisions in public opinion on energy consumption between the old member states and new member states. However, the postulated model did indicate a tendency in public opinion articulations in wealthier member states to favour post-materialist values and also to prefer the national level of policy-making. Significantly, the explanatory model indicated that differences in public opinion across the EU did not provide sufficient support for the development of strong energy policies at the EU level. To make a disturbing concluding remark, it appears that considerable risks and uncertainties exist in the global system in terms of the geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances of energy sup-

ply and production. The analysis, conducted on the basis of the specified explanatory model, indicated that, in terms of public opinion in 2005, the development of effective energy policies at the EU level was beset with considerable uncertainties and the risk of insufficient electoral support, which tended to lead to something of a stalemate in the EU-wide policy-making, in question.

Following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty (in referendums held in spring 2005, in France and the Netherlands), the Standard Eurobarometer survey, from autumn 2005, showed considerable differences in public opinion concerning the widening process (i.e. enlargement) and the deepening process (i.e. support for an EU constitution). Nine polities from member states in the new EU periphery expressed support both for future enlargement and deepening of the enlarged EU. Significantly, this so-called Integrationist group also included the Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and Irish polities. Identification of this group represents a significant outcome of the public opinion analyses carried out in this book. It documents the fact that polities in the new and old peripheries of the EU showed a tendency, in autumn 2005, to perceive the EU as an institutional setting, providing possibilities for the future balanced shaping of Europe. The widening process presented the EU with the difficult task of balancing the various demands of widening and deepening. It is not surprising that the search for a balance between widening and deepening has always been a principal issue in the development of the EU. Following the negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referendums, in spring 2005, clear public opinion opposing future enlargements emerged, in autumn 2005. On the one hand, the Eurosceptic polities of Austria, Finland, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Sweden opposed the widening as well as the deepening of the EU. On the other hand, the Institutionalist polities of France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium supported deepening, but resisted widening. These polities from the historical core of the EU articulated public opinion, which suggested their concerns regarding possible weakening and the overall effectiveness of EU institutions and procedures as well as anticipated changes in the established re-distributive policies of the EU, due to the May 2004 enlargement. A so-called Europractical opinion, expressed by the Czech polity, also emerged. It supported widening, but opposed deepening. Description of this considerable fragmentation in terms of public opinion, articulated across the twenty-five polities of the enlarged EU, is another key outcome of the empirical analyses carried out in this book, which suggests the risk of stalemate in the further development of the EU.

Practices of differentiated integration in the European Union emerged as a crucial aspect of the institutional and procedural building of the European Communities (EC) and later of the EU. The explanatory analysis, made in chapter 7, showed a lack of sufficient public-opinion support for the perspective of a two-speed EU, based on institutionalised core-periphery

procedures and relationships. The political elites and polities of the enlarged European Union are confronted with increasing diversity among members. However, in spite of the lack of support in some member states for the perspective of a two-speed EU, as suggested earlier in this book, the protracted renegotiation process concerning the rejected Treaty on the EU Constitution, in certain polities within the set of twenty-five member states, could lead to an alternative that would significantly redraw the macro-geography of European integration processes. A political process, based on the policy-making of certain political elites, could still emerge that would turn inwards and create a consolidated core of select states, the political elites of which would believe in closer integration. Clearly, such a political process has already been displayed in the creation of the inner circle of the Euro-zone. However, most of the complementary analyses made in this book suggest that this type of core-periphery strategy, seeking to balance widening and deepening is still beset with uncertainties and risks of insufficient public support from the EU polities concerned.

A final concluding remark to this chapter must, again, focus on the issue of identity. In agreement with Musil (1994, p. 13), the fact that the basic rationality of European integration processes cannot be based solely upon the principles of a common market economy should be reiterated. The analyses carried out in this book indicate the importance of diverse identities, expressed in the various differences in public opinion articulated across the twenty-five polities of the enlarged EU. The complementary empirical analyses of public opinion demonstrate that a strong and integrative sense of larger European community, based on "mutual sympathies and loyalty; 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual consideration" as envisaged by Deutsch and his colleagues long ago (Deutsch et al 1957, p. 36), is yet to emerge.

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RISKS OF A STALEMATE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A MACRO-GEOGRAPHY OF PUBLIC OPINION

Petr Dostál

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This book presents complementary studies of differences in public opinion regarding European integration processes. The May 2004 enlargement brought ten new member countries into the European Union and the macro-geography of identities and associated articulations of public opinion, across the twenty-five polities, changed significantly. The author uses the statistical tools of principal component analysis and standardised multivariate regression analysis (LISREL modelling) to examine differences in public opinion among the twenty-five polities of the enlarged European Union. The analyses of public opinion are based upon postulated explanatory models concerning, in particular, processes of integration, including the deepening, enlargement and two-speed institutional development of the European Union. The book provides a comprehensive reflection concerning public opinion differences that will shape the European Union for years to come.

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