Multi-Speed European Union
Differentiated Integration and Spatial Development in Public Opinion

Petr Dostál
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This publication was prepared within the framework of the Faculty of Science at Charles University in Prague’s research programme no. MSM 0021620831 “Geographic systems and risk processes in the context of global changes and European integration”.

The publication has been peer-reviewed.

This book is dedicated to Professor PhDr. Jiří Musil, CSc. of Charles University in Prague, who introduced the author to the field of social ecology and later inspired the author to study normative issues of European integration processes.
This book is a sequel volume in a larger project of mine, which examines current European integration processes through the empirical lens of multivariate explanatory modelling, focused specifically on changing articulations of public opinion across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged European Union. In the first volume, *Risks of a Stalemate in the European Union: A Macro-Geography of Public Opinion*, I explored empirical evidence regarding tendencies for differentiation in public opinion, articulated across the twenty-five polities of the European Union, resulting from the May 2004 enlargement. Explorations made in the first volume, especially in its final empirical chapter, considered differences in public opinion, concerning the deepening and widening processes of European integration, in autumn 2005. This second volume further examines differences in articulated public opinion on the deepening and widening processes, in the set of twenty-seven polities, with particular emphasis placed on current differences in public opinion, concerning the institutional options of a multi-speed or two-speed European Union, in which the speed of institutional development would be faster in a core group of ‘pioneering’ member states than in the peripheral group of remaining member states. In principle, institutional development towards a multi-speed or two-speed European Union would contribute to the necessary accommodation of significantly increased levels of diversity in the European Union of twenty-seven countries, which resulted from the May 2004 and January 2007 enlargements.

A fundamental component of my argument, in this project, is that emerging uncertainties are arising out of insufficient public support for deepening and widening processes, across the polities of the enlarged European Union, on the one hand; however, the institutional options of two-speed development are also subject to insufficient public support. The multivariate statistical methodology used in this book explores cross-national variations in public opinion. A crucial contention of this project is that European integration processes must be sustained by sufficient support coming from the polities (i.e. the electorates) of the democratic countries involved. Public opinion and mass interest articulations are central to studies regarding European integration and differentiation, because they constitute important feedback
relationships, which often imply barrier effects, arising from electorates and placed upon the policy-making and decision-making efforts of governing political elites. Describing empirical differences in public opinion on deepening, widening and differentiation also necessitates the inclusion of considerations concerning the multi-level character of European Union policy regimes and focuses on public opinion regarding future environmental and regional and cohesion policies, as well as perceptions concerning the role of regional and local authorities in current European spatial developments.

My research, concerning European integration processes, can be classified under one of four major parts of the research programme “Geographical systems and risk processes in context of global changes and European integration”, granted by the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MSM0021620831) to Charles University in Prague and carried out in the Geographical Section of the Faculty of Science. This book is a result of my participation in the research programme.

I must also acknowledge the support that the European Commission (currently the Directorate General Communication) gives to the research on European integration, by requesting, co-ordinating and publishing Standard, Special and Flash Eurobarometer surveys. The empirical analyses made in this book draw upon rich data sources from a number of these public opinion surveys and all the chapters of this book are original contributions.

I am also grateful to Prof. RNDr. Anton Bezák, DrSc., Faculty of Natural Sciences at Comenius University in Bratislava, to Prof. PhDr. Jiří Musil, CSc., Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague and to an anonymous reviewer for their uneasy task of reviewing the text and for the important recommendations they made.

Finally, Jiřina and our daughter Šárka deserve special thanks, because they remind me of what really matters in our life, in the enlarged European Union.

Petr Dostál
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1. Introduction

“The EU can currently be understood as a decentralized, territorially differentiated, transnational negotiation system dominated by elites. ... We place particular emphasis on the theoretical construct of world risk society derived from the theory of reflexive modernisation. Our aim is to clarify the question of what it means to conceive of European society as ‘regional risk society’. ... The crucial point is that the potential of the concept of differentiated integration can be fully exploited if it is spelled out completely in both its dimensions, namely, differentiation and integration.” (Beck, Grande 2007, pp. 53, 197 and 245)

The claim, quoted above, indicates that early dreams of a ‘federal Europe’, comprised of West-European states, from the late 1940s and early 1950s, in which the sovereignty of European nation-states would be ‘shared’, were never realised. Instead, a complex trajectory was followed which made it possible to take incremental steps towards European integration, but only within the limits of specific sectors of policy-making, at a pace controlled by the member states themselves. European integration processes tended to focus primarily on economic cooperation, which the nation-states involved saw as the least controversial, but necessary form of integration (Harrison 1995, Dinan 2005, Hix 2005, Giddens 2007). The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1952. With the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European Economic Community (EEC) came into existence, promising the establishment of a common European market and including the broader objective of the gradual development of an increasingly close union of European nations. In 1967, the ECSC, EEC and Euratom were formally fused to establish what became known as the European Community (EC). The community of six founding member states (West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) was enlarged, in 1973, with the incorporation of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland; however, on the whole, the 1970s appeared to be a period of stagnation. The European integration process gained new intensity after the Mediterranean enlargements, including Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986). The 1986 Single Market Act (SEA) envisaged a common market of flows, including goods, capital, services and labour force that would be fully introduced
by 1993. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), negotiated in 1991 in Maastricht and ratified in 1993, resulted in the creation of the European Union (EU). In 1995, Sweden, Austria and Finland joined and, at this point, the EU of fifteen member states was committed, under the TEU, to follow a trajectory, which envisaged both political union and monetary union with a single European currency.

The collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989 resulted in the end of the geopolitical and geo-economic division of Europe and created pressure for further eastward widening (enlargement) of the EU. Europe started to change fundamentally. Geopolitical pressures emerged, because some of the post-communist countries had already, during the first half of the 1990s, undertaken difficult institutional transformations from inherited etatist-socialist regimes and centrally administered economies towards an EU-like pluralism of an open democratic society along with a diversified structure of economic property forms, in which the private sector and world market system of price formation and resource allocation perform pivotal roles (Kornai 1990, 1995; Dostál 1997, 1998a, 1998b). However, the incorporation of ten new member states (Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) in May 2004 and two more in January 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) raised serious questions regarding how far the EU can be ‘deepened’, developing more intensive integration, as it is simultaneously ‘widened’ by the successive enlargements (Figure 1). Related doubts have also emerged concerning the EU’s capacity to be an effective actor in the global system, beyond its ability to form an integrated trading territory (see also Musil 1994; Giddens 2007, 2009; Morgan 2005; Dostál 2010a).

Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome begins with the declaration that “any European State may apply to become a Member State of the Community” (Preston 1997, p. 7). At different periods of EC or EU development, emphasis has been placed either on widening or deepening. Consequently, the search for balance between the widening and deepening processes has been integral to the European integration process. The widening process always involves complex negotiations between the EU and the candidate country. Since 1993, such negotiations must abide by requirements, resulting from the Copenhagen criteria, which all candidate states must meet to be able and allowed to join the EU. The Copenhagen European Council meeting of June 1993 established three basic EU criteria for the assessment of accession candidates:

- the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities
- the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU
- the ability to take on the obligations of membership (adopting the EU legislation and policies, the so-called acquis communautaire), including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (EC 2000, pp. 9–10).
These criteria reflect the repeated attempts by political representatives of the EU of twelve-member states to maintain a minimum level of homogeneity, in terms of relevant characteristics, in the enlarging EU. However, from the beginning of the European integration process, variations have existed among member states in the application of EEC, EC and EU policies, as well as in the level and intensity of participation in evolving EU policy regimes. Such variations have, at times, been due to the recognition of some objective circumstances, but it also often results from negotiations based on the desires of the political elites of the member states involved. The notion of differentiation is the most acceptable term to denote such variations. There is, however, a confusingly wide range of political terms, which only serve to reaffirm the complexity of political and analytic debates concerning the
nature of the differentiated processes that characterise European deepening and widening processes. The broad scope of political and analytic terms varies from notions such as flexible integration, variable geometry, integration a la carte, step-by-step integration, strengthened solidarity, concentric circles, opt-in and opt-out integration to advanced cooperation, multi-speed or two-speed EU (see Ehlermann 1995; Stubb 1996; Preston 1997; Wessels 1998; Kölliker 2001; Sepos 2005; Dinan 2005; Andersen, Sitter 2006; De Neve 2007; Dostál 2010a, pp. 129–132).

The critical issue of differentiated integration, which besets EU integration processes and which is especially significant, when the widening process with its various challenges and consequences is considered in connection with the deepening process, is the central point to be considered in this book. Moreover, various statistical multivariate analyses of public opinion, presented in this book, suggest that serious risks regarding insufficient public support for the widening and deepening processes are emerging in the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU. In addition, this book documents the low level of support, across the polities of the enlarged EU, for the institutional options of a two-speed EU, in which the rate of EU institutional development would be faster in a core group of ‘pioneering’ member states than in a peripheral group of remaining member states. In essence, there seems to be relatively little hope that the differentiation and integration processes taking place in the EU will be institutionalised at the macro-geographical level of the twenty-seven member states, in a comprehensive way and according to a clear and accountable core-periphery model in short term. In other words, there are good reasons to be ambivalent concerning increasing diversity and multi-speed developments in the EU, because considerable tensions exist in public opinion articulations, across the EU of the twenty-seven polities, between public opinion in favour of or opposed to widening and deepening processes. These articulations of public opinion tend to involve conflicting perceptions and evaluations, which are expresses in the plurality of Eurosceptic, Eurooptimistic, Europractical or Eurohesitant positions of the EU polities concerned.

The May 2004 and January 2007 enlargements of the EU brought historical, political and organizational changes, which have, in turn, significantly modified the institutional and geographical character of the continent. Clearly, the far-reaching post-war geopolitical and geo-economic fragmentation of Europe’s macro-geography, including the divisive Iron Curtain, complicated the evolution of European unifying processes and contributed to on-going core-periphery interactions in the continent. Figure 2 documents current differentiation in the enlarged EU, in terms of GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards) in 2007. On the one hand, extremely low levels of 2007 GDP are found in Bulgaria (38.1 percent of the EU average) and Romania (40.7 percent) while, on the other hand, the extreme position of Luxembourg’s ‘mini-economy’ stands out (276.4 percent), along with
Ireland’s high GDP level (146.3 percent). Luxembourg’s outlying position is due to a distortion in the indicator (about one third of the Luxembourgian labour force is comprised of foreigners who are not registered as inhabitants). Nonetheless, differences among the remaining twenty-six national economies of the EU are considerable and document the significant disparities between the wealthy and more productive member states and their poorer counterparts. The differentiation shown in Figure 2 also provides a basic foundation for a general macro-geographic regionalisation of the enlarged EU. First, the historical core of the EU includes the six founding member states: Germany (GE), France (FR), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE) and Luxembourg (LU). Second, the old outer core includes the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark (DK) and Ireland (IE), which joined in 1973. Third, the old periphery describes the additions of Greece (GR), in 1981, and Spain (SP) and Portugal (PT), in 1986. Fourth, the new outer core includes Sweden, Austria and Finland, which joined in 1995. And finally, the extensive new EU periphery includes Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia, which joined in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007.

The key conclusion to be drawn is clear. The scatter diagram documents a high level of diversity in the macro-geography of the current EU, particularly as a result of the last two enlargements. Indeed, this diversity, in the terms of the level of economic development and economic performance, is considerable.

After the Second World War, some of the countries of the EU15, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, had very poor national economies, while other national economies, including Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom and France, were performing relatively well. Table 1 clearly displays the basic diversity in the economic performance of the countries in question. Without considering outlying Luxembourg, a simple differentiation measure can be constructed to indicate the changing diversity, from a long-term perspective. This measure describes the difference in percentage points of the EU average between the average of the two maximum values and the average of the two minimum values. This simple measure indicates a great difference of 136 percentage points, in 1950, between Sweden and Belgium, on the one hand, and Greece and Portugal, on the other.

In 1995, there was a considerably smaller difference of 49 percentage points between Denmark and Belgium, on the one hand, and Greece and Portugal, on the other. This simple comparison clearly demonstrates that differences in economic performance in 1995 were much lower than in 1950. This was due to significant economic convergence tendencies across the western, northern and southern parts of Europe, realised from 1950 to 1995. Importantly, however, this measure also documents a significant increase in economic disparities, across the enlarged EU27 in 2007, with 99 percentage points separating Ireland and the Netherlands from Bulgaria and Romania. These basic data illustrate two important facts. First, the 1995 enlargement of the EU did not resulted in a higher level of economic differentiation, across the EU15, and did not present the EU with new pressing issues to accommodate diversity in terms of economic performance. Second, the two waves of EU enlargement, in 2004 and 2007, significantly increased diversity in terms of the basic economic performance of the EU27 and resulted in acute issues, necessitating institutional and policy reforms to the enlarged EU, reforms which restore a minimal balance between differentiation and integration.

It is essential to emphasise that the EU is not a state, but a political system which is based upon a compact of member states (Chryssochoou 2000; Hix 2005; Dinan 2005; Morgan 2005; Giddens 2007; Dostál 2010a, pp. 20–28). This understanding of the nature of the EU will be further considered in chapter 2 of this book, but the character of the approach selected must also be pointed out in this introductory chapter. This book is not about the long-term evolution of European integration processes. Instead, its major
The major objective of this book is not to explain the long-term evolution of the EU political system. In spite of the emphasis given to exploration of current differentiations in public opinion, across the enlarged EU, this study follows a systemic approach (see also Hix 2005; Fiala, Schubert 2000). Already in his early exposition of the systemic approach in political analyses, Easton strongly emphasised the importance of a suitable “definition of stable units for understanding human behaviour in its political, as well as in many of its other aspects” (1965, pp. 11). Accordingly, the key units of observation in this book are the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950 (ECU)</th>
<th>1995 (PPS)</th>
<th>2007 (PPS)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>113</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simple differentiation measure</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>99</td>
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Sources: Molle (1997, p. 439) and Eurostat
Note: Germany includes the former GDR in 1995 and 2007
twenty-seven polities of the current EU. The term polity shall be understood in this book as any politically organised society, occupying the well-defined territory of its nation-state which has developed its mass politics (Rokkan 1981, pp. 71). Thus, long-term differentiation tendencies among the articulations of national interests by political elites, representing the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU are not of primary concern in this book. Only certain critical outcomes, resulting from their decision-making and policy-making concerning the current period of EU integration, enlargement or differentiation are referred to, in order to have some specific reference points, in the complementary analyses of public opinion tendencies across the set of twenty-seven polities, which are carried out in this book. In essence, no attempt is made in this book to determine, by means of comparative analysis of the changing articulations of national interests and policy-making among the set of twenty-seven national political elites (national governments), in terms of a policy cycle, distinguishing policy formulations, implementations and policy evaluations.

A crucial contention of this book is that key European integration processes (deepening, widening and differentiation) at the EU level, must be sustained by sufficient support, coming from the polities (i.e. electorates) of the democratic countries involved (see also Dostál 2010a). Public opinion and mass interest articulations are central to studies on European integration and differentiation, because they indicate important feedback from electorates, concerning policy-making and decision-making both at national and EU levels, often implying barrier effects. It is clear that necessary public opinion support for European integration processes must develop, both in the old fifteen member states and the twelve new member states of the enlarged EU. Consequently, the theoretical considerations and empirical examinations made in this book must be based upon the selected general systemic perspective. Therefore, the realities of public opinion articulation tendencies, in the pluralistic and differentiated EU, must be considered at the general methodological level, in terms of feedback processes (Deutsch 1970, pp. 145–160). Positive feedback processes represent increasing support for the governing political elites, coming from the polities (i.e. electorates). Clearly, the amplification of positive feedback processes can even result in explosive political escalations and chaotic situations. Given the central theoretical and empirical considerations of this book, negative feedback processes are essentially critical in nature. Opposing public opinion exercises political pressure on the governing political elites of the member countries concerned and tends to maintain something of a status quo in political affairs. In systemic analyses, concerning the EU, one can attempt to learn how the EU is forming a compact of units (member states), which stick together and vary from one another in a regular enough way that it can be described in empirical terms and understood from a coherent theoretical perspective. Outcomes of the systemic approach become apparent in the complementary
analyses made in this book, concerning selected differentiations (variations) in public opinion as well as in terms of certain socio-economic and other indicators. The general systemic approach recognises the existence of units (member states along with their polities and political elites), which are connected by political, socio-economic and cultural processes. The outcomes of the EU system become apparent, by observing selected indicators of articulated differentiations (variations) in public opinion along with additional selected indicators. These indicators can reveal much about how the EU system works and how it is developing.

Consequently, this book explores cross-national variations and this is a crucial and necessary methodological decision. The book attempts to demonstrate that articulations of public opinion, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU, can be understood in terms of coherent systematic tendencies. It emphasises the fact that public opinion values and articulations can be characterised by central tendencies (national average values) at the level of each of the various polities. Such tendencies represent authentic characteristics for the polities in question and tend to impact other characteristics, at the polity level, in ways that cannot be reflected at the individual level. In other words, in order to examine connections between political systems, political cultures and public opinion articulations, across a set of polities, individual-level values need to be aggregated at the national level (Inglehart, Welzel 2005; Dostál 2010a).

These introductory points make it clear that systematic analytical efforts, concerning European integration processes, must focus on two basic questions. First, is there sufficient support for the integrative project of national political elites, as expressed in (i) the EU treaties, (ii) the processes of differentiated integration and (iii) the perspectives of multi-speed or two-speed development, all of which are reflected in the articulations of public opinion in the old and new member states of the enlarged EU? Second, can emerging differences in public opinion, among the set of twenty-seven EU countries, regarding the multi-speed EU perspective be explained within the larger explanatory context of the structural economic and social conditions as well as the public opinion orientations of the polities concerned? A larger context of selected conditions, which enables (a) the indication of the importance of inertia of basic mass values in the polities concerned, and (b) the assessment of emerging cleavages and uncertainties in public opinion regarding the European integration process, across the enlarged EU.

Rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty in referendums held in France and the Netherlands, in 2005, seemed to indicate the end of a long period of attempts to deepen the European integration process (Piris 2006). The initial stage of this period began with the Single Market Act (1986) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and seemed to end with the French and Dutch referendums (see also Dostál 2010a). Chapter 2 of this book explains that approaching the current period of EU integration processes, in terms of a
confederal consociational system (see Chryssochoou 2000, Rosamond 2000), allows for realistic interpretation of the contemporary state of affairs in the EU. The systematic analyses of public opinion in subsequent chapters of this book demonstrate, in accordance with the confederal consociational approach (see chapter 2), that the European electorate is still largely fragmented with significant cleavages in articulations of public opinion, delineated by the territorial borders of the twenty-seven polities. In other words, current articulations of public opinion, mass value orientations and national polity identities continue to be divided by the borders of the member states concerned and, consequently, the EU can be viewed as a compact of collateral nationalities and coexisting identities and political loyalties and intrastate acculturations. Therefore, it must be noted already at this introduction that the long-term formation process of an EU “demos” seems to be a very protracted process, but not an impossible process.

Since the beginning of European integration in the 1950s, the successive treaties admitted that objective differences among the member states, their regions and societal groups could, under certain circumstances, be reflected in the institutions and procedures that would be introduced. As a result, specific protocols and clauses were added to the treaties, variable procedures for implementing legislation were accepted in the form of phasing-in periods (delays) or opt-outs, establishing one of key aspects of differentiated integration. In light of the primary perspective of this book, it is important to understand that different time periods, concerning the introduction of institutions and procedures in member countries and across regions, also imply formations of spatial zones of diffusion at inter-state or regional levels. Accordingly and out of necessity, the subject-matter of multi-speed European integration processes includes studies of crucial aspects of geographical organisation and evolving, institutional arrangements, at the member state and regional levels (see chapters 4 and 5 of this book).

Therefore, this book examines existing empirical evidence, concerning public opinion in the set of twenty-seven polities and attempts to comprehend the variety of articulated tendencies of public opinion about:

- the deepening process (i.e. deeper integration)
- the widening process (i.e. enlargement)
- institutional options favouring the multi-speed development of the EU, based upon a core-periphery structure
- future environmental and regional policies
- the role of regional and local authorities.

These notions are minimal concepts, which will be used in the complementary analyses carried out in this book. Deepening is a compact notion referring to political institutional processes (i.e. negotiated in a series of intergovernmental conferences and realised by the successive EU treaties); occasionally, the increase in policy scope has been incremental through
which the member states have been drawing closer together by ceding more competencies and decision-making powers to EU institutional bodies (such as the European Commission or European Parliament; Hix 2005, Dinan 2005, Morgan 2005). To fully understand the research orientation of this book, it is necessary to recognise that the deepening process enables the EU to develop common policies and strategies (such as common agricultural policy, common foreign and security policy or common energy policy), as well as explicit space differentiating policies (such as regional and cohesion policies, see Molle 2007). Widening is the process of enlargement of the EU, spatially extending the EU institutional and procedural system through increasing the number of member states (Preston 1997; Hix 2005; Giddens 2007). It is significant to note that the current widening criteria (the Copenhagen criteria from June 1993) call for far-reaching institutional, organisational and behavioural adaptations in the accession countries concerned. Adaptation processes stretch much further, affecting entire societies and economies in the nation-states concerned, more than merely invoking necessary adaptations of the political and economic elites, in the acceding countries involved (see also Dostál 2010a, pp. 42–44). It is, therefore, important to discover whether such behavioural and public opinion adaptations contribute significantly to unifying European processes (i.e. inducing positive feedback processes of supporting public opinion) or whether the highly demanding adaptations tend to lead to critical public opinion, in acceding countries as well as in old member states of the EU15, regarding the future of the widening or deepening processes (i.e. inducing negative feedback processes of opposing public opinion).

The deepening and widening processes are interconnected in a complex way. Fröhlich claims, for example, that the twelve new polities, recently incorporated into the European Union, “belong more to the ‘intergovernmental’ camp than to the ‘supranational’”, meaning that they are not – at least for the time being – inclined to push for more integration or deepening of the Union. This clearly poses the question of a ‘two-speed Europe’” (Fröhlich 2005, p. 55). Taking this challenging claim seriously, chapter 2 investigates certain key issues that confront the process of multi-speed or two-speed integration of the enlarging EU. The increasing diversity of the EU, with each successive enlargement, makes it necessary to consider the increasing differentiation of the EU and associated problems, affecting its institutional structure, along temporal and spatial dimensions. Chapter 2 also emphasises the fact that the temporal and spatial dimensions of the changing European policies are connected with the multi-speed diffusion of socio-economic development, across member states, resulting in an institutional macro-geography of the EU that divides European space into a number of institutional-geographical zones. Current articulations of public opinion, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU, reflect this macro-geography of differentiation processes and indicate considerable diversity, concerning future deepening
and widening (survey results of Standard Eurobarometer no. 67, fieldwork in April–May 2007). Chapter 2 concludes with some methodological remarks describing the explanatory statistical modelling selected for use in this book. Chapter 3 examines differences in opposing public opinion regarding the institutional option of a two-speed EU (survey results from Standard Eurobarometer no. 66, September–October 2006) through the empirical lens of a postulated explanatory model. The statistical explanation attempts to discover whether public opinion, opposing two-speed EU development, tends to envision EU deepening, in terms of democratic or efficiency issues, across the twenty-seven EU polities. As Guérot states that the European integration process has shown that “there have always been the ‘big hesitators’, namely the United Kingdom and Denmark. But interestingly, up to present, the common ground of integration has never been put into question. Today’s discussion, nevertheless, seems to cement a ‘two-speed’ Europe with two different paths of integration rather than focus on a ‘magic core’” (Guérot 2005, p. 58).

Other key issues of public opinion, regarding spatial developments in the current EU, are considered in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 2 also emphasises that the EU can be characterised as a multi-level structure of institutions, procedures and policy-making (see Hooghe, Marks 1996; Christiansen 1996; Hooghe 2002; Molle 2007; Bachtler, Méndez 2007; Dočkal 2006). Relevant levels include the EU level, the national level and regional or local levels. Consequently, when one considers public opinion on the current character of EU deepening processes, it is essential to establish which of these institutional and spatial levels are perceived by the twenty-seven polities as being relevant and important (see also Dostál 2010a). Existing differences in public opinion support for policy-making at these institutional and spatial levels provide an indispensable context for the explanations of articulated public opinion on the roles of authorities at the EU level, the national level and the regional or local levels. Chapter 4, therefore, analyses differences in public opinion, concerning future environmental and regional policies of the EU (survey results of Special Eurobarometer no. 295, November–December 2007, and Flash Eurobarometer no. 234, January 2008). Chapter 5 also presents a postulated explanatory statistical model of differentiation in public opinion, this time regarding the role of regional and local authorities in the EU (survey results of Flash Eurobarometer no. 307, October–November 2008). Chapter 6 draws major conclusions for the book, stressing a necessary degree of ambivalence in terms of increasing diversity and multi-speed European Union as well as the search for a much-needed balance between differentiation and integration and the deepening and widening processes, in the circumstances of the presently insufficient public opinion support for the necessary institutional and procedural reforms of the enlarged European Union.
2. Multi-speed European Union: differentiated integration and spatial development

2.1. Introduction

The referendum in France rejected on 29th May 2005 the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe with a clear majority of 54.87 percent and with a high turnout of 69.3 percent. Three days later, also the electorate in the Netherlands rejected on 1st June 2005 the ratification with even clearer majority of 61.6 percent and a high turnout of 62.8 percent. The results of the two referenda have inevitably prompted questions about further European integration processes: (a) deepening processes increasing the use of supranational decision-making, or extending integration at the EU level to new policy sectors, and (b) widening processes admitting more new member states into the EU. It is therefore, not surprising that the question of how member states (i.e. their political elites and national electorates) conceive adaptations to European integration, became a central question of research concerning the development of the EU. Ensuing changes in the character of European integration and changing dynamics of deepening and widening emphasised the importance of differentiated integration of the EU: the importance of the EU as a system of differentiated by (i) policy sectors and levels of government and (ii) spatially differentiated by territories of member states, regions and localities. Consequently, the differentiated integration of the European Union (EU) has emerged as a crucial aspect in the institutional and procedural building processes of the European Communities (EC) and later of the EU. However, the process of differentiation has resulted in a series of questions concerning the the causal relations between the integration and differentiation across different policy sectors and across increasing number of member states and prompted the central question whether long-term unity within the EU can be preserved. Differentiation is a catch-all term which is used to describe variation in the application of European policies or variation in the level or intensity of participation in European policy regimes and governance (Ehlermann 1995; Stubb 1996; Wessels 1998; Kölliker 2001; Sepos 2005; Dinan 2005; Andersen, Sitter 2006; De Neve 2007; Dostál 2010a, pp. 129–132).
One of the major principles of the 1957 Treaty of Rome was the principle of equal rights and obligations for all member states. The differentiated process of integration challenged this central principle. The differentiated integration principle was formally introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam in terms of ‘enabling flexibility’. It must be noted, that there was nothing new about the notion and practice of differentiated integration. In a period when the European integration seemed to stagnate, Willy Brandt of West-Germany (1974) and Leo Tindemans of Belgium (1975) proposed the concept of differentiated integration in order to overcome perceived stagnation, enlargement demands, and inabilities of member states to agree on some new common policies (De Neve 2007, pp. 505–507). The primary reason that issues of differentiated integration arise is that significant differences exist, in terms of the socio-economic development or other circumstances of societies and their economies (i) among EU member states and, significantly, also (ii) across the regions or societal groups of the member states. The six founding states of the EC recognised these issues early, in the 1950s. The successive waves of widening led to increases of number of member states, but making unanimous decision-making difficult due to increasing heterogeneity of state interests, aspirations, and objective geographical and societal differences. As a result, from the very beginning of European integration, the treaties admitted that objective differences among the member states, their regions and societal groups could, under certain circumstances, be reflected in the institutions and procedures that would be introduced. A number of member states wished further integration, while other member states saw no important reasons for further deepening, or at least demanded to postpone participations in common decision-making (see De Neve 2007, Kölliker 2001). Consequently, specific protocols and clauses were added to the treaties and variable procedures for implementing legislation were accepted in the form of time delays (see also Dostál 2010a). It must be reiterated in light of the specific perspective of this book, that it is important to emphasise that differing timeframes, postponement periods, among member states and across regions, in terms of the introduction of institutions, procedures and policy-regimes also imply the existence of spatial zones of diffusion at supranational level across member countries or regional levels across regions within the countries concerned. Accordingly, the issue of multi-speed European integration must be approached in broader terms to encompass these less formal features of differentiated integration which involve essential aspects of geographical organisation, socio-economic development, cultural change and associated complex institutionalisation issues.

Thus, with the increasing size of the EC and later the EU, political and academic debates on various aspects of differentiated integration periodically re-emerged, suggesting that some member states should be allowed to form a first “pioneering group” of European integration. These suggestions were made under the expectation that the future EU would have twenty-five or
more members (Wessels 1998; Duff 1998; Kölliker 2001; Sepos 2005; Dinan 2005; Andersen, Sitter 2006). Ever since the first enlargement, with the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, and the subsequent Mediterranean enlargements, with Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986), these debates recognised the key importance of the increasing levels of diversity across the territory of the enlarging EC. The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) was the first major treaty change in the history of the EC that primarily strengthened the formation of a more integrated common market. Significantly, the SEA included, among other things, a single market program, which supported arguments in favour of cohesion policies. Article 23 of the SEA amended the Rome Treaty with a measure on Economic and Social Cohesion, giving the EC the task of reducing disparities between various regions in member countries as well as the developmental lag of the least favoured member countries. Further EC and EU policy-making transformed existing regional policies and common social and agricultural policies into an extensive framework of policy regimes, orientated at increasing cohesion and reducing disparities between member countries as well as regions and societal groups within member countries. The fact that the EU can be characterised as a multi-level structure of institutions, procedures and policy-making, was already stressed in chapter 1 (see Hooghe 2002; Molle 2007; Bachtler, Méndez 2007). However, in the multi-level structure of the EU, only certain member states and certain regions and societal groups were eligible for the financial benefits of such redistributive policies. Again, the orientations of European policy-making and governance, described, clearly recognised the importance of multi-speed diffusion of socio-economic development across member states and regions of the EC/EU. Clearly, the 1995 enlargement, including Austria, Finland and Sweden, and particularly the so-called “big bang” enlargement of May 2004, including Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus, and the January 2007 enlargement, including Bulgaria and Romania, have increased the already high level of diversity among the economies and societies of member countries and regions in the EU. Consequently, the option to implement institutional structures and governance based on an institutional option of differentiated integration, across the institutional and spatial levels of the EU, gained even more significance.

2.2. Clarification of multi-speed development and differentiated integration

It can even be argued that the notion of multi-speed or differentiated integration of the EU became an essential political principle in creating normative and cognitive foundations for governing in the EU. But, the meaning of the notion is not sufficiently clear. This is not difficult to understand, because
conceptual problems are based on the wide scope and numerous modalities of EU differentiation of integration processes. For example, the Maastricht Treaty brought two new forms of differentiation: the UK and Denmark’s non-participation in the European Monetary Union (EMU), specified in treaty protocols, and the UK’s opt-out regarding social policy. These new forms displayed a changing character of multi-speed integration. In terms of successive treaties, European integration went hand in hand with increasing institutional differentiation (or flexibility), it is the possibility for different countries to possess different rights and have obligations regarding different policy sectors. The historical evolution of the EU, at the same time, in terms of integration and differentiation raises a series of conceptual questions. Obviously, one of the most important questions concerns the claim that short-term differentiation is not conflicting with long-term integration of all member states at a higher level.

According to the broad notion of differentiated integration, thus, it is a process in which the EU member states’ quest for common aims is driven by a core group of member states, which are (i) able and (ii) willing to proceed further in the integration process, with the underlying belief that the remaining member states will follow later (see Stubb 1996, Kölliker 2001, De Neuve 2007, Dostál 2010a). Accordingly, the concept of differentiated integration assumes (a) the initial political readiness of member states, (b) the allowed flexibility of institutional arrangements, and (c) the character of sector or issue concerned. In other words, the concept of differentiated integration refers explicitly to (i) the formation of both a ‘pioneering’ core and a peripheral group of reluctant member states and (ii) a timeframe that assumes the eventual inclusion of member states into the ‘pioneering’ group, thereby restoring (later) full EU unity in the sector concerned. In contrast, the mentioned opt-outs of the UK and Denmark are instances of a mode of differentiated integration that is called “variable geometry”. This specific mode acknowledges the existence of irresolvable differences in political perceptions of national elites and electorates within the institutional arrangements of the EU by allowing permanent separation between the ‘pioneering’ group and less integrated member states. Moreover, the opt-outs of the UK and Denmark can also be perceived as an “a la carte” mode, whereby some member states are able to pick and choose – as one would from a menu – which policies they will participate in, while simultaneously supporting only a minimum of the EU’s common objectives and associated policy regimes (De Neve 2007).

It is obvious that in the differentiated integration the time axis is crucial, as is the idea that countries from the peripheral group can later integrate into the pioneering group. According to a more narrow notion of differentiated integration, the concept of multi-speed EU is replaced with the more clear concept of a two-speed EU. It is therefore important to emphasise that according to this more clear notion the multi-speed EU concept presents an in-
integration process, in which member states maintain the same policy regimes and actions, not simultaneously, but at different time periods. Sufficient stress should also be given to the fact that, while differences are acknowledged under this two-speed notion of differentiated integration, member states adhere to the same objectives, which could and should be accepted by all member states in due time. This concept is compatible with the basic principles of EU law (Ehlermann 1995, Stubb 1996, Kölliker 2001). Determining whether EU rules that differentiate must have time limits and what the ultimate deadlines should be (such as closing German or Austrian national labour markets to workers from the new member states for a period of eight years) has been a contested issue. Basically, the sort of situation which justifies differentiation and the absence or existence of an obligation to act is crucial. Natural or spatial conditions (such as climate or territorial distances) can legitimate permanent differentiation. On the other hand, specific situations, resulting from the historical development of societies and their economies, are likely to require temporary differentiation. Therefore, the broader concept of differentiated integration is also connected with the process of enlargement or widening. Widening can be defined as a process of gradual horizontal (territorial) institutionalisation taking place if institutional arrangements spread beyond the incumbent member states, that is if the compact of member states whose institutional arrangements and actions are governed through institutionalised norms, becomes larger (see also Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002). In this horizontal view, the differentiation integration process is a matter of degree. The widening process is seen as a gradual process which begins before the accession of new countries, and continues after their accession by the shift from the peripheral group to the ‘pioneering’ core group.

2.3. Three perspectives regarding the European Union

Also the perspective of differentiation implies that the nature of the EU is complex. It is, therefore, little surprising that various authors underline its hybrid character. For example, Pehe argued that the EU is “currently a hybrid, which combines the characteristics of an inter-governmental organization, a federation and a confederation. Some of the advocates of further integration speak of the need to transform the EU into a true federation, while others maintain that the present EU structures and decision-making mechanisms are its strength, because they recquire a process of constant political deliberation and negotiation at various different levels” (Pehe 2007, p. 147). This view sufficiently emphasises the complex nature of the current EU, but it has to be broaden by considerations of normative issues which are associated with problems of identity and cultural differences (see also Musil 1994). Because an important key feature of the EU is the lack of a well-integrated supranational (EU-wide) European polity (see further section 2.4.).
In order to decipher the hybrid nature of the current EU, it is needed to summarise here the features of three basic perspectives or approaches, which attempt to accentuate some EU features as the crucial attributes of the EU and together can represent the whole range of existing approaches (Taylor 1991; Rosamond 2000; Chryssochoou 2000; Costa, Magnette 2003; Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000; Christiansen 2001; Schmidt 2002; Hix 2005; Morgan 2005; Dostál 2010a, pp. 22–24). Two perspectives have dominated debates, concerning the nature of European integration: the supranational perspectives and the intergovernmental perspectives (see Table 2).

The supranational approaches are based on the pivotal claim that integration theory, concerning the EU, must focus primarily on the creation of common institutions, the procedures of which have their own independent authority, based on important competencies of policy-making and decision-making. In essence, emphasis is placed upon the ability of EU institutional actors to impose certain decisions and procedural rules on member states (Rosamond 2000, Morgan 2005). Emphasis is given to continuing gradualism in the European integration process.

It is clear that in the supranational perspective the EU integration processes are understood, in terms of the EU’s deepening process. It is also evident that this perspective stresses the decision-making power of common institutional actors of the EU, expanding from economic affairs to political and social policy-making. The supranational perspectives follow a formalist and largely normative view that is less interested in the actual roles of EU institutional actors and national actors and their real behaviour or in differences in perceptions of the EU development by national electorates. The supranational perspectives do not sufficiently conceptualise in terms of the existing multi-level nature of the policy-making and decision-making that is so typically a feature of EU operations, in reality. Another key feature of these perspectives is that they also tend to be Euro-optimistic and use views of a federal system as norms for evaluations of EU developments. Normative starting points of supranational perspectives tend to undervalue the role of a wide range of interest articulating groups in the actual operation of EU institutions (Greenwood 1997), as well as the utilisation of procedures and, significantly, articulations of divisions among the political opinions of national elites and general public opinion across the EU (Rosemond 2000, pp. 105–129; Morgan 2005; Dostál 2010a).

Intergovernmental perspectives stress the importance of state-centric formulations and, consequently, they present more realistic views concerning EU institutional and procedural developments. Intergovernmental perspectives take national preference articulations and strategic bargaining processes among EU countries into its central considerations and incorporate much empirical material from actual EU operations. The general intergovernmental perspective claims that national political interests are articulated in the EU member countries through domestic political debates and contestations,
Table 2 – Three perspectives on the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supranational perspective</th>
<th>Intergovernmental perspective</th>
<th>Confederal consociational perspective</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU integration is based upon authoritative governance institutions and policy-making activities above the member states; the integration process is gradual and leading to the creation of a European ‘superstate’; there is a tendency to replicate at the EU level state-like institutional arrangements resulting in further delegation of policy competences to the EU level, shifting decision-making from ‘low politics’ to strategic sectors of supra-national decision-making which are binding on member state governments.</td>
<td>EU integration is a series of bargaining processes among member states led by nation-state-centric views in which EU member states are the primary actors; integration demands arise from within domestic processes; national governments remain gatekeepers between members state’s politics and the EU; governments of member states give only limited authority to EU institutions to achieve specific policy objectives and state-oriented collective goods; national governments are constrained by domestic political arenas.</td>
<td>EU institutional structure and procedural system are enabling member states both to protect their vital interests by consensus and to achieve a certain unity of goals and to solve common issues; decisions are made jointly; veto right makes it possible to protect vital national interests; consociative character of the EU is to be found in interstate compromises; member states delineate basic segmentation of the EU; long tradition of post-war negotiations between nation-states (segments) is consolidated in Treaties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU supranational institutions are political actors in their own right, they are acting as supporters of further integration, supporting spill-over of common policies into other sectors of decision-making.</td>
<td>Supranational institutions of the EU are of limited importance and only assist and facilitate negotiations among member states. ‘Grand bargains’ are fixed in Treaties at the EU level and are changing the EU.</td>
<td>Segmental autonomy of member states is crucial; at EU level national governments form a compact of the political elites of member states with power-sharing and rotation of EU presidency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational laws of the EU provide effective constraints for the policies and decision-making of member states, channelling behaviour of firms and other organisations, and individual actors.</td>
<td>Member states pool and partly delegate sovereignty in their efforts to constrain and control one another; when national interests converge, EU integration can advance.</td>
<td>Representation in central EU institutions and the qualified majority voting are basically proportional to population size of member states; EU institutions, such as European commission, are encouraged to find compromises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political integration is, in part, driven by institutional dynamics, functional pressures across member states for the integration of related economic sectors.</td>
<td>Bargain processes reflect the national economic interests of EU countries. The primary interest of national elites is to keep themselves in office by re-elections.</td>
<td>Territorial boundaries of member states delineate segmental boundaries of their populations and national political elites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new EU polity above the member state level is gradually emerging; it is based upon an EU-wide public sphere supported through cross-border communication; there are emerging at the EU level cross-cutting political interests across party-systems of individual member states.</td>
<td>Supranational laws reflect the interests of the most powerful member states; understanding domestic policies is a prerequisite to analysing strategic interactions among big and small member states; public opinion of separate national electorates influences bargaining positions of national political elites.</td>
<td>Cultural systems of the individual member states are defined as subjective systems of institutions, beliefs and values; there is insufficiently developed EU-wide public sphere and a new well-integrated European polity is still not emerging; predominant role of national political segments within the EU continues.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

the emergence of national and supranational coalitions, social groups, interest articulations and political-economic competition. An in-depth analysis of domestic politics is seen as an indispensable prerequisite to interpretations, concerning the strategic interactions among member states (Moravcsik 1993, 1998; Rosemond 2000). The EU is perceived as the provider of a framework for the realisation of inter-state politics by different means of policy-making and decision-making. Further, such approaches claim that supranational laws at the EU level reflect articulated interests of the most powerful member states (which are usually considered to be Germany, France and the United Kingdom; see also Wessels 1998, Dinan 2005, Hix 2005, Greenwood 1997). As a result, a considerable number of studies following the intergovernmental perspectives have explored the interactions between national governments and EU institutions. In brief, the outcomes of analyses following the intergovernmental perspectives come closer to realistically assessing the complexities of the EU’s institutional and procedural system as well as the behaviour of national actors and EU actors. However, the fact that they do not capture wider scope of key features and interactions which has been simultaneously integrating and differentiating the EU system, remains clear (Rosemond 2000, pp. 146–147; Hix 2005; Beck, Grande 2007).

As a result of the historical, cumulative, institutional and procedural evolution of the European Communities (EC) and of the EU, beginning in the 1950s (i.e. since the Treaty on European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 and the 1957 Treaty of Rome); however, the current EU system, which can also be understood as a confederal consociational system, gradually emerged. According to such perspective, the EU is a multi-faceted, confederal compact of nation-states with some key consociative features (see also Taylor 1991; Chryssochoou 1997, 2000; Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000, pp. 124–125; Costa, Magnette 2003). The confederal consociational perspective provides a basis for more realistic interpretations of EU development than the two preceding perspectives (Table 2). This utilisation of the concept of a confederal consociation system recognises long-term trends that have been taking place in the EU since 1950s. The term “confederal” refers to the system of institutions and procedures, fixed in the successive treaties, which makes it possible the member countries not only to protect their vital interests with the possible use of a veto, but also to achieve a certain unity of goals through the necessary consociative endeavours of member countries to build consensus. The political elites, elected in the various member countries, represent the countries, in the words of Dahrendorf, as a “cartel of elites” (Taylor 1991, p. 110), which operates within the system of institutions and procedures of the EU.

Considering the term “consociation”, its reference to processes of cooperative, joint decision-making among national representatives at the EU level should be stressed. The following are well-known, defining characteristics of consociation:
the segmental autonomy (i.e. sovereignty) of member states (i.e. segments)

- a government (i.e. European Commission) comprised of a compact of political elites from the segments (i.e. member states)

- proportional representation in central EU institutions (in accordance with a defined proportion of the population of member states) and, significantly

- the right of mutual veto of member states which can prevent majority preferences from being translated into decisions (see Costa, Magnette 2003; Lijphart 1979).

For the EU, the territorial boundaries of the member nation-states delineate the segmental boundaries of their populations and the domestic scope of national political elites. Significantly, the term “segmental” also conveys the notion each member state having its own cultural system, which can be defined as “the subjective system of a society’s institutions: the beliefs, values and knowledge, and skills that have been internalized by the people of a given society” (Inglehart 1997, p. 15). Population size differences among member countries in the EU serve as the basic allocation standard of votes in some core institutions and procedures such as numbers of seats in European Parliament reserved for each member states, or formulas of qualified majority voting (QMV), etc. Consociative approaches give particular emphasis to the notion that the EU provides a means whereby the intra-national dominance of political elites, representing member state interests, can be enhanced by their largely managerial control through the veto right, at the supra-national level. The European Council of heads of national governments has the powers to overrule the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The Council of Ministers is the law-making institution of the EU to which each member country sends its representative. In reality, there are multiple Councils of Ministers dealing with specific sectors of policy-making. Depending on issues involved, decisions can be taken by simple majority voting, qualified majority voting or unanimity. According to consociative principles of proportionality, each member country receives a number of votes which is weighted against their population sizes. The two Councils are the key bodies for inter-elite consensus-building at the EU level (see Taylor 1991; Rosamond 2000; Costa, Magnette 2003; Chryssochoou 2000, pp. 171–200). The relationships between the two Councils, the European Commission and the European Parliament, within the confederal system of EU institutions and procedures, appear to comprise the real core of decision-making.

Obviously, in any consociative interpretation the notion of segment is crucial. This means that segments of the EU system (member states) are decisive territorial bases of political elites and “that the nature of institutions set up to reach compromises depends on the nature of the segment” (Costa, Magnette 2003, p. 6). It was already suggested above, that the history of the EU can be understood as emerging consociative compact of nation-states.
(segments) which cannot be reduced to varieties of the federal model of integration. This is the originality of the EU system. Costa and Magnette make further clear that “the complex mechanisms of the voting system that protect the smaller states from any danger of a government by a *directoire* exclusively composed of larger states, the very high thresholds of QMV ... and the tendency of governments to adopt norms by unanimity even where QMV would be possible” are the central features of the EU system (Costa, Magnette 2003, p. 10). Other mechanisms are used to limit majority decision-making such as compensations and package deals resulting in proportional outcomes, a variety of modes of derogation or opts-out (i.e. differentiated integration tools) which all make it possible to maintain decisive features of sovereignty of member states in the framework of the current EU. Following the confederal consociational approach one is insisting “on the predominant role of national segments within the Union. They still determine the essential phases of the way the EU works. In matters pertaining to the reforms of the treaties, the procedures of censure or appointment of the Commission, the vote of the budget or various decisions about redistributive policies” (Costa, Magnette 2003, p. 13). Consequently, in such an institutional and procedural system, there is not sufficiently stimulated an effective party system overarching the current twenty-seven national electorates which are represented in the EU parliament. Therefore, the decisions taken in the confederal and powerful European Council and the Council of Ministers are decisive (see also Hix 2005, Dinan 2005).

2.4. National and European identifications

It is therefore also not surprising that in the perspective of the confederal consociational approach the importance of the segmentation (i.e. fragmentation) of the whole EU electorate must be emphasised as a very important feature. (see also Duchesne, Frognier 1995). The same applies to similar implications resulting from the intergovernmental approaches (Moravcsik 1998). The effective formation of a well-integrated European polity is lacking (Caramani 2006). The strength of viewing the EU as a confederal consociative system is that such a view is readily connected to other key features of the empirical reality of contemporary European integration processes. It may be reiterated again that the EU is a compound system of distinct, culturally and politically delineated units (i.e. nation-states) which are bound together by treaties in a consensually arranged consociative system of institutions and procedures resulting from successive treaties since the 1950s. These units form a compact of states for specific purposes of economic and other integration and cooperation, without losing their basic nation-state sovereignty to a higher central authority and without losing their national identity (see also Rosamond 2000, pp. 148–151; Morgan 2005).
However, the notion of identity is ambiguous because it is given diverse meanings and uses. In the case of national identity, identities of individual citizens can be defined as outcomes of collective interactions and are complex patterns of values, meanings and skills which are associated with the citizenry whose delineation is drawn by the capacity of the nation-state concerned to intervene in a wide scope of societal and individual affairs (see also the definition of cultural system, Inglehart 1997). Duchesne and Frognier are claiming the “at an individual level, identity is taken to be a continuous (re)combination of different identifications, that is, of changing but relatively persistent patterns of references to potential groups of belonging” (Duchesne, Frognier 2008, p. 144). In other words, identifications with the nation-state or with the EU indicates (i) whether citizens feel to be attached to the national or EU people, (ii) whether citizens feel concerned by what is occurring at the two levels, and (iii) whether citizens feel to belong to them. People and groups combine their attachment and belonging to national and European identities with wide scope of identity markers in terms of language, generation, ideology and interests, territory (localities and regions) and history, etc.

Duchesne and Frognier also argued that the research orientation focused on current realities of identification processes can “include the idea that existing senses of belonging to both national and European level will/may change in the middle term. The notion of consistent feelings of belonging is relevant when referring to nations as they are old enough for this to take place. However, the EU is probably too young to have aroused deep and consistent feelings of belonging among the majority of its citizens” (Duchesne, Frognier 2008, p. 145). Taking these claims seriously, one can propose three following hypotheses regarding possible relationships between current national and European identifications. First, it can be expected that the identification with and attachment to the EU would be carried upon different sorts of feelings than identifications with nation-states. This expectation would imply that variables representing national and European identifications across the twenty-seven polities would not be statistically related. Second, it can be claimed that the EU identification processes develop in a similar way as nation-state identifications were developing since the 19th century and that the character of attachment to the EU is much the same as national identification. This claim would imply a clear negative correlation between indicators representing the two identifications of political and cultural processes which are competing with each other. Third, it can also be argued that there would be a positive relationship between the national and EU identifications, because citizens of nation-states concerned can view the EU as an institutional and procedural vehicle which complements the member states and provides significant extra empowerment to them. Accordingly, substantial positive correlation between indicators representing the two identifications would indicate perceptions of certain positive cumulating of power capacities of
nation-states involved and of the EU and suggest tendency to ‘we-feeling’ considering the EU “as an encompassing territory in which all other senses of belonging are nested (see also Duchesne, Frognier 2008, p. 163). However, analysing empirical data from direct elections for the European Parliament, Caramani felt compelled to argue “that, even though there have been six elections to the EP over the last 25 years, a distinct European electoral and partisan arena – a competitive sphere autonomous from national parties, issues, and alignments – has not as yet emerged. ... This means that no Euro-specific dimension emerges in European elections cutting across national ones” (2006, pp. 9–10). Given the importance of the notion of fragmentation of the EU-wide compact of twenty-seven national electorates in the framework of the confederal consociational perspective, it is worthwhile to statistically establish which of the three hypotheses regarding relationships between the national and EU identifications can be supported across the enlarged EU by current empirical evidence derived from a recent Eurobarometer survey. Results of Eurobarometer public opinion surveys are based upon samples of 1,000 respondents in each member states (in the microstates Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg 500 respondents, in Germany 1,500 respondents and the UK 1,300 respondents; see further methodical note in section 2.7.).

The scatter diagram in Figure 3 shows differences in net attachment to own country cross the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU which were registered in April–May 2007 (Standard Eurobarometer no. 67) in accordance with number of years of EU membership of the states concerned. The indicator of levels of net national identification is calculated as net opinion, i.e. the negative answers are subtracted from the positive answers (i.e. ‘very attached and fairly attached’ minus ‘not very attached and not at all attached’). The EU27-wide level of net national attachment is 83 percent (91 percent of positive answers, 8 percent of negative answers, and 1 percent do-not-know answers). Figure 3 indicates substantial differences. In the grouping of twelve new member states, the highest levels of national identification are registered in the Polish (PL), Bulgarian (BG) and Slovene (SI) polities. The lowest levels are in the Romanian (RO), Slovak (SK) and Czech (CZ) cases. However, net national identification levels in all cases from the new EU periphery are still above 80 percent. The three polities of the 1995 enlargement indicate also high national identification levels, and the Finish (FI) polity shows even one of the highest levels in the whole EU. The Greek (GR) and Portuguese (PT) polities of the Mediterranean enlargements indicate similar very high levels, but the Spanish (SP) case shows net national identification level below 80 percent. It seems to result from the political aspirations of regional autochthonous ethnic groups, in particular in Basque country and Catalonia who tend to have lower levels of Spanish identification (see Frye 1992; Mansvelt Beck, Markusse 2008; Dostál 1999). The Danish (DK) and Irish (IR) polities also express high national
identification levels above 90 percent. The electorate of the UK indicates one of the three lowest national identification levels in the entire enlarged EU and suggest to be relatively sceptic about British national attachment. Also the differences in the grouping of the EU founding polities are substantial. National identification levels are lower than in most of new member states and old member states. But still above 80 percent in Luxembourg (LU), France (FR), Germany (GE) and Italy (IT). However, very low levels of national identification level are articulated in the Belgian (BE) and Dutch (NL) polities. The Belgian case is not surprising given long-lasting ethno-political tensions between the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking parts of the Belgian electorate (see Deprez, Vos 1998; Markusse 1999). However, the position of the polity in the Netherlands (NL) is particularly unclear. Flash Eurobarometer no. 172 conducted immediately in the Netherlands (fieldwork 2–4 June 2005) after the negative referendum regarding the draft of EU constitution documented that only 19.5 percent of no-voters declared as the reason for their rejection of the draft EU constitution the supposed loss of national sovereignty. Two thirds of the Dutch voters thought that
the rejection of the draft would enable a renegotiation of the text in order to produce a more socially acceptable draft. The general conclusion to be drawn from the scatter diagram in Figure 3 is that the differentiation in net national identification levels across the EU27 is considerable. However, the average difference of 8 percent between the polities in the group of polities of the old EU15 (net level of 81 percent) and the twelve polities of new member states (net level of 89 percent) is small.

Figure 4 shows differences in net EU identification levels also registered in April–May 2007 (Standard Eurobarometer no. 67) and again displayed in accordance with number of years of EU membership. It is clear that specified differences are even greater than those regarding levels of national identification. Moreover, average EU27 net attachment level is only 9 percent (53 percent positive, 44 percent negative and 3 percent do-not-know answers). Thus, the average difference in EU attachment levels between the polities of the EU15 (net level of 6 percent) and the polities of new member states (net level of 15 percent) is more significant. Differences in the grouping of new member states are really substantial. The variation range stretches from the highest Polish level of 35 percent to the −35 percent articulated in the Greek part of the Cypriot polity (CY). However, other nine new EU polities indicate at least positive levels of net EU identification. The polities of the 1995 enlargement show negative levels of EU attachment. The position of the Finish polity (FI) is particularly extreme (−39 percent). It is interesting to note that also Scandinavian polities of Sweden (SE), Estonia (ES), Lithuania (LI) and also Denmark (DK) articulate negative net levels of EU attachment. The same applies to the Greek-speaking cases of Cyprus (CY) and Greece (GR). It is further interesting to establish the relatively high levels of EU identification in the old EU periphery formed by Spain (SP), Ireland (IR) and Portugal (PT). Some authors argue that higher levels of European identification can result from long-term experience with redistributive regional and structural funds support which was channelled through the EU level of policy-making (see Bachtler, McMater 2008; Molle 2007; and statistical analyses in chapters 4 and 5). Five EU founding polities articulate positive EU identification levels. The polities of Belgium (BE), Luxembourg (LU) and Italy (IT) express in the context of the EU27 high levels of net EU attachment. However, the polities of the influential German-French tandem articulate almost identical lower levels around 15 percent. This is surprising, because some authors claimed that debates on key institutional issues of the further EU development (enlargement and common constitution) have proceeded in the countries differently revealing great variation in salience of issues and cross-national specificities (see Adam 2007). The positions of the polities in the UK and the Netherlands are less surprising. The UK polity traditionally articulates considerable Euroscepticism (Giddens 2007), which can be called ‘old hard Euroscepticism’. In the case of the Dutch polity, however, one can speak of ‘new soft Euroscepticism’ which tends to assess
the EU reform attempts as insufficient to solve the arising from issues the last enlargements or globalisation pressures (de Wijk 2005).

At this point of the introductory examination of public opinion tendencies regarding the articulations of national and EU attachments and identification, the attention can be turned to Figure 5. The scatter diagram shows across the twenty-seven polities details of the relationship between the two directions of identification. It appears that there is no systematic correlation between the indicators representing the levels of the national and European attachments across the set of EU polities. It seems that this outcome suggests that the first above-formulated hypothesis must be supported at the cross-national level of the enlarged EU. Yet, the outcome is a complicated one. On the one hand, it seems that that the identification with and attachment to the EU is carried upon different sorts of feelings than identifications with the EU nation-states and, in consequence the variables representing national and European identifications are not statistically related in a systematic way. On the other hand, however, it is clear that this outcome is mainly caused by the positions of four deviant cases: the Netherlands (NL) and the UK
and also partly by Cyprus (CY) in lower-left part of the scatter diagram. The forth case is Poland in the upper-right part of Figure 5. The low-low positions of the former polities and the high-high position of the Polish polity are responsible for considerable distortion of the statistical outcome. It was already mentioned above that the Dutch and British cases represent ‘soft new’ and ‘hard old’ forms of Euroscepticism (see further section 2.6.). The set of other twenty-three EU polities in the variation range between the Belgian case (BE) and the Finish case (FI) indicates that the second hypothesis tends to characterise the interrelated differentiations in the national and European attachments and identifications. In other words, that the EU identification processes tend to develop in a similar way as nation-state identifications were developing since the 19th century and that the character of attachment to the EU is much the same as national identification. This cross-sectional negative correlation tendency thus suggests that the two identifications are in current articulations of public opinion across the major part of the enlarged EU competing with each other. It may be established that in autumn 2007 the British and also the Dutch polities did not perceived the national identification in terms of nesting in the European identification, and they simultaneously articulated relatively low levels of national identification. It seems that these articulation tendencies can be associated with long-term positions of the UK and the Netherlands in current changing context of the global economic and geopolitical context (de Wijk 2005). The extreme relative position of Poland seems to result from considerations of the Polish polity of its geopolitical and geo-economic position on the eastern border of the enlarged EU. It suggests that the Polish polity tends to perceive the EU as an institutional and procedural vehicle which complements strategic interests of the Polish nation-state and provides significant extra empowerment to it.

Gillespie and Laffan claimed that the development of European identity processes would necessarily imply “double disengagement”. On the one hand, there would be disengagement of citizenship from nationalistic definitions of nation-states and, on the other, democratic institutions would ‘emancipate’ from the territorial demarcations of nation-states (Gillespie and Laffan (2006, pp. 134–144). These aggregate results of the Eurobarometer fieldwork carried out in April–May 2007 suggest, however, that such a double disengagement from the traditional national territorial and European identifications is not taking place. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that “the framing of Europe, the way elites and mass media in the different European countries account for European integration, strongly influences people’s readiness to develop new allegiances and reorder their older ones” Duchesne, Frognier 2008, p. 163; see also Risse, Maier 2002). But, obviously, this introductory examination also suggests, in accordance with the crucial contention of this book, that there are effects arising from national electorates in the democratic countries involved feeding back to their political elites.
Consequently, public opinion on national and European identifications and interest articulations are also central to studies on European integration and differentiation. Accordingly, Drulák argues that “we come across the claim that the absence of a European demos, desired or not, prevents the European Parliament from providing a higher legitimacy to European integration and that the only place where it can be legitimized is the national parliaments. Indeed, from the positivist perspective, this is the only logical solution, if identities are pre-given then the institutional set up should reflect them. On the other hand, the constructivist perspective could show that a strengthening of the European Parliament is likely to contribute to the development of a European demos and European identity, regardless of whether it is desired or not” (Drulák 2001, p. 13). It is clear that necessary public opinion support for European integration processes and identification is a real phenomenon which must develop, both in the old fifteen member states and the twelve new member states of the enlarged EU in order to solve a variety of issues which are associated with the development of the multi-speed or two-speed European Union. It also must be noted that

![Correlation between net attachment to own country and net attachment to the European Union in April–May 2007 (N = 27). Source: own calculations.](image-url)
articulations of European identification are not stimulated due to the lack of effective EU-wide public sphere developments (see Risse, Maier 2002).

2.5. Multi-speed and two-speed European Union

Considering the three approaches on the EU summarised in Table 2, alternative theoretical perspectives, regarding the issues of differentiated integration, can be characterised:

1. The supranational approaches understand differentiated integration as a distortion of the European integration processes. Multi-speed EU is conceptualised in terms of temporary solutions, Member countries that are lagging behind the ‘pioneering’ countries have to speed up, whereas permanent opt-outs (variable geometry) and low levels of political willingness in some member countries to deepen the European integration process must not complicate the gradual federalising process.

2. From the intergovernmental point-of-view, differentiated integration is understood to primarily rest in domestic affairs and used as a means of pursuing national interests emerging from interactions between domestic actors and interest groups. Differentiated integration complicates mechanisms of negotiations and bargain and weakens a ‘culture of reaching consensus’. Member states which do not participate in the core can avoid certain costs, but they cannot reap a large portion of the benefits of membership in the ‘pioneering’ group.

3. The confederal consociational perspective sees differentiated integration as a bundle of multi-level processes, which tend to place the compromise-oriented tendency (stimulated by possible use of veto rights) at risk. Package deals and side-payments necessarily associated with differentiated integration increase further the complexity of the EU system. In view of needed flexibility, some issues of primary importance, such as issues of deepening and enlargement and changing the EU treaties can be solved by differentiated integration processes. From the confederal consociational perspective, differentiated integration processes can be understood and evaluated in terms of their long-term economic effects and institutional and procedural implications and emphasising some features of path dependency (consociative aspects) in the EU institutional and procedural development.

Reflecting on the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam provisions for differentiation and enhanced cooperation, Wessels (1998) reconsiders the central arguments in favour of what one might call a ‘core Europe’ and against an ‘intergovernmental Europe’. He points out that the 1976 Tindemans Report on European Union provides principles relevant to the debate on the advanced
cooperation provision of the Amsterdam Treaty (Tindemans 1976). These principles, in particular those concerned with the Economic and Monetary Union, were later incorporated into major articles of the Maastricht Treaty. Tindemans claimed that it is impossible “at the same time to submit a credible programme of action if it is deemed absolutely necessary that in every case all stages should be reached by all the States at the same time. The divergence of their economic and financial institutions is such that, were we to insist on this progress it would be impossible and Europe would continue to crumble away”. He further argued that those member states, which are capable of progressing in intensified integration, have a duty to forge ahead, and that member states which have reasons for not participating, should not do so. He proposed that the European Commission makes proposals to the European Council which would acknowledge this. Moreover, non-participating member states would receive from the other member states assistance and aid, enabling them to catch up with the other member states and also to take part in assessing the outcomes realised in the new policy sectors in question. Tindemans made a point to declare that these institutional arrangements would not mean “Europe a la carte: each country will be bound by the agreement of all as to the final objective to be achieved in common; it is only the timescales of achievement that vary” (1976, pp. 20–21). Wessels argues that the debate would become more important with the anticipated “eastern enlargement” (1998, p. 78). The provision allowing for enhanced cooperation and resulting in the formation of a ‘pioneering’ group of member states was an important step towards the deepening of the integration process, but it could also complicate crucial institutional mechanisms of the EU, which, since the beginning of European integration, took the perceptions, political will and interests of the member states into account. The Amsterdam Treaty provision institutionalised the concept of closer cooperation among a core group as a permanent, EU-wide principle.

However, Wessels claims that “the new provisions seem reactive and defensive. While they include the possibility of opting in, they do not necessarily expect that all other member states will follow according to a fixed plan and within a fixed period. The old underlying understanding that all ‘ships in the convoy’ will reach the harbour, only at different times, is no longer so dominant” (1998, p. 78). The provision indicated opposition to concepts of multi-speed development in terms of ‘Europe a la carte’, in which political interests need not take general integration objectives and principles into account. However, the concept of a ‘core Europe’, comprised of successful member states with higher levels of economic performance, was not avoided. The trend for larger member states to dominate was, likewise, not precluded. Wessels also warns that member states and their governments “do not like having to admit that their countries are only second rate. As important, they are very reluctant to apply for the relatively junior status of invited guest, a status which would involve loosing their right to full and
equal participation”. He continues, stating that “it is against the instinct of politicians to limit their own rights to a mere seat without a vote at a table in the knowledge that, in so volunteering, they may also be creating additional hurdles to their full participation at a future date” (1998, p. 82). “Eastern enlargement might further increase the gaps between the differing capacities of the member states, gaps which subsequently might not be easy to diminish” (1998, p. 83). Arguments also arose from potential outsiders, claiming that the exclusion of any member state that is willing and declares itself able to progress further would go against the basic principles of the EU (Duff 1998, Kölliker 2001, Sepos 2005).

Still more ambivalence surrounds the debate about the possibilities of centrifugal development. If every member state wishes to take part and none can be excluded, the larger, stronger or more economically advanced countries might be willing to seek deeper cooperation outside the EU’s institutional structure. The possession of “a potential veto right by non-participating member states could be perceived as disproportionate and might encourage the creation outside the European Union framework of a ‘hard core’ of progressive states. On the other hand, one could imagine that the same member states would demand that each case would be accepted by all, including those opting out or requiring a derogation, either of their own wish or ... because of their objective situation” (Wessels 1998, p. 84). The prerequisite to consensus can be understood as a procedural instrument that can be directed against the majority of member states which wish to pursue their interests in terms of deeper integration. Suspicion that consensus with non-participating member states might carry a price tag of concessions on the part of those states, willing to form a ‘pioneering’ grouping, exists. Such fears and suspicions have hindered intergovernmental debates on the EU differentiation process and options for its institutionalisation, at least since the mid-1990s (Sepos 2005).

Such fears and suspicions indicate a lack of confidence or mutual trust. However, fears could also arise on the part of non-participating member states, due to the fact that if they are granted a veto on the formation of a ‘pioneering’ grouping, their influence on policies and decisions, implemented thereafter in the core group, would be negligible. Non-participating member states could also be subject to problems concerning the conditions, procedures and timing for participation in the core group. In particular, if the core group countries were to exhibit a tendency to create policies extending beyond the initial decisions. On the other hand, non-participating states might attempt to reap benefits from not taking part in the core group and create, for instance, circumstances such as environmental or social dumping, or draw upon free-rider benefits, resulting from the activities of the core group. The fear that “closer cooperation should serve as a step towards a core Europe or a Europe à géométrie variable consisting only of some members who – especially in the light of eastern enlargement – might no longer
be interested in the participation of all members” should be pointed out again (Wessels 1998, p. 91).

These various considerations indicate some ambivalent features of the institutional option of a two-speed EU. It is also clear that the institutionalisation of a multi-speed EU (based on variable geometry or pick-and-choose solutions) could lead to chaotic institutional structures and procedures and result in unaccountable policy regimes, the outcome of which could lead to centrifugal disintegrative tendencies. It can be assumed that the ambivalent features of a multi-speed EU, as well as those of a two-speed development system, would be reflected in differences in the current articulations of public opinion analysed, in particular, in chapter 3.

Some of the scholars observing the European integration process characterise the EU as an ‘imperial constellation’ (Beck, Grande 2007; Zielonka 2006). However, there is no need to assume this terminology in order to present a current interpretation of existing macro-geography of European integration processes or to identify the asymmetrical political and spatial constellation of the EU, in terms of differentiated integration or multi-speed development (see also Beck, Grande 2007, p. 63). On the basis of the intensity of integration and institutional and procedural mechanisms of European integration processes and cooperation and according to the countries involved, one can identify at least six major zones, in the institutional macro-geography of European Union and Europe:

1. a zone of the deepest integration, comprised of member states willing to ‘pioneer’ and form a core group in the EU, such as members of the Eurozone, or those creating a common military force
2. a zone of intensive integration, including each of the twenty-seven member states, especially in terms of intensive integration pursuant to the ratified treaties on the common market (the so-called first pillar of the EU, which embraces, in particular, the original scope of the EEC) as well as common agricultural policy, competition policy, industry, research and development, or environmental and regional policies, over which the EU level retains considerable power and allocates important decision-making competences to supra-national institutions (in particular to the European Commission or the European Parliament)
3. a zone of limited integration and cooperation, which includes the twenty-seven member states and which deals with policy-making sectors of the so-called second (cooperation in common foreign and security policies) and third (cooperation in justice and domestic affairs) pillars. This zone has basically an intergovernmental character
4. a zone of extended power and influence, including states which have adopted EU rules and take part in a variety of programmes without being formal EU member states; members of the 1994 European Economic Area (EEA): Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein
5. a zone of candidates countries (currently Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey), or associated states
6. a zone of countries involved in so-called EU neighbourhood policies.

The zone of countries taking part in the European Economic Area is particularly interesting in the current macro-geography of the differentiated integration of Europe. Elliasen and Sitter (2004) speak of Norway’s ‘quasi-membership of the European Union’ and claim that Norway is a test case for indirect participation in European integration processes. The participation of Norway in the EEA is based upon three linkages: (i) extension of the Single Market Act by the EEA, but also by (ii) ad hoc Norwegian participation on some other EU initiatives, and (iii) adaptations and necessary adjustments due to new EU treaties. The EEA agreement involves Norway more in the EU common market than associated countries and it is upgraded in accordance with each enlargement wave. Norway also secured its participation in the Schengen area (i.e. passport free travel and related policies). The three EEA countries have to unilaterally adapt to the EU development. Therefore, the ‘quasi-membership’ of Norway and the other two countries is developing, but also asymmetric. The EEA granted participation in the EU Internal Market (except agriculture and fisheries) and required to accept relevant parts of the EU legal system. Elliasen and Sitter also indicate that the advantages of the ‘quasi-membership’ tend to shrink with each deepening and widening of the EU. It is essential to note that this general regionalisation of European integration processes and the example of Norway is not the result of a normative approach, but that, from the perspective of the confederal consociational approach, it reflects the basic asymmetries in the institutional-spatial structure of European macro-geography. It is clear that a set of integrated policies, to which all EU member states must subscribe and which would provide minimal room to manoeuvre (i.e. particularly the first and second zones), in order to limit the potential centrifugal tendencies suggested above, should be maintained. The idea that some member states are in this institutional-geographical constellation really more important and more committed to the integration and the deepening process than others is another important conclusion to be drawn.

In an influential speech delivered at Humboldt University on 12 May 2000, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer summarised some essential points, indicating the scope of the possible continued formation of a ‘pioneering’ core group of EU member states. His thoughts were revealing and can be condensed as follows:

– expansion of reinforced, deeper cooperation between those member states which want to cooperate more closely
– closer cooperation should not be misunderstood as the end of integration
– formation of a centre of gravity for member states with a nucleus of federal institutions
enlargement and political integration will depend decisively on France and Germany
- this centre of gravity must be open to all member states and candidate countries
- such a centre of gravity must also have an active interest in enlargement, it must be attractive to other member states
- the steps to a constitutional treaty will be a precondition to full integration.

Two important questions arise from these considerations on the institutional macro-geography of the EU and its potential core-periphery institutional structure. First, is this perspective of differentiated integration in the EU, in the institutional form of two-speed development, sufficiently supported by current articulations of public opinion, across the enlarged EU of twenty-seven member states? More specifically, does public opinion in the key influential countries of Germany and France tend to support the processes and vision of a two-speed EU? These empirical questions are considered in chapter 3. Second, does public opinion, across the twenty-seven polities, provide sufficient support for deepening and widening (i.e. enlargement) processes? The next section of this chapter explores this second empirical question.

2.6. Insufficient public support for political deepening and widening

It appears that considerable differences exist, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU, in public opinion concerning the two key directions of European integration: deepening (i.e. more intensive integration) and widening (i.e. enlargement). This is important empirical clam, because one can assume that the EU must demonstrate that it can effectively include member states, while continuing with integration processes. Significantly, not all polities in the old EU15 have been supportive of the widening and deepening processes (Fröhlich 2005, Guérot 2005). Not all electorates of the enlarged EU of twenty-seven member states are particularly welcoming towards additional potential entrants, including the Balkan countries and Turkey (see also Carkoglu 2003).

It is, therefore, not surprising that, after analysing national elections and European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2004, for all twenty-five member states (including the electorates resulting from the May 2004 enlargement and taking part in the 2004 European elections), the lack of an EU-wide electorate (i.e. the absence of an integrated EU-wide polity, see Caramani 2006) is one of the central characteristics of the confederal-consociational system of the EU. Thus, taking a closer look at existing differences in public opinion concerning the two European integration processes (enlargement and deepening), across the twenty-seven electorates, as a means of document-
ing the existing fragmentation of public opinion is a worthwhile endeavour (see also Dostál, Hampl 2008, pp. 46–54).

Recent results of the Eurobarometer surveys can be used to explore mass opinion and attitudes regarding the widening and deepening processes of integration, in the current EU of twenty-seven member states. Standard Eurobarometer survey no. 67 was carried out between 10 April and 15 May 2007 and based on stratified representative samples of 1,000 respondents from each electorate (in Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta samples included 500 respondents, see also section 2.7.). Figure 6 shows differences in net support for future enlargement according to the number of years of EU membership. The results of this Eurobarometer survey, carried out in spring 2007, indicate an EU-wide support level for future enlargement (question QA27.4 “what is your opinion on future enlargement of the EU to include other countries in the future years?”) of 49 percent. However, there is also significant portion (39 percent) against, with 12 percent undecided. Thus, net support level is positive, but only at 10 percent. After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, in January 2007, positive opinion on EU enlargement increased slightly from 46 percent, in autumn 2006 (Eurobarometer no. 66) with a decrease in negative opinion from 42 to 39 percent. However, these changes did not significantly alter the general pattern, across the enlarged EU.

Figure 6 documents considerable differentiation in net support for future enlargement. It appears that, in the grouping of the EU’s six founding states, polities indicate low-level support in Italy (IT) and the Netherlands (NL), while significant negative opinion is evident, in particular, in the EU-dominating member states of Germany (GE) and France (FR). Also, net support in the 1973 enlargement countries – Denmark (DK), Ireland (IR) and the United Kingdom (UK) – is low. But, the old EU periphery, consisting of Greece (GR), Portugal (PT) and Spain (SP), tends to support the future widening of the EU. Member states of the 1995 enlargement are more divided on this public opinion issue. Some support for future enlargement is evident in Sweden (SE), but opposing opinion clearly dominates in Finland (FI) and particularly in Austria (AT). Figure 6 clearly shows that the polities in the new EU periphery, formed by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, tend to support future widening. Net positive opinion ranges from lower levels in Estonia (ES) and Latvia (LA) to very high levels of support in Poland (PL) and Romania (RO). The general pattern of differentiation documents existing cleavages along the strategic geopolitical and geo-economic orientations for increasing the volume of potential power with future EU widening (see also Dostál, Hampl 2008). The primary conclusion is that there is a particularly significant public opinion cleavage between the representative samples of the electorates in the key founding-member states of Germany and France, on the one hand, and those of the twelve new member states, on the other. It seems that this clear public opinion cleavage could lead to protracted enlargement stagnation. It can be assumed that public
opinion and mass interest articulations from the most influential member states tend to constitute important feedback, in the democratic regimes of the EU member states, resulting in barrier effects arising from electorates and placed upon the decision-making and policy-making of the governing political elites involved.

Differentiation in public opinion concerning the deepening process can be specified by using results from Eurobarometer survey no. 67 to the question of whether there is support for a European constitution. To reiterate, rejection of the draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty in referendums, held in 2005, in France and the Netherlands, seemed to indicate the termination of a long period of deepening of the European integration process, a period that began, in its initial stage, with the Single Market Act in 1985 and continued with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Piris 2006). However, following the two negative referendums, considerable uncertainty about the future of the integration process emerged (see also Dostál 2010a). Therefore, one can assume that the question on ‘support for a constitution’ may capture the preferences for further deepening. According to the results of the same Eurobarometer
survey, there is an average support level for an EU constitution (question QA27.5 “what is your opinion on a constitution for the European Union?”) of 66 percent. However, 20 percent of respondents expressed opposition and 14 percent were undecided. In essence, net support for further EU deepening is relatively high: 46 percent. After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, public opinion concerning an EU constitution increased slightly from 63 percent, in Autumn 2006 (Eurobarometer no. 66), and from 61 percent, in Spring 2006 (Eurobarometer no. 65). There was practically no change in opposing opinion (which decreased from 21 to 20 percent). Again, however, these small changes do not significantly alter the general pattern, across the enlarged EU. It is, therefore, important to stress that the two negative referendums, in France and the Netherlands in 2005, did not lead to general negative opinion across the entire EU regarding further EU deepening.

Figure 7, however, documents very significant differentiation in net support for an EU constitution. Importantly, even in the so-called Eurosceptic countries, such as Austria (AT), the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark (DM), opposing opinion does not dominate and net support levels are positive. It appears that the grouping of EU founding states – with the exception of the Netherlands – exhibits high net support for further deepening of the EU; especially in Belgium (BE), Germany (GE) and Italy (IT). Considering the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, it is interesting to note that net support is significantly higher in France (FR) than in the Netherlands (NL). However, public opinion of the polities of the 1995 enlargement (Austria, Sweden and Finland) clearly indicates insufficient support for the EU deepening process.

Figure 7 also documents the fact that electorates in the new EU periphery tend to be divided on this issue. On the one hand, Czechia’s low level of support suggests that public opinion in this country more closely reflects Eurosceptic opinions in Austria (AT), Sweden (SE), Finland (FI), Denmark (DK) and the United Kingdom (UK). On the other hand, there are very high levels of support in Hungary (HU), Slovenia (SI) and Romania (RO). This general pattern of differentiation also suggests the significance of the risks, surrounding these current public opinion cleavages concerning the strategic options necessary to intensify continental integration, in order to strengthen the enlarged EU’s capabilities in its unavoidable competition with other sub-global systems in the world (Dostál, Hampl 2008).

The results of these EU-wide, public opinion surveys clearly indicate that important divisions currently exist across the twenty-seven member states in terms of articulations of views, concerning future widening and deepening of the EU. However, in spite of the current difficulties repressed by the French and Dutch polities, deepening and widening processes must be understood, at a general level, as the key orientations of future EU institutional and territorial development, which influence each other and which, in spite of some
short-term stagnation and the lack of public opinion support, could result in the very necessary, long-term coordination of future integration tasks of the countries involved.

Differences in public opinion regarding the two key orientations of EU development suggest that a low positive correlation exists between the two variables, across the twenty-seven polities. The scatter diagram in Figure 8 exhibits a low correlation (Pearson $r^2 = 0.141$), indicating that differentiation in net support for an EU constitution can only statistically determine 14.1 percent of the differentiation in the other variable. That is, there is a weak tendency indicating that those polities who support a constitution for the EU also are inclined to support further widening, while those polities who oppose a constitution also tend to be against further enlargement. The low positive correlation indicates that there is no general “trade-off” between the perceptions of the two crucial directions of European integration, Articulations of a perceived trade-off would be shown by a clear negative correlation. It appears that across the whole set of twenty-seven polities there is no tendency to see further deepening and widening as incompatible.
processes. This quite diffused relationship indicates the value of viewing the differences on the two indicators, in terms of a typology. The typology defined in Table 3 can be used. According to Karp and Bowler (2006), mass values orientations and attitudes and articulations of public opinion from the electorates in the enlarged EU can be classified into four primary types. However, compared to a typology proposed by Karp and Bowler, the labels of the types shown in Table 3 must be modified in order to make them applicable for analysis at the level of the twenty-seven polities.

Depending on higher or lower levels of support for deepening or widening (enlargement), the typology defines four primary directions in public opinion differentiations and articulations of instrumental reasons of polities involved. The two average net support levels in the pooled twenty-seven Eurobarometer samples, indicated above, are used as dividing thresholds in the typology. Higher levels of support for deepening as well as for widening describe polities, exhibiting an Integrationist orientation. The polities in this category see compatibility of the two crucial EU integration processes. Such an orientation in public opinion does not tend to perceive a trade-off between
This combination of public opinion articulations seems to be associated with certain optimism regarding the European integration process, expressed in greater confidence in EU institutions and common policy-making. It can also be argued that the polities of new member states are lacking long-term experience with the EU negotiation system which is meaning that they approach pressing questions of institutional reforms and widening with open mind and belief in simultaneous quest for effectiveness, consistency and solidarity based on significant redistributive policy regimes (i.e. structural and regional funds programmes; see also analyses in chapter 4 and 5). It appears that most of the polities from new member states forming the new EU periphery – Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Lithuania (LI), Cyprus (CY), Bulgaria (BG), Slovenia (SI) and Hungary (HU) – are expressing this public opinion orientation. Moreover, polities from the old periphery, Spain (SP) and Portugal (PT) are also in this group. It seems that the polities from the peripheral parts of the enlarged EU do not tend to be worried about consequences of further enlargement for the European integration processes. However, it should be noted that there is a certain risk that the polities of this peripheral group will not be able to provide decisive public support for continued, simultaneous deepening and widening, in the enlarged EU, because their countries and political elites lack the necessary power potential in internal strategic debates concerning the future EU institutional and spatial development. The conclusion can be drawn is that polities in the peripheries of the enlarged EU tend to perceive widening and deepening processes as a necessary means of extending the geographical limits of the current EU to the East (see also Dostál 2010a).

These ideas are connected with the type of the Institutionalist orientation. This opinion articulation appears to origin from views towards older traditional EU policies, such as common agricultural policy, or fears of los-

Table 3 – Public opinion on EU enlargement and deepening (spring 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of support for EU enlargement</th>
<th>Low levels of support for future EU deepening</th>
<th>Higher levels of support for future EU deepening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher levels of support for EU enlargement</td>
<td><strong>Europractical</strong> Main reasons: EU is conceived as common market, economic growth is important (CZ, MT, SK and LA)</td>
<td><strong>Integrationist</strong> European orientations, confidence in EU institutions and common redistributive policy-making (PL, RO, SP, LI, CY, BG, SI, HU, ES and SP with PT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower levels of support for EU enlargement</td>
<td><strong>Eurosceptic</strong> National pride and lack of trust in EU institutions (AT, FI, UK, NL, DK and GR with SE)</td>
<td><strong>Institutionalist</strong> Main reasons: old policies, farmers, loss of subsidies, concerns about weakening and effectiveness of EU institutions (LU, FR, GE, BE and IR with IT)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ing subsidies from structural and regional funds, in the wealthier member states, due to the fact that various subsidies would have to be shifted towards the countries of the new periphery (Baldwin, Wyplosz 2006; Preston 1997; see also the results of statistical analyses carried out in chapters 4 and 5 of this book). This public opinion direction also seems to suggest that electorates in Germany (GE), France (FR), Belgium (BE) and Luxembourg (LU) expect taxpayers in wealthier member states to be expected to make increased subsidy contributions to the common EU budget (Karp, Bowler 2006, p. 372). Considering historical analyses of European integration processes (Harrison 1995, Zielonka 2006), it is clear that these countries form the central part of the enlarged EU and that perceptions articulated by their electorates and political elites will be crucial in any political debate regarding future development of the EU. Particularly, the positions of influential electorates of Germany and France with regard to enlargement issues are important (see Adam 2007). Their concerns regarding the weakening and overall effective functioning of EU institutions and procedures further indicate the contents of this Institutionalist orientation. The polities of older member states are specific in their fear of widening and their support for deepening. Importantly, they seem to indicate their inclination to perceive a trade-off between further deepening and widening. It seems that these influential electorates accept a gradual deepening that would correct some deficiencies of the current EU institutional structure and procedures. The polities in Ireland and Italy represent transitory cases in the scatter in Figure 5, but they can also be grouped in this category; in spite of the fact that Italian public opinion has traditionally been among the most integrationist polities, throughout the long history of the EU (see Duchesne, Frognier 1995). It seems that the character of this Institutionalist group of large and influential EU electorates suggests the serious risk of protracted political debates, concerning any future enlargement of the EU. At more general level, one can claim that central to the institutional orientation in public opinion is the fear that further enlargement might destroy the delicate balance of power in the EU consociative system. It can also be envisaged, however, that mutual support between the Integrationalist orientation and the Institutionalist orientation might necessarily emerged as regards the trajectory of future EU deepening.

The Eurosceptic orientation represents public opinion of EU electorates, expressing low levels of support for both deepening and widening. National pride and a general lack of trust in EU institutions and their capabilities characterise this public opinion articulation. According to Morgan, a broad definition of Euroscepticism “refers to a political doctrine or movement motivated by hostility to European political integration” (Morgan 2005, p. 56). There can be distinguished three orientations of Euroscepticism. First orientation is concerned with the outcome of European integration: the existence of the EU. Second Eurosceptic orientation considering the integration proc-
ness is stressing its bureaucratic, undemocratic and “secretive” implications resulting in irreversible institutional and procedural changes which are realised by smaller reforms and resulting in important constraints on the sovereignty of member states. Third orientation of Euroscepticism is targeting the project of European integration and emphasises the fear that the EU tends to become a kind of federal ‘super state’ with even some features of a unitary state. It is clear that this third Eurosceptic orientation represents the most extreme form of Eurosceptic positions, because it comes from conservative commitment to the preservation of “distinctive national identity” (Morgan 2005, p. 58). Less extreme Eurosceptic responses to deepening and enlargement tend to be short-lived and are accompanied by narrowly-defined, instrumental self-interests, in terms of ‘euros and cents’ (Karp, Bowler 2006, p. 373). One can also distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. The ‘hard’ form is particularly stressing that the EU development is basically wrong because it constraints the functioning of nation-states and that there is not articulated European identity upon which the EU development can be based (see the outcome-oriented and the project-oriented Euroscepticism indicated above). The ‘soft’ form is emphasising that the EU is not effective or democratic and enlargements increase heterogeneity of the EU. This soft form of Euroscepticism recognises some European identification, but that identity must be defended. Seemingly, Austria (AT) is home to the most Eurosceptic electorate. Electorates in Finland (FI) and the United Kingdom (UK) also exhibit this public opinion orientation. It seems that these three polities tend to represent some mix of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptic orientations. Electorates in the Netherlands (NL), Denmark (DM), Sweden (SE) and Greece (GR) seem to present more transitory ‘soft’ cases, and are articulating in particular the fear that the EU “will not be able to maintain the level of social welfare protection that Europe’s nation-states have achieved in the post-war era” (Morgan 2005, p. 57).

Finally, the Europractical orientation provides some support for future enlargement, but shows lower support levels for the deepening process. Thus, also this public opinion orientation expresses inclination to perceive some trade-off between deepening and widening processes. Further, it seems that the electorates in Czechia (CZ), Malta (MT), Slovakia (SK) and Latvia (LT) tend to see EU membership primarily in terms of common market participations and perceive EU financial support, stimulating economic growth, as the key beneficial effect brought by the EU membership. At the same time, however, these electorates do not sufficiently trust EU institutions. They seemingly tend to understand the EU institutional and procedural system as one which has to be based more upon bargaining among member states and less up on multi-level modes of governance focused on the EU executive (i.e. the European Commission) and the EU legislative institution (i.e. the European Parliament; see also Hix 2005). It is important to emphasise that this Europractical group and the Integrationist group mutually include all
twelve polities of the new member countries resulting from the May 2005 and January 2007 enlargements. This Eurobarometer survey outcomes, from spring 2007, are certainly significant, as they indicate the current major divisions in public opinion in the enlarged EU of twenty-seven member states: the lack of support for future enlargements in most of the old member states, on the one hand, and moderate or high levels of support for enlargement in the new member states, shown both by the Integrationist and the Europractical orientations, on the other hand.

In essence, summarising these empirical results one must conclude that there is insufficient public support for political deepening and widening and pointing out to the considerable risk of lengthy political discussions concerned with the further EU development. The empirical results show that there have to be anticipated polarised orientations of public opinion across the enlarged EU: short term and long-term perspectives will have to be debated both in member countries and, in particular, at the EU level.

The considerations summarised in this chapter explained why the complementary analyses carried out in this book follow the broad and empirical analyses-based perspective of the confederal and consociative development of the EU. Particularly, the Single Market Act, the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice introduced institutional and procedural arrangements for more plurilateral system of governance characterised by differentiation. Due to increasing diversity of the EU resulting from each enlargement, the EU development based upon uniformity and homogeneity of principles and the same mutual obligations and rules and with acquis commnautaire representing the uniformity, has been accompanied by institutional and procedural mixity resulting in increasing complexity of the EU. In principle, the institutional option of a two-speed EU might accommodate various circumstances arising from the increasing complexity. The existing complexity of the EU is reflected in the considerable plurality in articulations of public opinion regarding deepening and widening processes. Accordingly, chapter 3 considers differentiation in public opinion, concerning the perspective of the further development of a two-speed EU, with the help of a postulated statistical explanatory model.

2.7. Methodological remarks

This book explores cross-national variations in articulations of public opinion across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU and attempts to identify coherent systematic tendencies. The idea that cultural values and articulations of opinion at the individual level in each of the polities can be characterised by central tendencies (national mean values), which represent genuine characteristics at the level of polities and which tend to have impacts on other characteristics at the level of the polities concerned,
in ways that cannot be reflected at the individual level, must be stressed. Therefore, individual-level values must be aggregated to the national level in order to examine whether systematic correlations exist, between political systems, political cultures and articulations of public opinion, across a set of polities (see also Inglehart, Welzel 2005; Dostál 2010a). Consequently, the statistical population, analysed in the explanatory statistical models in this book, is the set of twenty-seven EU countries, respectively their polities. The complementary statistical analyses carried out in this book, are based upon ecological correlation approach (see also Hofstede 2001, pp. 16–34). The statistical analyses are concerned with between-polity correlations which are calculated from average values of variables for each polity. It is obvious that ecological correlations are not identical with within-polity correlations. The present volume considers dimensions of culture of polities; thus, the number of countries covered is twenty-seven and large enough to include similar cases as well as different cases and the book is to be called a macro-geographic study comparing cultures of polities rather than categories of individuals in the countries concerned.

The postulated explanatory models used in this book are based on a combination of two multivariate statistical techniques. Multivariate techniques start from multivariate data matrices. A data matrix gives the results of a number of observations on a number of variables. Columns of the matrix (i.e. a table) refer to variables (indicators), rows to a set of units of observation (i.e. the twenty-seven countries or their polities). Multivariate techniques used in this book come down to operations on columns (variables) of the data matrix. What operations must be carried out is depending on the specific model which inspires the inquiry. The inquiry depends on the character of the specific questions asked about the variables and their interrelationships (i.e. correlations). The questions asked have to do with the explanation of variables and are concerned with identifications of variables which are determining other variables. It is also asked how effective the variables are as determiners. It must be noted that explanations of this type tend to expand into large explanatory models (see van de Geer 1971). The key statistical explanatory question asked is why the variable varies and to what extent its variance can be attributed to an identifiable other variable (i.e. explanatory variable). The approach chosen is theory-centred (see Ragin 1987, pp. 53–68). This research strategy is the variable-oriented approach which is “less concerned with understanding specific outcomes or categories of outcomes and more concerned with assessing the correspondence between relationships discernible across many societies or countries, on the one hand, and broad theoretically based images of macro-societal phenomena, on the other” (Ragin 1987, p. 53). Correlation analyses provide operational procedure specifying possible causation. The variable-orientated analysis is also a parsimonious strategy which attempts to keep the number of explanatory variables to a minimum.
First, principal component analysis is used (the necessary mathematical and computational procedures, see Harman 1967, Rummel 1970). This statistical technique makes it possible to specify the basic dimensionality of a correlation matrix of well-chosen variables, describing various aspects of the twenty-seven EU countries, their economies and societies as well as differences in articulations of public opinion from their polities. Second, the quantitative model building applied in this book makes use of the so-called LISREL (linear structural equations) method (see van de Geer 1971; Asher 1983; Saris, Stronkhorst 1984). This method is non-experimental and enables the construction of the causal orders, in terms of quantitative expressions, for the explanatory models, which are also postulated in chapters of this book in qualitative terms, in accordance with some explicit theoretical considerations of the variable-oriented approach applied to the EU developments.

Principal component analysis is a mode of multivariate analysis that provides the resolution of a set of variables linearly so that the variables in a new matrix of components (dimensions) are uncorrelated. The resolution is accomplished by the analysis a correlation matrix of selected variables by an iterative averaging procedure called the principal axis method (Harman 1967, p. 135ff). A satisfactory principal component analysis gives components which convey essential information of the original variables in the data matrix and their correlations. The principal components method has as its main objective to attain a parsimonious description of observed data and enables to extract a frame of reference (components) from the correlation matrix of the chosen variables, wherein each of the variables can be described, in terms of the new principal components. The application of the principal component technique affords a simpler interpretation of a given matrix of correlated variables. The first and each successive component represents maximum of the total variance of the observed variables. The first component is a linear combination of the observed variables and makes a maximum contribution to the sum of variances of the original variables. Only a few components may be obtained, if the first and following components account for a large share of the total variance of the observed variables. The second dimension (component) is uncorrelated with the first and adds a maximum of residual variance, extracted from the analysed correlation matrix. A third or any additional components (the maximum number is equal to the number of original variables in their correlation matrix) can be derived until the total variance of the original variables is extracted. The sum of the variance represented by all extracted principal components (dimensions) is equal to the total of the variance of the original variables in the correlation matrix (see Horst 1963). The variables are measured in comparable units, expressed in terms of the standard deviations of the original variables (the so-called z-scores with the mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one). Therefore, in the principal component analysis variables are not expressed in their original
unit of measurement, but their variations (i.e. differentiations) are made comparable in terms of standardised variations of observed variables.

The principal component analysis provides three sets of numerical results, which are used in the explanatory modelling of this book. First, the eigenvalues give the relative weights of each of the dimensions (components) describing the proportion of total variation among the observed variables that is represented by the extracted components. In other words, the eigenvalues specify shares of total variation in the correlation matrix that are accounted for by each of components. Second, the component loadings on each dimension (component) specify correlations between the observed variables (indicators) and the dimension, identifying those groups of variables that have common (i.e. inter-correlated) patterns of variation, within the set of observed units (in this book, the countries and polities of the EU27). The number of components in a correlation matrix determines the number of dimensions (dimensionality) of inter-correlated variables. In other words, one can use the components as primary additive (i.e. uncorrelated) dimensions that indicate the basic structure of the correlation matrix of observed variables. Third, the outcomes of principal component analyses give exact component scores. The component scores are linear combinations of the original variables (Rummel 1970, pp. 435–445). The principal component scores are new variables, which show how the units under observation (i.e. the twenty-seven EU member states or their polities) score on the components. Thus, each principal component is an observable set of scores, i.e. each of the twenty-seven EU countries or polities has a unique score on the component. Consequently, it is important to emphasise that in the complementary analyses and interpretations made in this book, the scores fulfil an essential role, because they can be utilised as new synthetic variables in further, sophisticated statistical modelling based upon the variable-oriented approach.

The linear structural equation (LISREL) procedure can, therefore, use the outcomes of a principal component analysis. The component scores can be employed in LISREL models as explanatory or dependent variables. The LISREL approach is a method for the estimation and testing of postulated causal models (see Saris, Stronkhorst 1984). This modelling approach is based upon the possibility that, although the dependent variable and explanatory variables cannot be manipulated as they can be in experiments, it is meaningful to statistically subtract the effects of controlled explanatory variables on the dependent variable (Ragin 1987, pp. 58–61). The effect of an explanatory control variable is its mean effect on the dependent variable, across all twenty-seven countries, net of the effects of other explanatory variables. It is assumed that the effect of the explanatory variable is the same in each observation unit (i.e. each country or its polity) regardless of values of the other explanatory variables. This statistical procedure enables to estimate and then exclude (control) the effects of variables by simple
subtraction. In this way, only broad patterns of co-variation are studied in this variable-oriented approach. If one is interested in the particularity of a case (country or polity) then one has to examine its deviation from a predicted pattern (regression). Therefore, the modelling procedure used in this book must be classified as non-experimental research strategy, in which the researcher cannot manipulate relevant variables. This has two significant impacts on research conducted using this method. First, it means that the researcher cannot obtain evidence regarding the causal ordering of events. The causal ordering of variables must be derived in a different way, through qualitative modelling. The qualitative modelling procedure necessitates that the researcher draws a diagram where by means of arrows going from one variable to another, he/she postulates how causal effects might run. This requires extensive theoretical work. When causal ordering is based on a well-formulated and postulated theory, the tenability of said causal theory can be tested with non-experimental data. The causal ordering assumes incomplete determination of variables and is concerned with a repeated application of multivariate regression applied to each variable in the model (except the first explanatory variables on the left-hand side of the postulated model). Thus, this statistical approach needs to order the variables from the left to the right and involves the repetition of multiple regressions for each variable in turn (van de Geer 1971). However, direct inference, concerning the causal ordering, is impossible without prior assumptions, which are elaborated in this book, in discussions focusing on theoretical assumptions about the actual functioning of the enlarged EU and differences in articulated public opinion across the twenty-seven polities. Second, the units of observation (countries or their polities) used in the study may differ with respect to various features and not only in the single aspect, for which one seeks to establish an effect in the model. Consequently, it is not clear whether a relationship, statistically established between the postulated explanatory variable and the dependent variable, should be attributed to a causal effect or to the effect of other variables. This problem is solved by the statistically controlling for important variables in the postulated model. In essence, in this approach, a causal theory is one that includes important variables, according to the theoretical insights of the investigator. From such theoretical insights, testable hypotheses can be derived with respect to co-variations (correlations) between dependent and explanatory variables. The theory must be rejected if these hypotheses do not hold true for the data. This methodological approach is thus founded upon the variable-oriented analysis and not upon case-oriented analyses (see Ragin 1987). In other words, explanatory models based upon the LISREL method enable one to sift through more or less important variables, in terms of their statistically estimated independent effects, as indicated by multivariate regression coefficients (see also Dostál 2010a, pp. 28–30). The approach is based upon partial-correlation technique in order to identify the character of postulated causal relationships between observed variables or variables
derived from the applications of principle component analyses (i.e. principle component scores). The postulated model is tested by trying to derive from it which partial correlations tend to be close to zero and which not. In brief, this method has the aim to specify linear equations that are equivalent to explanatory models which are postulated through qualitative theoretical modelling.

Classical multiple regression analysis, which identifies relationships between a dependent variable and a number of explanatory variables, forms the basis of the LISREL procedure. Accordingly, the goodness-of-fit of a LISREL model or its determination level is measured with a classical Pearson multiple linear correlation coefficient. Therefore, the LISREL procedure also belongs to the family of general linear models (see Saris, Stronkhorst 1984; van de Geer 1971). An essential feature of any linear relationship is that a change in $x$ explanatory variable will produce an equal amount of change in dependent variable $y$ and, thus, can be described with a linear equation. In contrast to multiple regression analysis, however, the LISREL method is explicitly concerned with the structure of effects, within the set of explanatory variables that statistically determine the variation (differentiation) in the last dependent variable and the effects are independent effects, as in the multiple regression model indicating the relative importance of the different explanatory variables. The larger the effect, the more important is the explanatory variable. This means that one can gain insight into the causal order of multivariate regressions. The postulated quantitative model is a system of multivariate regressions and one can use the LISREL method to estimate the causal order of effects among theoretically well-ordered explanatory variables for the entire model. However, in contrast to classical multiple regression coefficients, the LISREL method transforms these into standardised regression coefficients (so-called Beta coefficients). The standardisation of regression coefficients enables one to determine the magnitude of the direct effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable, resulting from one unit change (thus, a change of one standard deviation) of the explanatory variable (Asher 1983). Finally, it should be stressed that the effects of explanatory variables can be combined (multiplied) in the postulated model in order to specify indirect effects, mediated through chains of effects of theoretically relevant variables. It is clear that the variable-oriented approach used in the statistical modelling applied in this book only provides interpretations of general correlations and, thus, average effects. In order to indicate case-orientated variations in examined correlation, there is also made frequent use of visual documentation based on a large number of scatter diagrams showing exact positions of each case (i.e. country or its polity) in terms of correlations concerned (see Figure 2 interpreted already in chapter 1 and the scatter diagrams used in this chapter – Figures 3 to 8). These correlation diagrams give exact information about different degrees of magnitude on two variables of individual units in the set of twenty-seven
units of observation. The visual documentation using scatter diagrams makes it possible to identify outliers from general correlation trends and allows to identify subsets in the total set of countries or their polities (see Figure 8 and Table 3).

Finally, it must be noted again that most data used in the complementary cross-national statistical analyses carried out in this book are derived from various recent Eurobarometer surveys. Standard, Special and Flash Eurobarometer surveys are based on samples of resident populations of the twenty-five EU countries, as well as of the former candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania, 15 years of age and older. The basic sample design consists of a multi-stage random procedure and face-to-face interviews. The number of sampling points is drawn with probability proportional to population size (to ensure complete coverage of the country) and to population density (NUTS II regional level). The sample size is 1,000 respondents in each country and 500 respondents in the micro-states Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. In Germany the sample size is 1,500 respondents and in the United Kingdom 1,300 respondents.
3. Differentiation in opposing public opinion on a two-speed European Union (survey 2006)

3.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an interpretation of the current stage of the European differentiated integration process through the lens of public opinion in the twenty-seven countries of the enlarged European Union, concerning the institutional option of a two-speed EU. Clearly, the assumption that public opinion in the various countries is shaped by the societal context of the differentiated integration perspective of the EU27 rather than by the political texts concerning the institutional core-periphery perspective, should be made. In other words, it seems that the differentiation of various socio-economic, political and cultural circumstances, in the set of twenty-seven EU countries, must also be examined to determine whether they have important systematic effects on differences in support for or rejection of the perspective of a multi-speed or two-speed EU. Accordingly, it is necessary to use the opportunity provided by the Eurobarometer surveys, conducted in the EU27. These surveys allow for the comprehensive examination of differences in public opinion on the two-speed EU perspective, in the larger explanatory context of structural economic conditions and public opinion orientations, in the set of twenty-seven countries. The importance of both the inertia of basic mass values and the emerging divisions and uncertainties in public opinion on European differentiated integration, across the enlarged EU, can be indicated. The analysis can also point to emerging complexities concerning the core–periphery patterns in the current organisation of European space.

The EU was enlarged several times prior to 2007 and the political elites and polities of new member states have incrementally brought their diverse cultural orientations, political concerns and legal traditions into the EEC, EC and EU. The whole series of enlargements, which began in 1973, meant long-lasting challenges for the political, economic and cultural cohesion of the institutionally and spatially expanding compact of European states. Chapters 1 and 2 pointed out that the eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 represented a departure from the general rule that EU membership could basically be granted only to relatively wealthy countries and their culturally
largely-modern polities. It is clearly naïve to pursue the idea that the diversity, increased with every successive enlargement, might be accommodated by some simple institutional adaptations to the EU institutional structure and its procedures.

3.2. Differentiation in opinion supporting or opposing a two-speed EU

As discussed in chapter 2, the challenging option of possible further institutionalization of differentiated integration, in the form of a two-speed EU, is one possible route. Figure 9 clearly shows that, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU, significant differences exist in public opinion support or opposition, concerning development towards a two-speed EU that would be based on a core-periphery structure.

Figure 9 shows considerable correlation between net public opinion support for a two-speed EU in the Eurobarometer no. 64 survey, carried out in October and November 2005, and the Eurobarometer no. 66 survey, from
September to October 2006. Differentiation in public opinion on a two-speed EU exhibits significant stability. On the one hand, there are high levels of support in Estonia (ES), Cyprus (CY), Italy (IT) and Czechia (CZ). On the other hand, clearly opposing opinions are found in Eurosceptic Finland (FI), the United Kingdom (UK) and Sweden (SE), as well as in the Institutionalist polities of France (FR), Luxembourg (LU) and Poland (PL), accompanied by the Belgian polity. The range of variation in net support for a two-speed EU is considerable and it is clear that significant opposing public opinion concerning the option of a core-periphery EU structure has been expressed. These differences indicate that any explanation concerning them must be made in the more complex context of an explanatory model, which would incorporate selected, relevant explanatory variables. Significant differences exist in the group of the founding states of the EC/EU. Importantly, there is a low level of support for a two-speed EU in France; while in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, net support is very close to the zero EU level. In terms of the new member states, it appears that great differences are also present in this new periphery of the enlarged EU.

Figure 10 – Net support for two-speed EU in September–October 2006 and number of years of EU membership in 2007 (N = 27). Source: own calculations.
The Eurobarometer no. 66 survey, from September to October 2006, indicated that 40 percent of the total survey sample of 29,152 respondents supported the idea of a two-speed EU, while 42 percent opposed it and 18 percent were undecided. In autumn 2005 (the Eurobarometer no. 64 survey) there were very similar outcomes: 39 percent supporting, 44 percent opposing and 17 percent undecided. Figure 10 shows that polities of the historical core of the EU certainly do not tend to be enthusiastic about the institutional option in question. Only the Italian polity indicates positive net support, amounting to about 20 percent and similar to the support level exhibited by the Czech polity. With the exception of the Bulgarian and the Polish polities, there are net positive support levels in all polities of the new EU periphery. It is interesting to establish that the group of Eurosceptic polities (see Table 3) seems to be divided in its opinion on this issue. On the one hand, clearly negative opinion is articulated by the polities in Finland, the United Kingdom, Sweden and also in the Netherlands; but, on the other, limited support is evident in Denmark, Greece and Austria. Importantly, the French polity indicates considerable opposition to two-speed EU develop-
ment and German public opinion does not appear to give much support to this option.

In short, Figures 9 and 10 suggest the need for a complex explanatory approach. The results also clearly demonstrate the importance of differentiation in opposing public opinion as a dependent variable selected for the postulated explanatory model. Figure 11 provides detailed information on this variable, in terms of the number of years of EU membership. The scatter diagram is clearly an inversion of Figure 10’s diagram, but certain interesting details stand out. Very significant opposing opinions are found in Eurosceptic Finland, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Greece; however, the opposing positions of the Institutionalist polities of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany are also significant. Sufficient support for a two-speed EU, in these countries of the historical core, would be always required for any attempts of forming the EU, in the institutional direction concerned, to proceed.

![Figure 12 - Correlation between levels of opposing opinion concerning a two-speed EU (October–November 2005 and September–October 2006; N = 27). Source: own calculations.](image-url)
Figure 12 shows that there is a close correlation (determination level of 84.5 percent) between the differentiations in opposing opinion concerning the development of a two-speed EU, as monitored by the two surveys. Differentiation, across the set of twenty-seven polities, is very extensive and any changes between autumn 2005 and autumn 2006 appear to be marginal.

3.3. Negative view of globalisation and post-materialist value orientation

When considering political divisions in public opinion on a two-speed EU, across the twenty-seven polities concerned, the changing character of mass value orientations, associated with the shift from an industrial society and its economic system towards a post-industrial society, should also be taken into account. Such changes in mass value orientations are a result of lifestyle shifts, occurring in post-industrial societies, and have important outcomes, in terms of perceptions of an appropriate political agenda for the EU (Giddens 2007). Therefore, it is crucial to understand that perceptions articulated by citizens in present, post-industrial societies tend to be different from the material, survival concerns expressed by industrial societies (Inglehart, Welzel 2005; Dostál 2008; 2010a, pp. 33–38). The so-called post-materialist perceptions, articulated in public opinion in post-industrial societies, with their significantly modified socio-cultural environments, tend to be based less upon the direct experiences of material survival, and much more upon abstract cognitive insights. The worldview is changing, reflecting “a shift in what people want out of life” (Inglehart 1997, p. 8). Moreover, the post-materialist value orientation also tends to shape perceptions of globalisation pressures on populations at local, regional and national levels, as well as at the EU level. Such pressures result in new perceptions of the global system, which is seen as a ‘world risk society’, while the EU is perceived as a ‘regional risk society’ (Beck, Grande 2007; Dostál 2008). Accordingly, the postulated explanatory model in this chapter must incorporate variables capable of indicating such shifts in cultural mass values and political concerns.

It is clear that changing perceptions, regarding the EU’s political agenda, must be seen in the context of a variety of globalisation pressures, which are present throughout the countries in question, due to various economic and social transformations of the current world system (Giddens 2002, 2007; Held et al. 2005). Official documents of the European Commission, such as the March 2000 Lisbon Agenda, have also recognised this trend. Clearly, significant differences in the perception and assessments of various political goals and relevant aspects of globalisation extend from the EU and national political elites to include individual electorates, within the enlarged EU. In light of the changing contexts of current perceptions, concerning the relevant political agenda of the EU, it is logical to assume that differences,
in terms of globalisation, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU, could contribute significantly to explanations of differences in attitudes regarding future political agenda concerned with the institutional option of a two-speed EU and with issues surrounding future environmental, cohesion and regional policies (see chapter 4) as well as with the role of regional and local authorities in the EU regime of spatial development (see chapter 5).

The context of uncertainty and insecurity created by globalisation pressures and expressed in public opinion can be specified through outcomes of Eurobarometer surveys. Table 4 gives the results of principal component analysis that specifies a dimension, based upon opinions concerning five selected aspects of globalisation. The indicators used are answers from Eurobarometer no. 64 based upon fieldwork carried out in October and November 2005. It is a few months after the two referendums held in France and in the Netherlands which rejected the draft of EU constitution.

The results of the principal component analysis clearly indicate that positive loadings on this dimension represent opinions regarding globalisation, which stress anxiety about the socio-economic impacts of globalisation. The highest loading on the component describes the opinion that people tend to be afraid of job transfers to other member states with lower production costs (component loading 0.909). It is significant to point out the very high mean level of this opinion, throughout the EU27 (68.5 percent), indicating that this opinion dominates. The next opinion explicitly says that globalisation leads to the relocation of companies to countries where labour is cheaper (0.903). For this indicator, the mean is significantly lower (31.5 percent), a fact which can convey an interesting message. It seems that polities in some member states do not believe in the existence of lower labour costs in countries, which tend to gain from relocation. The fact that this attitude tends to emphasise tensions in public opinion between the polities in wealthier member states, with higher production costs, and those in the new member

Table 4 – Negative view of globalisation dimension (N = EU27; Standard Eurobarometer 64, fieldwork: October–November 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Component loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Currently afraid of job transfers to other Member States with lower production costs (QA18.8; mean = 68.5%)</td>
<td>0.909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Globalisation leads to the relocation of companies to countries where labour is cheaper (QA55; mean = 31.5%)</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Companies that relocate do so to increase profit (QA57; mean = 69.0%)</td>
<td>0.809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Globalisation brings FDI to our country (QA56; mean = 15.4)</td>
<td>−0.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Net agreement that the EU protects us from the negative effects of globalisation (QA56; mean = −7.5%)</td>
<td>−0.843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: variance represented = 67.4 percent
states, with lower labour cost levels, should be mentioned. The view that relocating companies do so as a means of increasing their profits presents a similar opinion tendency (0.809). The very high mean value (69.0 percent) of this variable indicates that this opinion also dominates. On the other side of the dimension, the negative loading of net opinion recognising the ability of EU policies to protect citizens from the negative effects of globalisation stands out (loading −0.843). However, the mean value is negative (−7.5 percent) indicating that the share of negative answers to this question outweighs the share of affirmative answers. The belief that global economic relations enable the inflow of foreign direct investment into the country in question presents an optimistic view (−0.602). Such opinion seems to express certain confidence in a country’s competitiveness; however, the mean value of this view is low (15.4 percent). It is clear that, based on the pattern of correlated views and their loadings on the specified dimension, the component can be considered a scale, which describes a negative view of globalisation. High scores, among EU countries, on this dimension represent anxiety and uncertainty concerning globalisation pressures (see also Beck, Grande 2007). Low scores indicate more confidence, regarding the current challenges of globalisation processes and their differentiated impacts, across the enlarged EU (see also Dostál 2010a, pp. 36–38). It is important to note that the current EU polities are confronted with two types of globalisation risks (Giddens 2002, 1994, pp. 152–153). First, there are risks arising from ‘fixities’ of nature and societal tradition. Consequently, responses to these ‘known risks’ are easier. Second, there are risks, which arise out of the impacts of knowledge advancements and affect the entire global system, including the natural environment. Mankind has little experience confronting this second type of risks, which include the greenhouse effect or uncertainties surrounding current, globalised financial markets. This type of risks differs significantly from risks that existed in the past. Old risks had well-known causes and predictable effects. The new risks associated with globalisation processes still appear to be often incalculable, in terms of relevant factors and causal mechanisms, and indeterminate, in terms of their societal and territorial impacts (Dostál 2005, pp. 21–22; 2008, pp. 28–32). Considering public opinion, which articulates a negative view of globalisation, these new circumstances must be taken into account. Clearly, differentiation concerning this negative view of globalisation must be incorporated in the postulated explanatory model if the current geo-economic context of attitudes towards EU institutional reforms, such as two-speed institutional development, is to be accurately portrayed.

The same applies to differences, across the enlarged EU, in terms of the shift towards post-materialist value orientations. Differences in the intensity of post-materialist values, across the twenty-seven polities, can also be considered to be important public opinion factors, which have substantial effects on differentiation in public opinion regarding the future institutional
EU agenda in question (see also Dostál 2010a). As emphasised above, the shift toward post-materialism refers to changing mass values and attitudes, which result in the decreasing importance of perceptions of economic survival (i.e. materialism). This is associated with the structural shift from the era of industrialisation to a post-industrial economy and society (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart, Welzel 2005). This change implies increasing existential security, in the circumstances of wealthy economies with advanced welfare state provisions. In the context of this book, emphasis should be given to the fact that the shift towards post-materialist values and associated attitudes results in life priorities of self-expression and quality of life as well as priorities involving environmental concerns. Post-materialist value orientations also imply critical attitudes towards authority, more critical and less easily manipulated political opinions and a critical approach towards European integration processes (Dostál 2008; 2010a, pp. 33–36). It is, therefore, worthwhile to explore and specify the importance of differences in the intensity of the post-materialist value orientation, across the EU of twenty-seven polities. Individuals in wealthy, post-industrial societies who feel relatively secure, in terms of material needs (i.e. economically), and are free to devote attention to concerns, which do not immediately threaten them, tend to develop cognitive insights, producing a risk awareness, in more abstract terms, of a ‘world risk society’. In other words, it seems that, with increasing economic security, one can observe decreasing egocentrism and increasing consciousness regarding environmental uncertainties and the risks of increasing regional inequalities. These socio-cultural tendencies are reflected in changing public opinion in the various post-industrial countries of the global system as well as across the enlarged European Union. A large number of surveys, carried out in western, post-industrial countries, document the shift from materialist, survival value orientations towards post-materialist values, which clearly appear to be more sensitive to alternative political and environmental considerations. “Individual security increases empathy, making people aware of long-term risks. The rise of self-expression values fuels humanistic risk perception. These risk perceptions are fundamentally different from the egocentric threat perceptions that underline survival values” (Inglehart, Wenzel 2005, p. 33). Accordingly, one can claim that the extent, to which post-materialist cultural expressions and perceptions of political and environmental risks and inequalities tend to prevail over materialistic survival values, reflects the level of post-industrial, socio-economic development in a given country (see also Inglehart 1997).

Table 5 presents five indicators, representing typical post-materialist and materialist opinions. These indicators are also derived from Standard Eurobarometer no. 64, which was carried out in the twenty-seven countries in autumn 2005. The structure of principal component loadings clearly shows the presumed distinction between post-materialist and materialist orientations. High positive loadings on the dimension highlight the emphasis given
to the protection of free speech (0.935), demands for more information concerning environmental and nuclear safety policy (0.844) and the EU priority to protect the environment (0.553). On the materialist side of the dimension, substantial negative loadings represent materialist concerns for rising prices (−0.835) and the EU priority to fight unemployment (−0.556). It should be noted that the mean values of the materialist indicators are higher than those of the post-materialist opinion orientation. The 10.1 percent mean describing opinion on the importance of protecting freedom of speech is particularly low.

These differences clearly document that, on the one hand, a shift towards the post-materialist value orientation is actually taking place, but that, on the other hand, this important cultural change is still in its initial stages, in the current EU, as a whole. However, in spite of this recognition, earlier public opinion research indicates that the shift towards the post-materialist value orientation is central to the understanding of differentiations in various other public opinion tendencies, across the enlarged EU (Dostál 2010a). Hence, the component score on this dimension will be used to indicate differences in post-materialist orientations, across the twenty-seven polities.

The correlation between scores on the post-materialism and the negative view of globalisation dimensions, shown in Figure 13, is substantial. A simple Pearson correlation coefficient, measuring their linear relationship, has a value of 0.503, indicating a determination level of 25.3 percent. However, the relationship is not linear, because the most post-materialist polities of Denmark (DK), Sweden (SE) and the Netherlands (NL) do not exhibit maximum levels, in terms of negative view of globalisation. On the other end of the scatter, there are polities indicating less anxiety for globalisation pressure, in light of their articulated levels of post-materialist value orientation, such as the polities of Bulgaria and Romania. Nonetheless, one important message conveyed by this scatter diagram concerns the extreme positions of the German and French polities on the negative view of globalisation dimension. It can be assumed that the opinion of the electorates in these two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Component loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) protecting freedom of speech (QA33a; mean = 10.1%)</td>
<td>0.935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) more informed on environmental and nuclear safety policy (QA22; mean = 26.1%)</td>
<td>0.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) priority of the EU to protecting environment (QA34; mean = 22.2%)</td>
<td>0.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) priority of the EU to fighting unemployment (QA55; 43.7%)</td>
<td>-0.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) fighting rising prices (QA55; mean = 33.1%)</td>
<td>-0.835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: variance represented = 63.6 percent
most influential member states, since the outset of the European integration process, might tend to have significant barrier effects on the policy-making and decision-making of the national political elites in question. It is also significant to note that the Europractical polity of Czechia has the highest score on the post-materialist value orientation dimension of all twelve polities from the new member states.

3.4. Explaining opposing opinion concerning a two-speed European Union

The postulated statistical model, explaining differentiation in opposing public opinion concerning the institutional option of a two-speed EU, across the twenty-seven polities, is presented in Figure 14. The explanatory model includes four structural variables, indicating selected aspects of the socio-economic and political circumstances in the countries concerned. The model
also incorporates four public opinion variables, which describe selected public opinion tendencies that are assumed to have systematic effects, across the set of twenty-seven polities, on the final dependent variable: differentiation in opposing public opinion concerning a two-speed EU (OPPOSING TWO-SPEED EU).

The dependent variable, describing opposing opinion for a two-speed EU, is derived from a Eurobarometer 66 survey question: (QA26.5) “What is your opinion on the speed of building Europe being faster in one group of countries than in the other countries? Please tell whether you are for it or against it.” This dependent variable is determined, in the multiple regression of eight explanatory variables, at a level of 72 percent (Pearson multiple correlation coefficient = 0.891). This determination level allows for the consideration of various, estimated direct or mediated effects, in the postulated model. It appears that the structural variable representing the share of high-tech services in the knowledge industry (in 2006) has a strong positive direct effect (0.52) on the post-materialism measure (the principal component score on the post-
materialism dimension, see Table 5). This effect is represented by a standardised regression coefficient, indicating that a shift of one standard deviation in the explanatory variable causes a shift of 0.52 of one standard deviation in the dependent variable. These standardised regression coefficients (often called Beta coefficients) are independent effects, wherein all other effects are held statistically constant (see methodological remarks in section 2.7.). The strong effect of this structural variable – the share of high-tech services in the knowledge industry – is in accordance with the hypothesis that the occupational structure of post-industrial economies is stimulating a shift towards a post-materialist value orientation (see Inglehart, Welzel 2005; Dostál 2010a). Another important positive effect (0.37) arises out of the tax revenue (in 2006) variable. This structural variable represents differentiation in the intensity of welfare state provisions, across the twenty-seven countries (see Esping-Andersen 2000, Swank 2002). According to the theory about the emergence of post-materialist values, this substantial positive effect was expected. This is due to the fact that advanced welfare states, based on high levels of tax revenue, provide considerable existential security, in post-industrial societies, which is a crucial condition for the emergence of post-materialist value orientations in the polities concerned. The EP seats 2004–7 variable, representing differences in the number of seats in the European Parliament (EP), resulting from the European election of 2004 and the additional 2007 election, in Bulgaria and Romania, exhibits a very low negative effect (−0.16). In light of the confederal-consociational system of the EU, discussed in chapter 2, differences in the number of seats reflect proportions in the population of the twenty-seven polities. Thus, the low negative effect suggests that tendencies towards post-materialist value orientations are more progressive in smaller polities than in larger ones. The last structural variable, representing turnout in the 2004 and 2007 European Parliament elections, shows no systematic effect. Together, the four structural variables determine a relatively high level (65 percent) of the differentiation in post-materialism scores.

Scores on the negative view of globalisation measure are determined by the five variables, at a level of 45 percent. A strong positive effect (0.69) arises out of EP election turnout; suggesting that polities being disciplined and participating in the European elections tend to be anxious about globalisation pressures. The other significant effect (0.56), from the tax revenues 2006 variable, indicates that European polities with more negative views towards globalisation tend to be those in advanced welfare states. The other two structural variables have no systematic independent effects on the negative view of globalisation variable. The next public opinion variable describes differentiation in positive answers to a survey question as to whether respondents expect that an EU constitution will make EU operations more democratic. Considering the overall survey, 65 percent agree, 17 percent disagree and 15 percent are undecided. The determination level of this public opinion variable is lower (33 percent), but interesting direct effects from
the explanatory variables exist. The fact that an EU constitution must be seen as further deepening of the EU integration process should be reiterated (see chapter 2, Table 3). The post-materialism measure shows a strong negative effect (−0.52). This interesting effect indicates the scepticism of polities, with more post-materialist values, towards deepening processes and their potential to democratise the EU (see also Dostál 2010a, pp. 121–141). This effect corresponds with Hix’s claim that, due to the greater cognitive skills of post-materialist electorates, “greater understanding of and information about the EU will lead to greater awareness of its failings and limitations…” (Hix 2005, p. 162). Similar indications of post-materialist Eurocriticism will be identified in the postulated correlation analyses and models presented in chapters 4 and 5. There is also a positive effect (0.33) resulting from the indicator of advanced welfare states. This variable, however, has contradictory effects in the multivariate model. When mediated by the post-materialist measure, it has a negative effect (−0.52 × 0.37 = −0.19) and a similar results occur when the effect of the variable is mediated by the globalisation measure (−0.30 × 0.56 = −0.17). These low negative effects combine to make an aggregate negative effect of −0.36. Next, there is a public opinion variable representing differences in the opinion that “an EU constitution will make EU operations more efficient” (question QA36). Considering the overall survey, 64 percent agree, 20 percent disagree and 16 percent are undecided. This opinion also exhibits a wide range and indicates a very extreme division in public opinion: from 80 percent in the Institutionalist Belgian polity to 17 percent in the Eurosceptic polity of the United Kingdom. The determination level of this public opinion variable is high (81 percent). However, only one substantial independent direct effect (0.83), coming from the opinion variable representing the view that an EU constitution would make the EU more democratic, is present in the model. This convincing outcome of the postulated explanatory model indicates that these two positive views, regarding a constitutional arrangement, strengthen each other and seem to be important in the articulation of reasons for support for further EU deepening (see also Dostál 2010a, pp. 134–137).

Finally, the attention can be turned to the dependent variable, in the postulated explanatory model: differentiation in opposing public opinion concerning a two-speed EU. Table 6 presents all eight direct effects on this variable. A strong positive effect (0.72) arises out of the opinion that an EU constitution would make the EU more efficient. This is an important effect, because it seems to suggest that a key reason to oppose the core-periphery model lies in its assumed incompatibility with more efficient EU operations (see also the discussion in chapter 2). Interestingly, the opinion that an EU constitution would make the EU more democratic has a similar, yet negative, effect (−0.73). This is an interesting outcome, because it suggests that polities supporting the view of a democratic EU constitution also tend to support the institutional option of a two-speed EU, due to its potentially
positive impacts on needed flexible, political and democratic development of the EU, as a whole, and its possible side-effects, such as reducing the well-known democratic deficit of the EU and increasing its already low level of accountability (Hix 2005, pp. 177–180). Next, a strong positive direct effect (0.77) results from the structural variable representing the share of high-tech services in the knowledge industry. This result suggests that there is considerable resistance to a two-speed EU in advanced countries with post-industrial economies. The remaining structural variables have low effects on the dependent variable.

The postulated explanatory model also estimates the crucial and complex effects of the globalisation and post-materialism measures. The globalisation measure has a substantial positive effect (0.56) on opposing opinion concerning a two-speed EU. In addition, a positive effect, mediated by the view of a democratising EU constitution, is also present \((-0.30) \times (-0.73) = 0.22\). The total of these two positive effects is 0.78, suggesting that polities, characterised by considerable anxiety concerning globalisation pressures, tend to oppose the institutional option of a core-periphery EU structure. It also seems that these effects suggest a dominance of economic considerations in the public opinion articulations concerned. The French polity seems to represent this articulation tendency in current public opinion in the enlarged EU. The effects of the post-materialism measure are contradictory. On the one hand, there is a substantial negative effect \((-0.50)\). This effect suggests that more post-materialist polities do not tend to oppose the concept of a two-speed EU, because they tend to approach the concept in terms of flexibility and member state-based political choices. On the other hand, however, a positive effect, mediated through the view of a democratic EU constitution, is also present \((-0.52) \times (-0.73) = 0.38\). This outcome of the postulated model seems also to indicate that doubts, concerning the democratising potential of an EU constitution, tend to result in an opposing perspective regarding the institutional options of a core-periphery EU structure.

Table 6 – Effects of the explanatory variables on differentiation in opposing public opinion concerning a two-speed European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Direct effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Seats in European Parliament (elections 2004 and 2007)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in 2006</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Turnout in European Parliament elections 2004–2007</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) High-tech, knowledge-intensive services in 2006</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Post-materialist orientations in 2005 (PCA score)</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Negative view of globalisation in 2005 (PCA score)</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Opinion EU constitution more democratic (2006)</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Opinion EU constitution more efficient (2006)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations
3.5. Conclusions

From an institutional viewpoint, the fact that the differentiated integration of the European Union (EU) has emerged as a crucial aspect of the institutional and procedural building of the European Economic Community (EEC), European Communities (EC) and later of the EU, should be reiterated (Stubb 1996, Sepos 2005, De Neuve 2007). However, the statistical explanatory analysis in this chapter has shown that there is insufficient public opinion support for a two-speed EU. This is one of the most significant results of the empirical considerations of this book. The postulated explanatory modelling also indicates considerable ambivalence, concerning public opinion perceptions of the potential two-speed development of the EU. In light of the debate in chapter 2 (see also Duff 1998; Wessels 1998; Beck, Grande 2007), it is significant to establish that articulated public opinion, assuming that a constitution will improve the efficiency of the EU, tends to emphasise technical-economic issues and to oppose two-speed development. In contrast, public opinion, assuming that a constitution will make the EU more democratic, tends to reduce opposition to the institutional option of two-speed European integration. These two contradictory effects indicate the ambivalent character of this institutional option, as discussed in detail in chapter 2. It is no exaggeration to state that finding a working relationship between EU integration and differentiation will be a long-term task of the political elites involved, a task which must certainly include a mission to mobilise sufficient electoral support for such a relationship, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU. The slow political process of turning inwards, involving a smaller number of member states, whose political elites believe in closer integration, could then continue. Such a political process is clearly already represented in the creation of the inner circle of the euro-zone. However, this slow and gradual trajectory of the future European integration process would also require, in any case, additional support in the form of stronger positive public opinion feedback from the polities to the governing political elites involved. Without such increased public support for the institutional option of a two-speed EU, any further progress in the formation of a ‘pioneering’ inner core group and a broader group of member states, remaining in the periphery of the current confederal consociational system of twenty-seven or more states, can scarcely be imagined. Another central conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that a strong and integrative sense of larger European community as envisaged by Deutsch at al. (1957, p. 36) and other observers of unifying and fragmenting tendencies in Europe (Musil 1994; Sinnott 1995; Westle 1995; Giddens 2007; or Beck, Grande 2007), is yet to emerge in public opinion of the enlarged European Union, which, however, is inevitably confronted with the increasing diversity of its members.
4. Differentiation in public opinion on future environmental and regional policies of the European Union (surveys 2007 and 2008)

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents analyses of tendencies in current public opinion concerning issues surrounding future environmental policies and regional and cohesion policies, across the twenty-seven polities of the European Union. The analyses indicate public opinion and mass interest articulations of national electorates and can contribute to a better understanding of these EU policies. To reiterate, public opinion and mass interest articulations of national electorates tend to form positive or negative feedbacks, which often imply barrier effects for the policy-making and decision-making of governing political elites of the democratic countries involved. The economic and social transformations associated with the current development of post-industrial societies have resulted in new challenges for environmental policies and regional and cohesion policies (see also Dostál 2010b), in the EU. In a Green Paper on territorial cohesion (Territorial Cohesion: Turning territorial diversity into strength, October 2008), the European Commission recognised that “many of the problems faced by territories cut across sectors and effective solutions require an integrated approach and cooperation between the various authorities and stakeholders involved. In this respect, the concept of territorial cohesion builds bridges between economic effectiveness, social cohesion and ecological balance, putting sustainable development at the heart of policy design” (2008, p. 3). In light of this recently declared integrated territorial approach, the new challenges of future environmental policies and regional and cohesion policies are mutually considered in this chapter.

Environmental policy-making was a latecomer to the policy agenda of European integration and has seen gradual increases in importance since the 1970s. Since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) has primarily been driven by quantitative considerations for building the common market, with little attention given to its qualitative aspects (McCornick 2001). In 1987, the Single European Act confirmed that environmental management was one of the formal policy goals of the European integration process. The environment is now one of
the primary policy interests of the EU. The Single European Act instituted an explicit legal basis, upon which environmental protection could operate. However, internal market measures were to be determined through qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. Measures concerning environmental protection required the unanimity of all member states. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty listed the environment as a key policy goal of the EU and extended qualified majority voting to environmental policy-making, while also strengthening the role of the European Parliament in this sector of policy-making (Dinan 2005).

Regional and cohesion policy-making is also one of the primary policy interests of the EU. It is concerned with the reduction of economic and social disparity between wealthier and poorer regions (Molle 2007). It is founded on the conviction that such disparities threaten the integrity of the single market and are incompatible with the ideals of community and solidarity. The European Regional Development Fund was established in 1975. The Mediterranean enlargements (Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986) provided motivation for a quest for regional and social cohesion. Significantly, the 1987 Single Market Act also included a section on economic and social cohesion and committed to reduce disparities between the various regions and to increase the socio-economic levels of less-developed nations (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal). Within the territory of the European Community of twelve member states, increasing regional differences had a north-south pattern, with Ireland forming a western periphery. The Single Market Act recognized that excessive disparities between member states and regions could cause poorer member states to block European legislation and impede the implementation of various policies within the single market programme (Hix 2005). Partnership between decision-makers in core institutions of the EU, national governments and regional self-governments and administrations, along with representatives of labour unions, local business associations, and social action groups, has become one of the key principles of cohesion and regional policy (Bachtler, McMaster 2008). Cohesion and regional policies have allocated considerable funds and the principles of programming, implementation, monitoring and control have been characterised by increasing organisational complexity (Molle 2007).

The costs of cohesion in the enlarging EU have led to questions regarding the future, as well as the considerable costs of regional policies in the EU15, and have changed perceptions of this sector of policy-making (Baldwin, Wyplosz 2006). The nature of attitudes towards environmental challenges has changed significantly, since the beginning of the new millennium. Differences in socio-economic development among member states and regions, along with differences in environmental quality, are associated with differences in national legislative responses to problems concerning cohesion and regional development and the environment. Such differences have increased with the successive EU enlargements. In particular, the large May 2004
enlargement, with ten new countries, and the January 2007 enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania) resulted in significant increases to regional and environmental disparities, in the EU. The EU’s previous north-south gap showed a strong decreasing tendency; however, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements introduced a new east-west gap, i.e. significant disparities between the fifteen old member states and the twelve new member states. Therefore it is not too surprising that these increased disparities also tend to be reflected in significant differences in public opinion articulations, across the polities of the EU of twenty-seven member states.

Questions arise as to whether public opinion differences represent important political divisions, across the enlarged EU, in terms of the future orientations of environmental, cohesion and regional policies. Considering political divisions in public opinion among the countries involved, it is also necessary to take the changing character of mass value orientations, associated with the shift from an industrial society and economic system towards a post-industrial society, into account (see also chapters 2 and 3). To reiterate, changes in mass value orientations result from current lifestyle shifts and have significant outcomes, in terms of perceptions regarding relevant EU political agenda, concerning environmental, regional and cohesion policies (Giddens 2007). Therefore, the fact that the perceptions of environmental issues and issues of regional disparities, articulated by citizens in current post-industrial societies, tend to differ from the material, survival concerns of industrial societies, should be pointed out again (Inglehart, Welzel 2005; Dostál 2010b). The post-materialist perceptions, articulated in public opinion in the post-industrial societies, with their significantly modified environments, tend to be based less upon direct experience with material economic survival, but much more upon abstract cognitive insights. Moreover, as emphasised in chapter 3, the post-materialist value orientation also tends to be shaped by the impacts of globalisation pressures on populations at local, regional and national levels as well as at the EU level. Such pressures result in new perceptions of the global system, in terms of a ‘world risk society’, while the EU is perceived as a ‘regional risk society’ (Beck, Grande 2007; Dostál 2010a). Post-materialist value orientations also imply critical attitudes towards authority, more critical and less easily manipulated political opinion and a critical approach towards European integration processes.

These theoretical and empirical considerations indicate that, on the one hand, a shift towards the post-materialist value orientation is taking place, but also that, on the other hand, this important cultural change is still in its initial stages, when considering the current EU as a whole (see chapter 3). However, in spite of this, earlier public opinion research has indicated that the transition towards the post-materialist value orientation is a key factor in understanding differences in a variety of other public opinion tendencies, across the enlarged EU (Dostál 2010a). The analyses carried out in this chapter describe major divisions in public opinion articulations and indicate
some uncertainties and risks, resulting from insufficient public opinion support for the EU policy agenda, in some member states of the enlarged EU. The data analysed in this chapter are derived from the results of recent public opinion surveys (i.e. Standard, Specific or Flash Eurobarometer surveys), organised by the European Commission.

The main structure of this chapter is as follows. First, systematic differentiations in public opinion, concerning the orientation of future environmental policies, across the EU27, are presented. Second, differentiations in opinion on the future orientation of regional and cohesion policies are identified. Third, an explanatory correlation analysis is carried out. It uses differentiation in the negative view of globalisation (see Table 4) and in the post-materialist value orientation (see Table 5) along with two additional structural variables (GDP per capita in PPS and the number of years of EU membership) to explore existing public opinion divisions, concerning future environmental, regional and cohesion policies, across the enlarged EU. Finally, the last section presents major conclusions from the analyses.

4.2. Public opinion on future environment policies

The character of debates on environmental challenges has changed considerably, since the beginning of the millennium (Antrop 2008). The shift toward post-materialist values is bringing change in the political agenda, throughout post-industrial and advanced industrial societies. Since 2000, political agenda has moved away from a focus on economic growth, at any price, towards considerations of the environmental costs of economic growth (Stern 2007). Consequently, in member states and at the EU level, economic issues are increasingly forced to share the political spotlight with issues that were less visible a generation ago. Giddens argues that the policy area, in which “Europe could lead the world is the further development of ecological modernisation. It is possible that rather than further reducing competitiveness, the development of new ecological technologies – just as important, styles of life – could be a spur to its renewal” (2007, p. 187). Giddens has also pointed out that important environmental issues are beset with risks that remain incalculable, in terms of relevant actors and causal mechanisms, and indeterminate, in terms of societal and territorial impacts (Giddens 2002, Dostál 2005).

Table 7 presents the results of a principal component analysis of seven selected indicators. The indicators are derived from the Special Eurobarometer no. 295 survey, entitled ‘Attitudes of European citizens towards the environment’, which is based on fieldwork carried out in November and December 2007. The analysis indicates that a major portion of the correlations between the indicators (62.8 percent of total variance of the seven variables) can be represented by two orthogonal (i.e. not correlated or additive) components.
The first component could be described as a dimension representing concerns about climate change (34 percent of the total variance of the seven variables). The highest positive loading on the dimension describes the answer that, when one is talking about environment, he or she thinks first about climate change (loading 0.904). The second highest loading describes an affirmative answer that respondents are worried about climate change (0.771). On the opposing pole of the dimension, significant negative loadings (−0.691 and −0.646, respectively) describe variables indicating the importance attributed to air pollution and to the pollution of towns and cities. This loading structure clearly documents a polarisation between more abstract considerations of climate change, on the one hand, and the more specific concerns with air pollution and local pollution levels in towns and cities, on the other. Significantly, the mean level of worrying about climate change is relatively high (55.9 percent).

The second component shall be called landscapes and disasters. This dimension represents nearly 27 percent of the total variation of the correlation matrix for the selected indicators. The highest positive loading on this component describes the answer that, when one is talking about environment, he or she thinks first about green and pleasant landscapes (loading 0.781). The second highest loading describes an affirmative answer that respondents are worried about natural disasters – earthquakes, floods (Q3; mean = 32.9%). A positive response, indicating that people are worried about water pollution – seas, rivers or underground water, has a similar, high loading (0.703). The mean level of association of the environment with green pleasant landscapes is
lower (14.7 percent), but the other two indicators represent higher average levels of environmental concerns (32.9 and 47.4 percent). The outcomes of the principal component analysis document the significance of the two dimensions, in current public opinion, articulated on environmental issues. Scores on the first dimension indicate more abstract concerns with climate change and global warming, across the twenty-seven polities. Addressing the problems of climate change and global warming certainly demands EU-wide and, particularly, world-wide collaboration. It seems that public opinion orientations, which consider climate change and global warming to be crucial environmental concerns, tend to perceive the current EU as a ‘regional risk society’, which should develop political agenda that would be effective in the even wider context of the global system (see Beck, Grande 2007). In contrast, perceptions represented by the second component seem to be more concrete and contextual and are, primarily, locally and regionally constituted.

4.3. Public opinion on future regional and cohesion policies

The Lisbon Agenda conveyed the importance of issues surrounding the economic and social disparities among member states and among regions. Over the long period of the European integration process, from 1973 to 2007, the EC and EU underwent six successive enlargements. The level of economic and social inequalities, both among member states and regions, increased initially, due to each enlargement. However, as emphasised earlier in this book, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have substantially increased regional inequalities, across the EU (Molle 2007). The structural, regional and cohesion funds are the primary EU resources available for mitigating the problems of disparities among member states and regions. The funds contribute to economic and social development in the regions and member states involved. The accession of the twelve new member states in 2004–2007 did not result in increased budget contributions from the wealthier old member states. Among other things, this could mean that the reduction of disparities between regions and member states will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, it is not too surprising that the European Commission also published Flash Eurobarometer no. 234, entitled ‘Citizen’s perceptions of EU regional policy’, based on fieldwork carried out in January 2008. The survey attempted to identify current differences in public opinion on future orientations of regional and cohesion policies, across the enlarged EU.

Table 8 presents the outcomes of another principal component analysis involving ten selected indicators. The three rotated components combine to represent 70 percent of the total variation of the chosen variables. These variables indicate what respondents consider to be priorities, important for their city or region. Respondents could choose from ten priorities. The indicators
are calculated as net positive opinions, i.e. negative answers are subtracted from positive answers. The first component shall be labelled the innovation dimension, because it represents correlations between opinions, prioritising EU regional policies orientated at economic organisational innovation. The highest loading on this component describes the priority of research and innovation (0.847). The priority given to support for small businesses has the second highest loading (0.845). A high loading, describing the priority of environment and risk prevention follows (0.730). Additional less significant loadings represent the priority of energy infrastructure and a sustainable energy supply and the priority of employment training (0.593 and 0.519, respectively). Interestingly, the priority given to environment and risk prevention has the highest mean level (77.3 percent) of these five variables.

The second component shall be called welfare, because it represents correlations between priorities, focusing on the maintenance of welfare state provisions and the importance of national and regional decision-making. The highest loading describes positive opinion on the right to decide about strategies and projects of EU regional policies in member states and regions.

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**Table 8 – Three rotated components of public opinion on orientations of regional and cohesion policies (N = 27; Flash Eurobarometer 234, fieldwork: January 2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Component 1 INNOVATION</th>
<th>Component 2 WELFARE</th>
<th>Component 3 INFRASTRUCTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) research and innovation (Q6C) mean = 38.4%</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>-0.252</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) support for small businesses (Q6F) mean = 59.8%</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) environment and risk prevention (Q6E) mean = 77.3%</td>
<td>0.730</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) transport – rails, roads and airports (Q6A) mean = 53.6%</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) information, communication technologies (Q6D) mean = 30.7%</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) energy, sustainable infrastructure (Q6B) mean = 48.8%</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) decisions EU projects in MS and regions (Q7) mean = 67.0%</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) employment training (Q6G) mean = 61.1%</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) involvement of local BA and TU (Q8) mean = 74.3%</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) education, health and social infrastructure (Q6H) mean = 82.0%</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Rotation method is varimax with Kaiser normalisation; Total variance represented by the three components is 70 percent

(0.745). The priority of employment training has the second highest loading (0.698). Positive opinion on the obligation of member states and regions to involve local business associations and trade unions, in considering equal opportunities and the institutional environment, has a similar loading (0.690). The last significant loading on this component is associated with the priority of education, health and social infrastructure (0.670). Significantly, all four of these opinion variables have high mean levels. In particular, the mean of the priority of education, health and social infrastructure is very high (82 percent). This implies that this opinion orientation represents very significant perceptions, concerning necessary, future regional and cohesion policies. The third component is labelled *infrastructure*, because it tends to represent opinion, prioritising various sorts of technical and social infrastructural policies. The highest loading on the dimension describes the priority of better transport facilities, ranging from railways and roads to airports (0.925). Other significant loadings are lower and include priorities concerning information and communication technologies (0.601), education, health and social infrastructure (0.542), and energy infrastructure and sustainable energy supply (0.525). It is clear that this component also implicitly represents systematic opinion articulations, regarding EU policy-making in transportation, communication and social affairs (Molle 2007).

### 4.4. Correlations between principal component scores and other variables

Further explanatory analysis in this chapter is based upon a correlation matrix of explanatory and dependent variables (see Table 9). In the preceding sections, some possible factors and public opinion tendencies have been suggested to contribute to an explanation of the systematic differences in the perceptions of environmental issues, specified above, and the priorities of future EU regional and cohesion policies. Table 9 presents correlations (Pearson correlation coefficients), across the twenty-seven member states, between two structural explanatory variables (GDP per capita in purchasing power standards in 2006 and the number of years of EU membership in 2007) and scores on the seven dimensions of public opinion, determined through the principal component analyses in the preceding sections. As previously indicated, following earlier theoretical considerations, scores from the specified dimensions of negative view of globalisation and post-materialist value orientation will also be used here as explanatory variables. The correlations shown in Table 9 clearly demonstrate that some estimated relationships are substantial and interesting, in light of earlier theoretical considerations. Obviously, no correlations exist between the fifth and sixth dependent variables and among the seventh, eighth and ninth dependent variables, because these two groups of component scores come from uncor-
related versions of the principle component analyses, summarized in Tables 7 and 8. The relationships shown in Table 9 seem to allow for the following interpretations to be made.

First, it is no surprise that the GDP variable and the number of years of EU membership variable exhibit a significant correlation (a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.68), because the economies of older member states still have higher levels of aggregate economic performance per inhabitant (Baldwin, Wypolsz 2006). However, substantial positive correlations (0.54 and 0.55, respectively) exist between the GDP variable and scores on the negative view of globalisation and the post-materialism dimensions. Thus, it is clear that concerns about globalisation pressures and the post-materialist value orientation are more intensive, in public opinion articulated in the wealthier member states. It is also interesting to establish that the globalisation measure is more closely related to the years of EU membership (0.54) than is the post-materialism measure (0.43). This means that anxiety and concerns about globalisation are more dominant in the perceptions of electorates in the older member states. It is also interesting to note that correlation between scores on the globalisation measure and the post-materialism measure is significant (0.50), but at a lower level than other correlations of theoretical importance, in Table 9.

Second, more abstract concerns for climate change and global warming (see Table 9) were expected to be related to the post-materialist value orientation. This hypothesis is clearly sustained by the high positive correlation (0.69) between the two measures (see Figure 15). The fact that all polities of the new member states tend to articulate low levels of concern about climate change should also be noted. A significant correlation (0.66) also exists between these concerns and the globalisation measure. The scatter diagram in Figure 15 also suggests that an important relationship exists between concern for climate change and the number of years of EU membership.
However, this correlation (0.39) is much lower, primarily due to the outlying positions of public opinion in Sweden (SE) and Denmark (DK). There is a higher correlation (0.56) with the GDP variable, indicating that concern for climate change is more intensive in public opinion of the wealthier member states (see also Giddens 2009).

Third, Table 9 also shows significant negative correlations. A strong negative correlation (−0.62) exists between the score on the landscape and disaster dimension and the number of years of EU membership. Figure 16 shows a more complex negative correlation, documenting the clear dominance of the public opinion cleavage between public opinion in the new member states, on the one hand, and opinion in the old member states, on the other (see also Dostál 2010b). The scatter diagram displays the extreme positions of Cyprus (CY) and Greece (GR), where certain environmental circumstances (earthquakes, extensive woodland fires, etc.) clearly shape current perceptions of landscapes and natural disasters.

Finally, there are correlations between scores on the three components of articulated opinions regarding the priorities of regional and cohesion
policies and the explanatory variables and scores on the two environmental components. It appears that public opinion, represented by the innovation component, tends to be more intensive in wealthier countries (correlation of 0.38) and older member states (correlation of 0.44). Interestingly, public opinion represented by the welfare component tends to show a number of negative correlations: with the GDP variable (-0.34), the globalisation measure (-0.42), the post-materialism measure (-0.65), and the climate change component (-0.57). These negative relationships suggest that this continuously important opinion orientation (see the high mean levels of the indicators involved, in Table 8) concerning the maintenance of welfare state provisions and services and the role and obligations of national and regional authorities, in projects of EU regional policies, tends to be intensive in poorer and newer member states, with electorates that are less concerned about globalisation and follow largely materialistic value orientations. The clear negative correlation (-0.57) with scores on the dimension representing more abstract concerns with climate change and global warming is also in accordance with the dominance of materialistic perceptions, which tend not
to associate environmental issues and regional inequalities with the characteristics of a ‘world risk society’. Similar negative correlations characterise the relationships of scores on the infrastructure component, which describes priorities focusing on technical and social infrastructural policies. However, these negative correlations are not high. An interesting low positive correlation (0.37) exists between this infrastructure component and the landscape and disaster component, indicating an association with environmental perceptions that characterise public opinion, in the new member states.

4.5. Conclusions

It appears that these articulated public opinion differences represent important political cleavages concerning the future orientations of environmental policies and cohesion and regional policies, across the enlarged EU. It is also clear that the shift from an industrial society towards a post-industrial society continues to result in ongoing lifestyle shifts and to have important outcomes, in terms of current perceptions regarding relevant EU political agenda. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that current perceptions of environmental issues and issues of regional disparities, articulated by citizens in post-industrial societies, tend to be different from the material survival concerns of industrial societies. The correlation analysis carried out in this chapter also suggests that post-materialist perceptions, articulated in public opinion from post-industrial societies, tend to be based less upon direct experience of material survival, but much more upon abstract cognitive insights. People’s worldview is changing, reflecting changes in what they want out of life. Moreover, the articulated perceptions, concerning environmental issues and regional and cohesion policies, also tend to be shaped by impacts of perceptions regarding globalisation pressures on populations at local, regional and national levels as well as at the EU level. Such pressures result in new perceptions of the global system, in terms of a ‘world risk society’. It seems that these tendencies are, in part, reflected in public opinion orientations that view climate change and global warming as crucial environmental concerns and perceive the current EU as a ‘regional risk society’, which should develop political agenda that can be effective in the even broader context of the global system. In contrast, perceptions represented by the landscape and disasters component seem to be more specific and contextual and are locally and regionally constituted. The three components of public opinion regarding the orientation of regional and cohesion policies document a complex pattern that suggest more conservative value orientations and perceptions in industrial societies than in the post-industrial societies. The public opinion orientation on research and innovation, including small businesses, or the orientation on environment and risk prevention, tends to articulate public opinion which fits with the emerging post-industrial era.
This is due to the fact that dominant public opinion, concerning future regional and cohesion policy-making, focuses on maintaining established welfare state services and the role and obligations of national and regional authorities in EU regional policy projects (see also chapter 5). Such public opinion tends to be more dominant in poorer and newer member states, with polities which are less concerned about globalisation and which can also be largely characterised by materialist value orientations from the old industrial society. A public opinion cleavage seems to be emerging between the polities of the older and wealthier historical core of the European Union and the polities of the new member states, which are seemingly less aware of the global context, in which EU environmental and cohesion policies must take place, considering the global nature of environmental problems and the territorial risks of global competition.
5. Differentiation in public opinion on regional and local authorities in the European Union (survey 2008)

5.1. Introduction

This chapter examines differentiation in public opinion concerning the representation of regional and local authorities, in the enlarged EU. In the EU of twenty-seven countries, there are nearly three hundred programming or administrative and self-governmental regions and ninety-two thousand municipalities. Territorial interests of numerous regional and local authorities are supposed to be represented in the confederal consociational system of the EU by the Committee of the Regions (CoR), among other things. The Committee of the Regions is a political assembly, which gives the EU system of institutions and procedures a certain voice in debates on issues of spatial development, across regions and local communities (Hooghe, Marks 1996). The Committee has only advisory powers and one of its important competencies is to monitor whether the policy-making and implementation of policies satisfy the principle of subsidiarity. The principle means devolving decision-making down to the most appropriate level of government. In the EU institutional context, it means that decision-making can be taken away for the level of European Commission, and shifted to levels of national government authorities, or lower to regional and local authorities. This principle has been included in the system, ever since the 1993 Treaty on European Union entered into force, and does not entail shift of competencies, but rather how they should be exercised. There is a commitment, according to the subsidiarity principle, that decisions be made as closely as possible to the citizens (Dinan 2005, Hix 2005). This concerns primarily the balance of power between EU institutions (in particular the European Commission) and member-state authorities. Interestingly, in terms of the differentiated integration process of the EU, the subsidiarity principle can be applied in a variety of ways in federal or unitary member states (Hooghe, Marks 1996, pp. 75–76; Christiansen 1996). It could also be applied in different ways if institutional development were to be more oriented towards the trajectory of a two-speed EU, with significant differences between EU, national and regional levels of decision-making for a ‘pioneering’ core group of member states and a peripheral group of the remaining member states.
Flash Eurobarometer survey no. 307 (entitled “The role and impact of local and regional authorities within the European Union. Opinions on the different levels of public authorities and awareness of the Committee of the Region”), carried out in October and November 2008, makes analysis of existing differences in the articulations of public opinion concerned with perceptions of EU, national and regional/local levels of public authorities, across the twenty-seven EU polities, possible. It also enables one to discern existing differences in public awareness of the CoR. Accordingly, the next section provides a concise overview of the institutionalisation of the CoR. The next section summarises the long-lasting debate on changing the balance of power between EU and national levels of decision-making and so-called “third level” of regional or local authorities, concerned with spatial development and regional and cohesion policies. These brief overviews are followed by a statistical analysis of significant tendencies in the articulations of public opinion, as recorded by the survey.

5.2. Institutionalisation of the Committee of the Regions

The institutionalisation of the role of regional and local authorities and the articulation of sub-national territorial interests in the EU has been a long process, extending through nearly three decades. The European Commission set up the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities (CCLRA), in 1988, within the framework of a new regional policy regime (Hooghe 1995; Hooghe, Marks 1996; Christiansen 1996). Members of the CCLRA were appointed by the Assembly of European Regions (AER) and the Council for European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), the two primary European sub-national associations. In 1991, the European Commission proposed the institutionalisation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The European Commission envisaged such a committee’s role to include advising the Council of Ministers and the European Commission on regional and spatial development policy-making and relevant legislation. The twelve member states included a provision to establish an advisory committee, consisting of representatives of regional and local authorities from the member states, in the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU). The CoR’s inaugural meeting was held in March 1994. In terms of nation-state representation, the CoR is identical to the older Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and also has 222 members. CoR representatives are appointed unanimously by the Council of Ministers, based on proposals from the member states, for a four-year term. Each national government uses its own specific criteria, but CoR representatives represent regional and local authorities as well as national associations of municipalities. The Council of Ministers and the European Commission must consult the CoR regarding a wide range of policy-making in all policy sectors, which have implications for European
economic and social cohesion, such as regional disparities, economic and social inequalities, social welfare policies, education and culture, transport and communication, and environment or energy. The Council of Ministers and the European Commission can enforce a one-month time limit for the submission of a CoR opinion. The CoR may also issue its own opinions, if it concludes that some specific regional interests are involved. In brief, formal powers of the CoR are consultative.

Chapter 4 considered a similarly broad range of issues, in terms of public opinion concerning future policy-making in the sector of EU regional and cohesion policies. Such considerations also involve the interests of the CoR in territorial polities, across the EU. Despite assertive leadership, in terms of its advisory powers, the CoR fulfils a limited role, because its formal powers are consultative. Moreover, its composition is too heterogeneous for it to become a key player at the real core of EU multi-level governance. Initially, the European Parliament (EP) seemed to be unhappy about CoR’s establishment and expressed some concerns about its dealings with the EP (Hix 2005). Consequently, in the multi-level articulation process of territorial interests in the EU, the CoR is at the heart of multi-level governance, but does not play a decisive role. It should be noted that the European Commission wished to increase the involvement of sub-national interests in the initiation, adoption and implementation of regional and cohesion policies. The so-called partnership between the European Commission and regional authorities became a primary relationship in issues related to regional and cohesion policies. Regional authorities were invited to submit applications for funding to the European Commission. It seems that changes in programming and implementation tended to strengthen the actual powers of the European Commission in the multi-level EU regime.

5.3. The changing balance between the EU level and the national level

Therefore, it is not too surprising that creation of the CoR must be viewed in the context of the debate between ‘denationalisation’ and ‘renationalisation’ in EU policy-making on regional and cohesion policies. Bachtler and Méndez (2007) examined the various policy stages, from 1988 up to the debate concerning the 2007–2013 period. They made a longitudinal analysis of how decisions regarding the spatial and sectoral allocation of funding were made, during four separate periods (1989–1993, 1994–1999, 2000–2006 and 2007–2013). Bachtler and Méndez focused particularly on spatial concentration (i.e. the spatial coverage of EU funding; where was the money spent?) and on programming (how was it spent?). Considering these two questions, they were interested in the two high-priority principles, for both the European Commission and the member states, and they were able to analyse diverging preferences and political tensions, between these sets of
actors. Under the 1988 reform, the European Commission created a list of eligible regions, using EU-wide criteria for the first time and narrowly focusing the policy within the European spatial and thematic scheme, which did not necessarily coincide with the domestic, regional objectives of all member states. This shift in policy making was described in political and scholarly debates as ‘denationalisation’. The 1994 changes reconsidered funds for the 1994–1999 period and amended the list of eligible regions, providing more flexibility in the criteria application and allowing member states to propose eligible areas. In 1999, regional and cohesion policy was reconsidered, once again, as part of budget negotiations and the adaptation of policy priorities for the 2000–2006 period. Some observers of the changing policies, during these two periods, recognised a certain degree of ‘renationalisation’ in EU policy-making on regional and cohesion policies, based upon the increasing ability of individual member states to shape the policy developments and area designation (Bachtler, Méndez 2007). In 2005 and 2006, another reform of the area designation system for the 2007–2013 period occurred. Three new priority objectives were outlined: convergence, regional competitiveness and employment. The last two of these priorities became the responsibility of the various member states.

Analysing the four stages of reform, from 1988 to 2006, in detail, Bachtler and Méndez (2007, pp. 556–557) draw a number revealing conclusions. First, considering the spatial concentration principle, area designation decision-making indicated the ability of the European Commission to allocate two-thirds of all funding to the least-developed EU countries and regions, regardless of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and considerable pressure from the member states. Although member state influence increased over time, EU designation and eligibility criteria remained predominant, from 1989 to 2006. Second, in terms of programming the influence of the European Commission was also decisive in each of the four periods, due to the fact that “the Commission has been able to negotiate modifications to programme strategies, in some case involving major changes to the policy choices, strategic priorities and delivery mechanisms of Member States” (2007, p. 556). Third, Bachtler and Méndez argue that the set of twenty-seven member states is certainly not a homogeneous group. While groups of member states share the European Commission’s views on certain problems, other member states oppose these views. “Final collective decisions may deviate significantly from the preferred policy option of individual Member States. ... There is inadequate understanding of the sophistication of the interplay of the key actors and insufficient appreciation of how this interplay varies at different stages of the cohesion policy design/implementation process.” Finally, they claim that “the role of national governments relative to the European Commission has been exaggerated” (2007, p. 558). The fact that the European Commission wanted to create the CoR as an institutional vehicle that could be used as a body that would provide contacts at regional and local levels,
in the member states, effectively bypassing the national governments should be reiterated (Hix 2005, pp. 220–223).

5.4. Explaining perceptions of EU, national and regional/local levels

These developments and the associated analytical claims of a number of scholars provide this chapter with an indispensable context for the explanations of articulated public opinion, concerning the roles of authorities at the EU level, the national level and the regional/local level. The data used to construct the postulated explanatory model are primarily derived from Special Eurobarometer survey no. 307, carried out in the period of 6th October – 6th November 2008. This survey is entitled “The role and impact of local and regional authorities within the European Union. Opinion on the different levels of public authorities and awareness of the Committee of the Regions”. The aggregate results are based upon a representative sample of 26,618 respondents. Each EU country is represented by a sample of one thousand respondents. In the member ‘micro-states’ of Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus, samples of 500 respondents were used.

5.4.1. Trust in the national level and hesitant trust in the EU level

The first task in constructing a suitable explanatory statistical model (see Figure 19) is to identify existing systematic differences in public opinion, concerning trust in region/local authorities, national authorities and EU authorities. The results of the statistical explorations specify the differences in the key dependent variables that shall be examined in the postulated multivariate model.

Table 10 presents the results of a principal component analysis of the correlation matrix of seven variables. The first (unrotated) component represents 41.07 percent of the total variance of the seven selected indicators. The highest component loading (0.857) on the dimension describes trust in national government. The mean value of this variable, in the set of twenty-seven polities (N = 27), is 38.1 percent. This variable presents the answer to the question: “please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust the national government”. Answers to the question: “representatives of the different levels of public authorities, European level, national level and regional or local level, are all present in the European institutions. From the following political representatives, which ones are best placed in European institutions?” which indicate the national level, have the second highest loading (0.749). The opinion that the national authorities level has the most impact on respondents’ life conditions (the mean value of this opinion is 47.1 percent) presents the third highest loading (0.706) on the component. The variable trust in regional and local authorities also has a substantial
Table 10 – Trust in national level dimension (FEB no. 307, October–November 2008), N = 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Component loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) trust in national government (QA12.4), mean = 38.1%</td>
<td>0.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) your national political representatives are best placed in European institutions (QH3.1), mean = 30.1%</td>
<td>0.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) national level has most impact on your life conditions (QH1), mean = 47.1%</td>
<td>0.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) trust in regional and local authorities (QA12.3), mean = 50.0%</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) regional/local authorities sufficiently taken into account when deciding policies in the EU (QH2), mean = 20.5%</td>
<td>0.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) your regional/local representative are best placed in European institutions (QH3.1), mean = 18.0%</td>
<td>-0.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) regional and local levels have most impact on your life conditions (QH1), mean = 34.2%</td>
<td>-0.459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: variance represented = 41.07 percent
Source: FEB no. 307, October–November 2008; own calculations

Figure 17 – Trust in the national level of authorities and representatives and number of years of EU membership (October–November 2008; N = 27). Source: own calculations.
loading (0.698) on the dimension and a higher mean value of 50 percent. A lower positive loading (0.488) describes the opinion that regional and local authorities are sufficiently taken into account, when deciding policies in the EU. This variable has a low mean value of 20.5 percent, but it still suggests an association between the strong emphasis on the importance of the national level, represented by the three highest loadings, and this specific opinion, indicating a lower level of significance attributed to regional and local authorities in the EU context. This empirical conclusion is further supported by the two negative loadings (−0.380 and −0.459) indicating polarisation of opinion between the trust, importance and capacities, associated with the national level in contrast to that associated with the regional and local authorities level. In light of the debate between the ‘denationalisation’ and renationalisation’ of the EU regional and cohesion policy regime, summarised above, this polarisation in opinion has been selected as the key dependent variable in the postulated explanatory model (see Figure 19).

On the other hand, low levels of trust in national authorities are found in the new member states of Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czechia and Latvia. It seems that the polities in this group of new member states systematically lack sufficient confidence in the capacities of their national governments. Low scores in Italy, the United Kingdom and Portugal can also be understood from this perspective.

The other empirical question to be considered is whether a similar component, representing differences in trust and capacities in the EU level authorities, can be derived. Table 11 presents the results of a principal component analysis, based upon the correlation matrix of five indicators. The component represents 51.6 percent of the total variation of the five variables. The two highest loadings on the dimension describe the need to be more informed about the CoR (loading 0.942) and about the CoR representatives of the polities concerned (0.919). These very high loadings suggest that the communication practices of the CoR are insufficient and that there is a low level of awareness concerning its activities, within the nation-states concerned. A tendency to trust the EU level is also represented (0.620). Similarly, lower

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Component loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) more information on CoR (QH5.1), mean = 56.1%</td>
<td>0.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) more information on your CoR representatives (QH5.1), mean = 57.3%</td>
<td>0.919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) trust in EU (QA12.6), mean = 53.3%</td>
<td>0.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) EU level has most impact on your life conditions (QH1), mean = 9.6%</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) your MEPs are best placed in European institutions (QH3.1), mean = 28.7%</td>
<td>0.463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: variance represented = 51.587 percent
Source: SEB no. 307, October–November 2008; own calculations
component loadings describe articulations of public opinion, recognising certain impacts of the EU on living conditions (0.500) and the role of members of the European Parliament (0.463). This structure of loadings clearly shows that the dimension represents a hesitant trust in the abilities and capacities of EU authorities and representatives to defend personal, local or regional interests. When asked who is best positioned to defend their interests at the EU level, respondents, from the entire survey, split their answers between their own national representatives (29 percent), members of the EP (26 percent) and local and regional representatives (26 percent). The differences are relatively small, but scores on the dimension clearly indicate significant differences (see Figure 18).

The scatter diagram in Figure 18 shows the average position of the Institutionalist polities of the EU historical core. It appears that these polities tend not to have strong public opinion on the issues in question. A similar group exists, composed of Austria (AT), Finland (FI) and Sweden (SE). The results also indicate that the polities in the United Kingdom, Spain and...
Ireland are not interested in the CoR’s activities and do not consider the EU level to be an important decision-making and policy-making level, affecting their living conditions. Less-hesitant polities can be found in Slovakia (SK), Cyprus, Czechia and Romania. It seems that these polities, from the new member states, wish to be more informed about the CoR’s activities and also tend to view EU actors as relevant players. Greece (GR) displays the highest score and Denmark (DK) also has a higher-than-average position. On the other hand, more sceptical opinion exists, within the set of new member states, in Hungary (HU) and Poland (PL) as well as in the Baltic polities of Estonia (ES), Latvia (LA) and Lithuania (LI). The scatter diagram in Figure 18 documents a complex pattern which requires further examination, in the postulated explanatory model, in order to distinguish between substantial independent effects and effects, which do not represent similar systematic tendencies, across the set of twenty-seven polities.

5.4.2. Postulated explanatory model

The explanatory model includes two multivariate measures, representing systematic differentiations in the correlated financial characteristics of the sub-national public sector, across the twenty-seven countries. Public sector finances include the revenue and expenditure tendencies of sub-national governments and administrations (see Bennett 1990). Using basic data concerning finances at the sub-national level, in the enlarged EU of twenty-seven member countries (DEXIA 2007), it is possible to specify two dimensions, representing systematic differences across the EU.

Table 12 presents the results of the principal component analysis of a correlation matrix of five indicators. The component represents 68.6 percent of total variation. This component can be called the *decentralised welfare state* dimension. The highest loading (0.929) describes sub-national expenditures as a share of national GDP (2006), representing the importance of the sub-national level, in the countries concerned. The second indicator is the sub-national public sector’s share in public expenditures in 2006 (loading 0.880). The third indicator is the share of sub-national investment in total public investments in 2006 (loading 0.831). The fourth variable describes the total revenue from taxes and social contributions as a portion of GDP in 2005 (loading 0.767). The final indicator is the absorption of EU structural funds (payments and allocations as a %) in 2006. It is clear that all of these high loadings represent traditional aspects of advanced welfare states, with high shares of total revenue from taxes and social contributions and higher shares of sub-national public expenditures (Swank 2002, Asping-Andersen et al. 2002). The advanced, decentralised welfare states: Denmark, Sweden and Belgium exhibit the highest positive scores on this dimension. The lowest scores on this component describe Malta, Cyprus and Greece, along with additional new member states.
Table 13 presents another dimension, summarising correlated aspects of expanding finances in the sub-national public sector from 2000 to 2006. This component can be described as the expanding sub-national public sector and it represents 50.2 percent of total variation. The highest loading (0.908) is associated with average annual growth of sub-national public investment (% in volume) and it indicates the significance of the expanding sub-national public sector. The second indicator is the average annual growth of sub-national public expenditures (% in volume; loading 0.726). The third indicator is the share of personnel expenditures in sub-national expenditures (as a %) in 2006, mean = 33.1% (0.679). The fourth variable is the public budget balance as a percentage of GDP in 2006 (−0.82%) (0.293). The last indicator is public debt as a percentage of GDP in 2006 (−0.781). It is clear that the high positive loadings represent increasing finances for the sub-national public sector. However, the substantial negative loading of the final variable indicates that countries, which expanded their sub-national sector, from 2000 to 2006, were not confronted with high public debt.

Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Estonia have the highest scores on this dimension. It is clear that, from 2000 to 2006, these poorer economies were engaged in a catching-up process. The federal member states of Germany and Austria, along with Italy, Portugal and Malta have the lowest scores on this component.
Now, attention can be turned to the postulated model shown in Figure 19. On the left hand side of the explanatory model, there are two structural variables: the share of knowledge intensive services in total employment, in the countries involved, and GDP per capita (in PPS). The first variable indicates differentiation in the shift of national economies to advanced, post-industrial structures. The other structural variable indicates differences in economic performance, across the set of twenty-seven economies. It is not surprising that the variables are correlated (0.73). Looking at the postulated causal order of the model from an explanatory perspective, it appears that differentiation in scores on the decentralised welfare state measure is determined by the two structural variables at a level of 40 percent. A substantial positive effect (0.67) comes from the variable indicating a shift towards an advanced post-industrial economy. Clearly, this high effect documents the historical connection between Europe’s advanced economies and its advanced welfare states (Swank 2002). The structural measure describing the expansion of sub-national public sector is determined, in the model, at a low level of 13 percent. Thus, it appears that the differentiation of this multivariate measure is largely determined by factors that are not included in the postulated model. The negative effect (−0.29) coming from the GDP variable suggests the above-mentioned, catching-up process, which is taking place in poorer EU economies. The same hypothesis is suggested by the other low negative effect (−0.24), coming from the decentralised welfare state measure. However, the post-materialism measure is determined at a higher level of 64 percent. Two substantial effects help to explain this result. A positive effect (0.50) arises out of the knowledge intensive services variable. Another positive effect (0.31) comes from the decentralised welfare state measure. These two effects document, once again, that expected, systematic connections exist between advanced welfare states and a post-industrial economic structure as well as the shift to post-materialist value orientations (see also chapters 3 and 4).

In this model, determination of the differentiation of opposing opinion regarding a two-speed EU (see also the multivariate analysis in chapter 3) reaches a lower level of 32 percent. There are three interesting effects. First is a positive effect (0.49) coming from the knowledge-intensive service variable, indicating the importance of the shift of national economies towards advanced post-industrial structures. The fact that a similar effect was established in the postulated model in Figure 12 should be noted. These two positive effects suggest that wealthier and economically advanced polities tend to oppose development towards a two-speed EU. Another positive effect (0.38) arises out of the decentralised welfare states measure. The effect of the post-materialism measure is negative (−0.37), Also in accordance with the discussed outcomes of the modelling in Figure 12.

The next variable in the postulated model is the score on the welfare component described in chapter 4 (Table 8). To reiterate, this measure
represents public opinion stressing priorities of future regional and cohesion policies, orientated at maintaining welfare state provisions and national and regional decision-making. This multivariate variable is determined at a level of 45 percent. There is a substantial negative effect (−0.50) coming from the post-materialism measure. This modelling outcome is not surprising, because the simple correlation coefficient is also substantial (−0.65; see Table 9). As stated in chapter 4, this negative effect suggests that the more post-materialist polities of the EU do not tend to support the traditional orientations of regional and cohesion policies, represented by the component. A low negative effect (−0.26) also arises out of the knowledge-intensive service variable, indicating a weak systematic association with lower levels of post-industrial development.

The component score on the hesitant trust in the EU level of authorities and representatives dimension (i.e. the hesitant trust measure) is determined at a level of 43 percent. Three direct effects are substantial, negative and interesting. The regional welfare measure exhibits a high negative effect (−0.73). This effect is significant, because it suggests that public opinion,
supporting the traditional orientations of regional and cohesion policies, does not express higher levels of trust in the EU level of policy-making and decision-making or interest in the activities of the CoR, across the enlarged EU. There is also a substantial negative direct effect (−0.55) arising out of the knowledge-intensive service variable, indicating that, particularly, polities in the post-industrial economies do not feel a need to be more informed about the CoR and do not tend to perceive the EU as an important level of policy-making and decision-making. Finally, the decentralised welfare state measure has a negative effect (−0.41). This negative effect also suggests that the polities in the most advanced member states of the enlarged EU do not tend to see the EU level as a particularly relevant echelon and hesitate to perceive it as a level where key policies or decisions are made.

Table 14 summarises the direct positive and negative effects on the ultimate dependent variable in the postulated model in Figure 19. The hesitant trust measure appears to have a substantial positive effect (0.59). This is an important result of the explanatory modelling. It suggests that the polities inclined to articulate, through their public opinion, a need for more information on the CoR and which exhibit hesitant trust in the EU level, also tend to trust the national level and the regional/local level of public authorities. No contradictory tendencies are evident in these two public opinion tendencies. However, the regional welfare measure does exhibit complex effects. On the one hand, a substantial direct effect (0.57) indicates tendencies, across the twenty-seven polities, to simultaneously support the traditional orientation of regional and cohesion policies and the national and regional/local levels of public authorities. On the other hand, an interesting negative effect (−0.73 × 0.59 = −0.43), mediated through the hesitant trust measure, also indicates a certain tendency to disassociate support for the national level with views favouring traditional orientations of regional and cohesion policies.

Other significant outcomes of the explanatory model include the effects of the post-materialist measure. There is a substantial positive direct effect (0.57), indicating, once again, that this value orientation tends to support the national policy-making level to the detriment of the EU level (see also Chapters 3 and 4). However, a low negative effect (−0.50×0.57 = −0.29), mediated by the regional welfare measure, is also evident. Again, it appears that the more post-materialist EU polities tend to oppose the more traditional orientations of regional and cohesion policy-making, while simultaneously not hesitating to give support to the national level of decision-making. A substantial positive effect (0.50) comes from the knowledge-intensive services variable and indicates a systematic impact of post-industrial economic structures. The remaining mediated effects are quite complex. The effect (0.50×0.57 = 0.29) mediated through the post-materialist measure is positive, while additional low indirect effects of this variable exist in the postulated model that are negative. There is also a negative effect (−0.34) coming from
the opposing opinion on two-speed EU variable. This effect suggests that the polities opposing this option for institutionalised, differentiated integration, do not tend to trust decisions made at the level of national or regional/local authorities. A low positive effect (0.28) from the GDP variable also indicates a weaker tendency among polities in the countries with higher economic performance levels to prefer the policy-making of national actors.

5.5. Conclusions

The results of the statistical modelling carried out in this chapter indicate that the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU exhibit public opinion, which tends not to perceive the CoR as a major player, in the EU arena, in terms of issues surrounding spatial-economic disparities, regional and cohesion policies and associated sectors of policy-making. In light of the debate concerning the ‘denationalisation’ and ‘renationalisation’ of regional and cohesion policy-making, the outcomes of the postulated model seem to suggest the existence of tendencies in public opinion articulations to trust more in the national level of policy-making and to exhibit hesitance to trust the EU policy level. The statistical manipulation of Eurobarometer survey data, presented here, indicates a need for improved promotion and public awareness, concerning future regional and cohesion policies as well as concerning the credibility of the EU level and the role of the CoR in necessary articulations of territorial interests, across the enlarged EU. The formal involvement of the CoR in EU policy-making has apparently not resulted in a more clear perception of the place of the CoR in the EU’s existing system of multi-level governance. In terms of public opinion articulations from across the twenty-seven polities, for instance, the CoR is perceived as remaining marginalised in EU policy processes. It is clear that the set of twenty-seven member states is not a homogeneous group. Regarding certain problems, groups of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Direct effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) knowledge-intensive services in total employment (%) in 2006</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) GDP (in PPS) per capita in 2005</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) decentralised welfare states (PCA score) in 2006</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) expanding decentralised states (PCA score) 2000–2006</td>
<td>−0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) post-materialist value orientation (PCA score) in 2005</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) opinion opposing two speed EU (%) in 2006</td>
<td>−0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) opinion on EU regional policy to welfare (PCA score) in 2008</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) hesitant trust in EU level (PCA score) in 2008</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations
member states share the views of the European Commission, while other member states have clearly opposing positions. Consequently, ultimate collective decisions often deviate in significant ways from the preferred policy options of various, individual member states. The articulations of public opinion analysed in this chapter suggest the inadequate understanding of the sophisticated interplay among the key actors, and the insufficient appreciation of how this interplay changes in the different phases of cohesion policy design and implementation. The fact that the European Commission wanted to create the CoR as an institutional vehicle, which could be used as a body that would provide member states with contacts, at regional and local levels, effectively bypassing the national governments, should be reiterated. However, these results seem, also in this respect, to be ambivalent.
A clear message is conveyed by the complementary analyses made in the chapters of this book. There is insufficient public support, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU, for the deepening and the widening processes. Moreover, there is also insufficient public support for the institutional option of building a multi-speed, or more accurately, a two-speed EU. It seems that the polities do not tend to reflect the risks resulting from such a lack of positive feedbacks on the political elites confronted with difficult tasks to find some constructive ways establishing more coherent balances between the deepening processes, the enlargement process and the differentiated integration processes. Beck and Grande can be cited again with their claim that “the EU can currently be understood as a decentralized, territorially differentiated, transnational negotiation system dominated by elites. … The crucial point is that the potential of the concept of differentiated integration can be fully exploited if it is spelled out completely in both its dimensions, namely differentiation and integration” (2007, pp. 35 and 245). Thus, there is ample room for ambivalence. The general message, conveyed by the complementary statistical examinations of the various Eurobarometer surveys, made in this book, indicates certain antagonistic tendencies, across the twenty-seven polities, in terms of the analysed articulations of public opinion regarding the key processes of European integration.

The initial analysis of differences in articulations of public opinion concerning further deepening and widening, made in chapter 2, documents insufficient support from the polities for the two crucial orientations of the European integration process. Indeed, there is a group of Integrationist polities, from the new and old peripheries of the enlarged EU, which tends to support the simultaneous pursuit of the deepening and widening processes. However, the polities of the most influential member states, Germany and France, along with those of Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg, oppose further enlargements of the EU and tend to merely support an Institutionalist perspective of further deepening. There is also a Europractical group, composed of polities of certain small member states, including the Czech polity, which supports the widening process, but resists the deepening process. It seems that this group tends to perceive the widening process...
primarily in terms of enlargements of the EU common market. Finally, there is a group of Eurosceptic polities, including the most post-materialist polities of Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland. These polities are accompanied by the United Kingdom, Austria and Greece. The polities in this grouping seemingly tend to articulate both the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of Euroscepticism. The ‘hard’ form is particularly stressing that the EU development is basically wrong, because it constraints the functioning of nation-states. This form of Euroscepticism is also claiming that there is not articulated sufficient European identity upon which the EU development can be based. The ‘soft’ form is emphasising that the EU is not effective or democratic and that enlargements increase heterogeneity of the EU. This soft form of Euroscepticism recognises some European identification, but it claims that European identity must be defended. This basic fragmentation of articulated public opinion orientations, concerning the deepening and widening processes, reflects the increased diversity of the enlarged EU of twenty-seven polities. This fragmentation also represents basic types of significant relationships feeding back from the polities to the policy-making of the political elites of the member states involved.

This book combined a systemic approach with the confederal consociational view of the EU, in order to make the general perspective of the complementary analyses more realistic. The analyses made in this book explore cross-national variations. It must be reiterated that this is a crucial and necessary methodological decision (see also Dostál 2010a). The statistical examinations represent an attempt to demonstrate that articulations of public opinion, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU, can be understood, in terms of coherent systematic tendencies. The systemic approach recognises that values and articulations of opinion at the individual level, in each of the polities, can be characterised by central tendencies (national average values), which represent authentic characteristics at the level of the polities in question and which tend to impact other characteristics at the polity level in ways that cannot be reflected at the individual level. In order to examine connections between political systems, political cultures and articulations of public opinion, across a set of polities, it was necessary to aggregate individual-level values to the national level.

Chapter 2’s clarification of the concepts of multi-speed development and differentiated integration and the institutional option of a two-speed EU emphasised the fact that, since the outset of European integration, various aspects of differentiated integration were allowed in the successive treaties and practices of EU policy-making. Significantly, different timeframes, in terms of the introduction of institutions and procedures, among the member states and across regions, implied emerging spatial zones of diffusion at supranational or regional levels. An institutional macro-geography of the European integration process was gradually created with six major zones of differentiated integration. In principle, the differentiated integration process
could be further institutionalised in the form of a two-speed EU, but probably not in the form of a multi-speed EU, which would include some chaotic solutions, such as variable geometry or pick-and-choose strategies. The fact that the institutional option of a two-speed EU might be able to accommodate certain pressing issues of the search for balance between deepening and widening processes, arising from the significantly increased diversity of the EU of twenty-seven member states, should be recognised. However, the multivariate statistical approach, applied in chapter 3, which describes the barrier effects of feedback from the polities, through their articulations of public opinion, toward the governing political elites, also indicates insufficient support for the institutional option of a two-speed EU.

There were also some ambivalent outcomes of the analyses made in chapter 4, concerning differentiation of public opinion on future environmental and regional policies. It appears that perceptions of environmental issues and issues of regional disparity, articulated by citizens in current post-industrial societies, tend to differ from the material-survival concerns of industrial societies. The post-materialist perceptions articulated in public opinion in the post-industrial societies tend to be based less upon the direct experience of material survival, but rather upon abstract cognitive insights. The worldview of polities is changing and reflects a transition in what people want out of life. Moreover, the post-materialist value orientation also tends to be shaped by the impacts of globalisation pressures on populations at local, regional and national levels as well as at the EU level. Such pressures result in new perceptions of the global system, in terms of a ‘world risk society’ (see also Dostál 2010a, pp. 33–35; 2008). It seems that these tendencies are, in part, reflected in public opinion orientations that consider climate change and global warming to be future crucial environmental concerns, perceiving the current EU as a ‘regional risk society’, which needs to develop a political agenda that can be effective, even in the broader context of the global system. In contrast, the perceptions represented by concerns with landscape and disasters seem to be more specific and contextual and, therefore, are more locally and regionally constituted. As a result, public opinion on the orientation of future regional and cohesion policies exhibit a complex pattern that suggests more conservative value orientations and perceptions in the industrial societies in contrast to less-conservative views in post-industrial societies. The dominant conservative opinion tends to be more common in poorer and newer member states, the polities of which are less concerned about globalisation, indicating largely materialist value orientations in their articulations of public opinion.

Chapter 5 considers some aspects of the institutionalisation of the evolving EU regime for regulating unequal spatial development, across the member states and their regions. The results of the analysis indicate that the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU articulate public opinion, which tends not to perceive the Committee of the Regions as a major player, in
the EU arena, in terms of solutions of issues of spatial-economic disparity and regional and cohesion policy-making. In light of the debate between 'denationalisation' and 'renationalisation' in regional and cohesion policy-making, the outcomes of the statistical analysis suggest the existence of tendencies in public opinion articulation, which bestow more trust on the national level of policy-making and are hesitant to trust the EU policy level. There is a need for more and better promotion and public awareness, concerning future regional and cohesion policies as well as the credibility of the EU level and, in particular, the role of the Committee of the Regions in articulations of territorial interests across the enlarged EU. The formal involvement of the Committee of the Regions in the EU policy-making has apparently not resulted in more clear perceptions of the place of the Committee of the Regions in the existing system of EU multi-level governance. In terms of public opinion articulations across the twenty-seven polities, the Committee of the Regions is perceived as remaining marginalised in EU policy processes. The statistical manipulation of the Eurobarometer survey data indicates an ongoing need for improved promotion and public awareness, concerning future regional and cohesion policies as well as the credibility of the EU level and the role of the Committee of the Regions in necessary articulations of territorial interests across the EU of twenty-seven polities. The articulations of the public opinion, analysed in chapter 5, also indicate inadequate understanding of the sophisticated interplay between key actors and insufficient appreciation of how this interplay has changed, during the various phases of cohesion policy design and implementation. To reiterate, the European Commission wanted to create the Committee of the Regions as an institutional vehicle that could be used as a body, which would provide contacts at regional and local levels, in the member states, effectively bypassing the national governments. However, the statistical analysis seems to indicate ambivalent results in this respect as well.

The estimated systematic effects of the post-materialist value orientation on other articulations of public opinion are significant outcomes of the postulated explanatory models. The complementary multivariate statistical analyses carried out in this book confirm that the more post-materialist polities, in the enlarged EU, tend to not support policy-making and decision-making, at the EU level. These polities are more inclined to support the national level. It is clear that necessary public opinion support for European integration processes must develop both in the fifteen old member states and in the twelve new member states of the enlarged EU.

The theoretical considerations and empirical examinations made in this book were based upon a general systemic perspective. The realities of public opinion articulation tendencies, in the current pluralistic and differentiated EU, must be considered at a general methodological level, in terms of feedback processes. Given the central theoretical and empirical considerations of this book, negative feedback processes are, in essence, critical. Opposing
public opinion exercises political pressure on the governing political elites of the member states involved and tends to maintain certain states of political affairs. Consequently, this book explores cross-national variations. This was a crucial and necessary methodological decision. The book demonstrates that articulations of public opinion, across the twenty-seven polities of the enlarged EU, can be understood, in terms of coherent systematic tendencies.

Despite the ambivalent character of some of the empirical outcomes, the systematic analytic efforts concerned with differences in public opinion, regarding European integration processes, rightly focused on two basic questions. First, to what extent is the integrative project of the national political elites, as expressed (i) in the EU treaties and consociative decision-making, (ii) in the processes of differentiated integration and reflected (iii) in the perspectives of a two-speed development, supported by a sense of European political community in public opinion articulations in the old and new EU member states? Second, can emerging differences in public opinion on the perspective of a multi-speed EU be explained, across the set of twenty-seven EU countries, with the help of larger explanatory models? Larger explanatory models of selected conditions enabled the indication of (a) the importance of the inertia of basic mass values in the polities in question, and the assessment of (b) emerging divisions and uncertainties in public opinion regarding the European integration processes.

The final conclusion to be drawn is that, in addition to certain ambivalent results, the explanatory modelling used in the complementary analyses of this book contributed to a specific and systematic understanding of current European integration processes. Speculations about different possible scenarios of future developments of the EU are beyond the analytical scope of this book. The central contention of this book is clear: the EU in its present form remains – despite of some of its supranational and intergovernmental characteristics – a confederal institutional and procedural system with crucial consociative features (see also Dostál 2010a). The complementary analyses of public opinion suggest that the current EU has still to come to terms with the increased diversity resulting from the last enlargements. Significant differences in public opinion indicate that the polities of new member states contribute their own experiences and perspectives on future EU developments. The polities, but in particular political elites, of older and new member states are obliged to clarify their responses to the various perceptions evolving across the current EU. The evolution of the EEC, EC and EU has been based upon endless compromises. Political macro-geography of European integration processes is already in a largely asymmetric way organised at least in a configuration of six interconnected zones and this macro-geography documents the existence of multi-speed Europe. Increasing heterogeneity of the EU brings differentiated integration processes and aspirations and ambitions of some political elites to move ahead in deepening processes and form an avant-garde core of the existing macro-geographi-
cal structure. But, deepening and widening must be pursued in a balanced manner, more or less simultaneously, to ensure that the EU can develop and make deals between twenty-seven or more member states. The political elites of EU member states are responsible for the failures of mobilisation of necessary public opinion support for further EU development. These ambivalent issues and responses are likely to be at the focus of political and academic debates in the coming years.
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Břetislav Balatka, Jan Kalvoda:  
**Vývoj údolí Sázavy v mladším kenozoiku**  
Evolution of the Sázava Valley in the Late Cenozoic

The historically unique and aesthetically beautiful Posázaví landscape in central Bohemia has, from a geomorphological standpoint, been less explored scientifically than the territories, through which the Labe and Vltava Rivers flow. The Sázava River has an unique position among the rivers and streams of the Bohemian Massif, in particular, due to the unique characteristics of the river valley’s development and the accumulated terraces. The diverse geological structure of the drainage basin, regional neo-tectonic events and extensive climatic changes during the young cenozoic comprise the primary reasons for the diversity and dynamics of geo-morphological processes in the area. This monograph presents significant findings of research on the geo-morphological development of the Sázava River Valley, including paleo-geographic correlations between the emersion of the terrace system and the current international stratigraphic classification of the quaternary period.

In Czech, 16 × 23 cm, 200 pp., colour appendix, hardcover, ISBN 978-80-904521-1-4, 1st printing 2010

Miroslav Marada a kol.:  
**Doprava a geografická organizace společnosti v Česku**  
Transport and Geographical Organisation of Society in Czechia

Transport is one of the most dynamic parts of our everyday lives. Perhaps this is the reason that current geographical studies of transport focus most frequently on problems for applied research, e.g. on the degree of transport serviceability for rural areas or the impact of motorways on the development of settlements and regions. Of course, problems of a more general nature exist: the transport hierarchy of settlement centres in terms of various types of transport and their correlation with the complex settlement hierarchy; the development of transport interactions within the settlement system and their impact on changes in the significance of settlement centres; the structure of transport service provision as part of relationships between a settlement centre and its hinterland; etc. Transport geography can also contribute to basic research, to studies concerning the status and development of the geographical organisation of society. This monograph, presenting – at least partially – the topics mentioned, is proof of this potential.

In Czech, 16 × 23 cm, 168 pp., colour appendix, hardcover, ISBN 978-80-904521-2-1, 1st printing 2010
Ivan Bičík a kol.: Vývoj využití ploch v Česku
The Evolution of Land Use in Czechia

Research on the state and development of landscape has experienced extraordinary growth over the last quarter century, growth that is undoubtedly connected with the need to resolve increasingly complex problems concerning interactions between nature and society in territorial units at a variety of scales. Findings document far-reaching changes in land use that have taken place during the market economy period (1845–1948), the totalitarian society period (1948–1990) and the current period of political and economic transformation (1990–2000). The monograph documents the transition from locally organised society to modern society, in which rather large regions with similar landscape structure are formed due to the dominant functions of various regions. This makes it possible to study general trends in using small categories of land parcels, their overall structures and change over time as well as their territorial differences within Czechia’s territory.

In Czech, 16 × 23 cm, colour, hardcover, ISBN 978-80-904521-3-8, 1st printing 2010

Tomáš Hudeček: Dostupnost v Česku v období 1991–2001:
vztah k dojížděcí do zaměstnání a do škol
Accessibility in Czechia During the Period from 1991 to 2001: the Relationship with Commuting to Working and to School

Transport plays an increasingly significant role in our everyday lives. This is particularly true in the shortening of distances, i.e. the development of new means of transport and improvements to the transport infrastructure. The improved accessibility of any place on the earth acts as a foundation for that place’s qualitative growth, development and an increased amount of opportunities to make contact with its surroundings. This monograph contains an analysis of changes in accessibility in Czechia during the period from 1991 to 2001, focusing on use of private automobile transport. The relationship between such change and the number of contacts among significant settlement centres in Czechia is evaluated. In addition, the capital city of Prague and its hinterland receive increased attention. The book also includes a breakdown of the methods for modelling themselves and calculations of accessibility utilising GIS.

In Czech, 16 × 23 cm, 144 pp., colour appendix, hardcover, ISBN 978-80-904521-4-5, 1st printing 2010
This book presents complementary studies of differences in public opinion regarding European integration processes. The May 2004 enlargement brought ten new member countries into the European Union and the macro-geography of identities and associated articulations of public opinion, across the twenty-five polities, changed significantly. The author uses the statistical tools of principal component analysis and standardised multivariate regression analysis (LISREL modelling) to examine differences in public opinion among the twenty-five polities of the enlarged European Union. The analyses of public opinion are based upon postulated explanatory models concerning, in particular, processes of integration, including the deepening, enlargement and two-speed institutional development of the European Union. The book provides a comprehensive reflection concerning public opinion differences that will shape the European Union for years to come.
MULTI-SPEED EUROPEAN UNION: DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PUBLIC OPINION

Petr Dostál

Published by Czech Geographic Society, Albertov 6, 128 43 Praha 2, Czechia with an issue of 350 copies

Editor: Vít Jančák

Cover photography: European Union

Layout, type-setting: Karel Kupka (P3K)

Printed by Ekon, Jihlava

First edition

Praha 2010
This book provides analyses of differences in public opinion regarding European integration processes across the twenty-seven countries of the current European Union. Explanatory statistical modelling used in complementary analyses of the book contributes to specific and systematic understanding of public opinion regarding crucial European integration processes: deepening, enlargement and differentiated integration. The analyses suggest that the European Union has still to come to terms with the increased diversity resulting from the last enlargements. Political macro-geography of public opinion regarding European integration processes documents the existence of multi-speed Europe. The author postulates explanatory models concerning national and European identities and opinion on deepening, enlargement and two-speed institutional development of the European Union. The book provides evidence about various ambivalent issues and public opinion responses which are likely to be at the focus of political and academic debates in the coming years.

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